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THE USE OF ECONOMICS EXPERIMENTS 
TO UNDERSTAND PATENT LICENSING, PATENT CHALLENGING AND 
PATENT LITIGATION BEHAVIOR 
Rita Gaby Abdelnour, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2009 
Adviser: Amalia Yiannaka 
The existing patent literature suggests that the patent breadth is an important 
factor in determining the innovator‟s patent licensing and litigation behavior and that 
licensing a patent to a competitor is driven by profit. The present study develops two 
economics experiment to investigate these assumptions.  
First, a choice experiment is developed to investigate the patentee‟s objective 
when licensing her innovation, by examining whether, when the decision to license is 
made, the patentee maximizes profits or her strategy is to maintain a dominant market 
position by controlling the largest market share. The results show that the assumptions of 
profit maximization and licensing to weak competitors in an effort to leave strong 
competitors out of the market are not always true. Rather the innovator‟s incentives 
concerning patent licensing depend on the market structure and the innovator‟s beliefs 
regarding existing rivals.  
A second interactive experiment is developed to investigate the effects of the 
breadth of patent protection and the cost structure of a potential licensee on an 
innovator‟s decision to license her patent and to litigate under infringement as well as on 
the likelihood of a patent challenge under six different market conditions. The likelihood 
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of licensing occurrence is affected by the patent breadth and the nature of the potential 
entrant under specific market conditions. The likelihood of an innovator making the 
decision to offer a license is found to be greater with broad patents regardless of the type 
of the potential entrant. The likelihood of patent challenge is found to be greater with a 
broad rather than a narrow patent and when no licensing offer is made by either the 
patentee or the potential entrant. Also, a weak rival is more likely to challenge a patent 
than a strong rival. Finally, the likelihood of an innovator invoking an infringement trial 
is greater when she holds a narrow patent, as suggested in the patent litigation literature, 
and when she faces a strong rival. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Science does not know its debt to imagination” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
“Experiments are a powerful method for the discovery of where the theory works” 
Francesco Guala 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Technological change and global competition have made innovation activities a crucial 
means for the survival of companies that strive to compete in the world market and meet 
changing consumer preferences. Designing and developing new products and services 
can be very costly and companies may not undertake research and development (R&D) 
costs if they do not have the means to recoup their investments. Patenting is the strongest 
form of intellectual property protection that grants exclusivity to an innovator over his 
invention for a fixed period of time, enabling him to create a limited monopoly over his 
innovation. By granting exclusive rights as a reward for a new invention, the patent 
system provides the innovator with incentives for R&D and encourages in return the 
disclosure of information. It also encourages the production of improved and alternative 
products as rival companies work to develop workarounds to already existing patented 
inventions.  
Despite the protection it grants to innovators, a patent is not always the optimal 
mechanism to safeguard intellectual property (Mansfield et al. 1981; Yiannaka & Fulton 
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2010), recoup R&D costs and maximize the innovator‟s rents. As Mansfield (1984) 
stated, in some industries 60% of patents are effectively terminated within 4 years which 
is less than the statutory life of 20 years from the filing date, and a large portion of the 
patents are duplicated within five years (Levin et al. 1987). 
Often, a company‟s effort to safeguard its innovations just starts with the granting 
of the patent. Once granted, patents can be directly and indirectly challenged. Statistics 
show that 6% of the patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) are directly 
challenged within nine months of the patent grant (EPO 2001) and that 80% of these 
patents end up being amended (Cyranoski 2004). In the United States, 75% of the patents 
whose validity has been directly challenged end up being amended or revoked (Barton 
2000). A direct validity challenge takes place in the Patent Office and/or the court while 
an indirect validity challenge takes place during an infringement trial. Thus, if a patent is 
infringed, the patentee may file a lawsuit in order to enforce the patent. In response to the 
claim that she has infringed the patent, the accused infringer might challenge the validity 
of the patent and as a result of this challenge the patent might be invalidated, revoked or 
amended. In fact, half of the patents whose validity has been challenged indirectly are 
found to be invalid (Miller and Davis 1990). However, many patents are not enforced by 
litigation. Instead, a patentee may find it optimal to resolve a dispute privately through 
licensing where the patentee allows the use of the patent in exchange of a certain royalty. 
A number of studies has shown patent breadth – the technological territory 
claimed and protected by the patent and determined to a great extent by the innovator 
during the patent granting process – to be an important determinant of patent litigation 
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(see Yiannaka & Fulton 2006 and Yiannaka 2009 for a discussion). In general, the 
broader the patent breadth, the more difficult is market entry by potential competitors 
without infringing the patent but also the higher is the likelihood of patent challenge and 
invalidation (Lentz 1988, Merges and Nelson 1990). The patent breadth decision affects 
the innovator‟s ability to effectively litigate the patent and therefore affects his decision 
to invoke a trial under infringement as well as his decision to license the patent 
(Yiannaka and Fulton 2010, Fulton and Yiannaka 2009). 
In fact, the decisions that characterize the innovator‟s patenting behavior such as 
patenting versus trade secrecy, determining the optimal patent breadth when patenting is 
chosen, licensing the innovation and finally litigating under infringement are all 
interlinked and crucial in determining the level of innovation rents that can be captured. It 
is essential for an innovator to identify the optimal strategies that will enable him to 
protect his invention and maximize his innovation rent.  
In the economics literature, many studies empirically examined some of the above 
mentioned decisions (Mansfield 1986, Levin et al. 1987, Lerner 1995, Cohen et al. 2000, 
Hussinger 2006). The results of these studies are reported in more detail in chapter III. 
However, all these empirical works are based on surveys. Existing data on patent 
granting and patent litigation cannot be used to examine the innovator‟s patenting 
decision making process since only the final outcomes are observed (i.e., whether a 
patent has been licensed or whether litigation has taken place) and not the decision 
making process itself. This study fills this gap in the literature by using economic 
experiments to evaluate different aspects of the innovator‟s patenting behavior.  
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1.2. Objectives of the thesis 
The objective of this study is twofold. First, the study empirically tests the assumption of 
profit maximization behind the licensing decision by allowing innovators to choose 
among profits and a dominant market share. Second, it empirically examines the 
licensing decision making process under different market conditions. Specifically, it 
examines the decision to license an innovation, the decision to challenge a patent, the 
litigation decision under infringement and the interdependence that exists between these 
decisions.  
More specifically, the economic questions addressed in this study are the 
following: 
 Examine whether innovators are more likely to maximize profits or their market 
share when they are making the decision to license their patents. 
 Examine the effect of patent breadth and the cost structure of a potential entrant 
on the innovator‟s patent licensing and litigation behavior. Specifically we 
examine whether innovators are more likely to license and litigate a broad versus 
a narrow patent and/or license and litigate when facing a certain type of 
competitor (i.e., one of similar cost structure to the innovator, a low cost rival and 
a high cost rival).   
 Examine the effect of the patent breadth on the entrant‟s decision to challenge the 
patent and test whether broad patents are more likely to be infringed than narrow 
ones.   
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 The effect of market conditions like the completeness and symmetry of 
information, the nature of the bargaining process (one shot versus multiple 
interactions) that takes place when a licensing fee is determined and the party 
initiating the licensing offer (innovator or entrant) on the patent licensing, patent 
challenging and patent litigation decisions.  
Since only the ex-post decisions regarding licensing are observable rather than the 
decision making process itself, it is not possible to use licensing data that would serve for 
this study. In order to counter this obstacle, economic experiments are designed and 
conducted.  
1.3. Methodology 
Each of the above economic questions will be examined by conducting economics 
experiments with undergraduate students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln as 
subjects. This study contains two separate economics experiments: 
 In order to determine the objective of the patentee‟s licensing decision, an 
individual choice experiment is developed. The experiment contains two distinct 
scenarios with several rounds each. In both scenarios the subject is an innovator 
who has already made the decision to license. He is facing two virtual competitors 
(a weak competitor and a strong competitor) and is asked to make the decision as 
to whom to license. In the first scenario, it is assumed that the rival that was not 
chosen will stay out of the market, while in the second scenario the rival that did 
not receive a license is allowed to enter the market without a licensing contract. 
The experiment is set-up to examine whether, when the decision to license is 
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made, the patentee maximizes profits or her strategy is to maintain a dominant 
market position by controlling the largest market share.  
 In order to examine the influence of the patent breadth, the cost structure and the 
market conditions on the patent licensing, patent challenging and patent litigation 
decisions, an interactive experiment is developed. In this experiment, subjects are 
paired up randomly and anonymously, with one being the innovator and the other 
being the potential entrant. Game trees that approximate various market 
conditions are developed and the subjects are asked to make decisions at each 
node of a given game tree that is presented to them. Each decision is associated 
with a given payoff. These decisions are: (1) sell or buy a license, (2) determine a 
licensing fee, (3) accept or reject the licensing offer, (4) in case the licensing 
option is not chosen or the licensing offer is rejected, the entrant has to make the 
decision between staying out of the market, entering the market by investing in 
R&D or challenging the patent via infringement, and finally (5) in case the patent 
is challenged, the innovator has to make the decision between invoking an 
infringement trial or not. Decisions 1, 2 and 3 can be made by either the innovator 
or the potential entrant depending on the market conditions outlined in the 
specific game. 
The results of these experiments will help in shedding light on the determinants 
affecting the innovator‟s patent licensing and litigation behavior as well as the entrant‟s 
patent challenging behavior and in understanding the decision making process itself. 
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Moreover, they will allow testing empirically the predictions of the theoretical models of 
licensing behavior.    
1.4.  Organization of the thesis 
The remaining chapters in this study are organized as follow: Chapter II presents a brief 
overview on experimental economics: its origin, growth, methodology and validity. 
Chapter III summarizes the existing literature on the strategic use of patent breadth and 
licensing as well as the litigation process. Chapter IV describes the common 
methodology and setting for both experiments, such as the recruitment of subjects and the 
preparation of the sessions. Chapter V outlines the individual experiment developed to 
determine the objective of the licensing decisions. Chapter VI outlines the interactive 
experiment developed to examine the effect of the patent breadth, cost structure of the 
potential entrant and market conditions on the patent licensing, patent challenging and 
patent litigation decisions. Finally, Chapter VII concludes the thesis.      
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CHAPTER II 
BRIEF OVERVIEW ON EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Economics has historically been viewed as a theoretical discipline with no room for 
experimental procedures. The reservation in considering economics as an experimental 
science dates back to the nineteenth century. English political economist John Stuart Mill 
(1836, p.124) raised several obstacles such as the impossibility of controlling key 
economic variables, and of keeping background conditions fixed so as to check the effect 
of manipulating each cause in isolation (Guala 2008). However, the use of experimental 
methods in economics has come a long way since then, especially starting the second half 
of the twentieth century. Guala (2008, p.1) considers that “like many other new 
developments in the social sciences during the second half of the twentieth century, 
experimental economics is largely a by-product of the combination of massive 
investments in science, a fertile intellectual culture and socio-political conditions in the 
1940s and 50s in the United States”.    
Following the steps of mathematical economics, econometrics and game theory 
that started as separate topics and moved gradually to become well established tools in 
economics, experimental economics started its transition from a topic practiced by 
specialists to a tool (Morgan 2003, Samuelson 2005). Nowadays, economists are more 
and more relying on experiments in which subjects‟ behavior determine how much 
money they earn to generate data that will help answering economic questions or testing 
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existing theories (Roth 1993). After all, as Friedman and Sunder (1994, p.1) mention in 
their book, “History suggests that a discipline becomes experimental when innovators 
develop techniques for conducting relevant experiments”. 
2.2.  General definition of experimental economics 
Experimental economics can be defined as the use of experimental methods in a 
controlled environment. Vernon Smith (1994) identified seven reasons that explain why 
economists conduct experiments: (1) test a theory, or discriminate between theories, (2) 
explore the causes of a theory‟s failure, (3) establish empirical regularities as a basis for 
new theory, (4) compare environments, (5) compare institutions, (6) evaluate policy 
proposals, and (7) the laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design. The 
controlled environment provides the advantage of isolating the effect of all variables 
other than the variable of interest, allowing answering directly a specific question using 
cash motivated subjects.  
Many references attribute the origin of experimental economics to Edward 
Chamberlin who examined a market institution under controlled conditions in his 
classroom in 1948. However, the use of experimental methods in economics can be 
traced back to Thurston (1931) who worked on fitting experimentally individuals‟ 
indifference curves, his work being later picked up by Rousseas and Hart (1951). Roth 
(1988) mentions that the origin of experimental economics can even be traced back to 
Bernouilli in 1738 who conducted informal experiments in economics.  
It is a common belief that von Neumann and Morgenstern‟s work, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (1944) had a great influence on the emergence of 
10 
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experimental economics (Roth 1993, Guala 2008). Some of the early experimental works 
between 1930 and 1960 involved expected utility theory (i.e., Allais 1953, Edwards 
1953), effects of market institutions on the convergence toward equilibrium by 
redesigning Chamberlin‟s experiments (Smith 1962) and bargaining behavior (Siegel and 
Fouraker 1960). Starting the 1960s, experimental economics experienced a considerable 
growth and became more and more supported and funded (Hagel and Roth 1995). 
According to Sunder (2006, p. 22), “economics experiments can yield a great deal of 
data, limited only by the interest and imagination of the experimenter and the ingenuity in 
capturing the data without significantly distracting the subjects from their substantive 
task”. They are applied in market, bargaining, decision making, games, auctions, as well 
as being used in classrooms to teach microeconomics theory. 
2.2.1. Source of data 
Since the birth of experimental economics, laboratory experiments have been the major 
source of experimental data. However, more recently, economists started gathering data 
through field experiments, with Peter Bohm being considered the father of field 
experiments (Dufwenberg and Harrison 2008). 
The main differences between lab and field experiment are that field experiments 
take place in the natural environment of the agent being observed versus the artificial 
environment designed for the purpose of the experiment and that the subjects used are 
recruited from the market of interest (Friedman and Sunder 1994, List 2008). Harrison 
and List (2004) differentiated the different sources of gathered data by proposing the 
following classification: (1) conventional lab experiment, (2) artefactual field 
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experiments, (3) framed field experiment, (4) natural field experiment. Therefore, field 
experiments stand somewhere between laboratory experiments and naturally occurring 
field data (List 2008).   
2.2.2. Individual versus interactive experiments 
In both, lab experiments and field experiments, there are two types of experiments that 
can be conducted depending on the nature of the economic question addressed: individual 
choice experiments and interactive choice experiments. The first type does not involve 
any interaction between the subjects participating in the experiments and its objective is 
the study of individuals‟ choices or the decision making processes. On the other hand, 
interactive choice experiments allow for interactions between the subjects (Starmer 
1999). Siegel and Fouraker stress the importance of anonymous interaction between 
subjects in their experiments to avoid the introduction of uncontrolled “social” 
phenomena (Roth 1993). 
2.2.3. Methodological guidelines  
In order to be successful, economics experiments should follow a number of basic golden 
rules which are listed below.  
 Use of real incentives to motivate subjects: Siegel was the first experimenter to 
stress the importance of using real incentives to motivate subjects (Guala 2008). 
 Clear instructions and demonstrations  
 Avoidance of deception 
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 Avoidance of a bankruptcy problem that might generates risk seeking behavior in 
subjects since negative payments are not credible. 
 Avoidance of exposing subjects to the goal of the experiment to avoid 
contamination of the results. 
2.3.  Validity and criticism 
Despite their growing importance, economics experiments are often challenged and 
criticized for their internal and external validity (Friedman and Sunder 2004, Guala 
2005b).  
 Internal validity refers to the inferences made from the experiment about 
individual behavior. This problem can be taken care of with proper experimental 
design and data analysis.    
 External validity refers to the generalization of the inferences to the real world 
and is due to the artificiality of the settings of the experiments. 
In defense against these criticism, Smith (1982) states four “percepts” that will 
ensure the internal validity. The percepts are nonsatiation (subjects prefer more to less), 
saliency (payoff linked to the actions of the subjects), dominance (payoff higher than any 
cost associated with participation in the experiment) and privacy (each participant knows 
only her own payoff). He also states a fifth percept, parallelism, that takes care of the 
external validity by presuming that the result can be transferred to the real world: 
“propositions about the behavior of individuals and the performance of institutions that 
have been tested in laboratory microeconomies apply also to nonlaboratory 
microeconomies where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold” (Smith 1982, p. 936).  
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2.4.  Concluding remarks 
Both, economic theory and experimental economics have limitations: Economic theory 
may be inaccurate, imprecise, uninformative and/or too complicated. On the other hand, 
experiments may be inaccurate, imprecise, uninformative and/or informative only at 
unreasonable cost (Samuelson 2005). In conclusion, both, economic theory and 
experimental economics can be combined to the benefit of each other (Samuelson 2005), 
and as Guala (2005, p. 194) states “experiments are a powerful method for the discovery 
of where the theory works”. 
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CHAPTER III 
BRIEF OVERVIEW ON PATENT BREADTH, PATENT LICENSING AND 
PATENT LITIGATION 
3.1.  Introduction 
Firms tend to protect their innovation profits with different mechanisms such as patents, 
secrecy, lead time advantage and the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing 
capabilities (Cohen et al., 2000). Often, at the firm level, firms tend to use different IP 
protection tools since they have more than one invention (Levin et al., 1987). Some 
studies showed that “firms generally do not prefer to rely on trade secrecy protection 
when patent protection is possible” (Mansfield 1986, p. 180) while others found that a 
patent is most important in protecting product innovations while secrecy is more adequate 
in protecting process inventions (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000). Hussinger (2006) 
analyzed the importance of patents and secrecy in protecting inventions using a sample of 
product innovating firms in German manufacturing in 2000 and concluded that patents 
are used to protect valuable inventions. The remainder of this chapter is going to focus on 
one form of IP protection tool, the patent, in terms of the factors that affect a patentee‟s 
decision to license the patent and litigate it under infringement. along with all the 
subsequent consequences that might derive from it.  
3.2.  The patent: An IP protection tool 
A patent is a form of IP protection tool that grants its holder exclusive rights on 
his innovation for a fixed period of time in return for the disclosure of information 
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concerning the innovation. A patent is generally characterized by it length and breadth 
(scope). The patent length refers to the statutory life of the patent and is predetermined by 
law (20 years) while the patent breadth is defined as the technological territory claimed 
and protected by the patent.  O‟Donoghue et al. (1998) introduced the notion of effective 
patent life which they define as the expected time until a patented product is replaced in 
the market and which is determined by both the patent length and the patent breadth. It is 
the effective patent life that determines the return from innovation to the innovator. 
Patent protection is costly but necessary. It is costly because it creates market 
power and it is necessary because the costs of invention are very high (compared to really 
low when reproduced), and in the absence of protection the innovator might end up not 
benefiting from his innovation (Hopenhayn and Mitchell 2001). For a patent to be 
granted, the innovator should prove the novelty, utility and non-obviousness of the 
invention. However, once granted, a patent does not guarantee the patentee protection for 
the entire patent life. In fact, as mentioned in chapter I, the validity of a patent can be 
challenged directly in the Patent Office or the courts or indirectly during an infringement 
trial and the outcome of the challenge might result in the patent being revoked or its 
scope narrowed.  
3.3. Strategic use of patents 
Patent holders are entitled to some exclusive rights that will help them compete with their 
rivals. These rights are (1) the right to license or not, (2) the right to change licensing 
terms, (3) the right to settle patent litigation and (4) the right to offer package licenses. 
Patents also allow the patentee to increase the competitor‟s costs by using a litigation 
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strategy, threatening of a lawsuit to coerce the acceptance of a licensing contract or a 
package of licenses (Rubinfeld, 2004). 
3.4.  Patent breadth 
The patent can be either broad or narrow. The traditional view has been that the reward to 
the innovator is maximized when a broad patent is claimed (Merges and Nelson 1990, 
Gilbert and Shapiro 1990). However, Yiannaka (2002) developed theoretical models that 
showed that narrow patents may be optimal and preferable to broad ones; the variables 
affecting the patentee‟s breadth decision are the potential competitors‟ R&D 
effectiveness, the legal costs incurred by the patentee and the entrant during an 
infringement trial and during a direct validity challenge, the degree that patent breadth 
affects patent validity, the level of monopoly profits realized by the patentee when entry 
does not occur, the level of duopoly profits realized by the patentee and the entrant when 
entry occurs and the discount rate.  
The existing patent literature suggests that the breadth of a patent is an important 
factor in determining the innovator‟s licensing and litigation behavior. Studies have 
shown that broad patents can encourage technology licensing (Gambardella et al. 2007) 
and can reduce the incentive of the licensee to terminate the licensing contract as well as 
his incentive to compete aggressively with the innovator (Gallini 2002). In addition, 
broad patents are often associated with a higher likelihood of being challenged directly or 
indirectly and the outcome of these challenges is more likely to be unfavorable to the 
patentee, e.g. the patent can be revoked or amended (Lentz 1988, Merges and Nelson 
1990, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). Yiannaka (2009) found that the greater the 
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patent breadth, the lower the entrant‟s incentive to develop a process that doesn‟t infringe 
the patent and the higher his incentive to infringe the patent. 
3.5. Patent licensing 
A license authorizes the licensee to use a patented innovation without the risk of facing 
an infringement trial in return for a royalty fee. Existing studies on licensing establish its 
important impact on the diffusion of technology, the duplication of research and product 
market competition (Rockett 1990, Gallini 1984). Licensing to a competitor is attributed 
to a profit motive or strategic incentive (Hsu and Wang 2004). 
Theoretical studies on licensing suggest that licensing can be used strategically as 
a way of (1) letting a competitor enter the market while taking away its incentive of 
conducting R&D that would make him a fiercer competitor (Gallini 1984), (2) crowding 
the market with weak competitors to keep the strong competitor out (Rockett 1990), (3) 
inducing the entrant to invest in a product quality that maximizes joint profits (Fulton & 
Yiannaka, 2009), (4) avoiding patent litigation by settling (Meurer 1989). In addition, a 
patent holder is more likely to license a technology in the presence of moral hazard than 
under symmetric information (Schmitz 2007). 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
The present study extends the existing patent literature by empirically testing (1) the 
assumption of profit maximization when the decision to license a patent is made  (2) 
examining the effects of patent breadth and the nature of a potential entrant on patent 
licensing, patent challenge and patent litigation behavior under different market 
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conditions using economics experiments. The economics experiments developed along 
with the findings are described in Chapters V and VI. These experiments should be seen 
as a first step towards the empirical study of the patent licensing, patent challenge and 
patent litigation decision making process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMMON SETTINGS FOR BOTH EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter discusses the procedure that is common in conducting the two experiments. 
It includes the choice and recruitment of the subjects, the organization of the sessions, the 
payment of the subjects and finally the data storage.  
4.1.  Pre-session 
4.1.1. Choosing the subjects 
The subjects used in this experiment are undergraduate students at the University of 
Lincoln-Nebraska pursuing different majors at the College of Agricultural Sciences and 
Natural Resources (CASNR), the College of Business Administration (CBA) and the 
College of Engineering. For the first experiment, we recruited students from CASNR and 
CBA only while in the second experiment we extended the recruitment to include all 
undergraduate students registered in the summer session at UNL.  
The use of undergraduate students as subjects is common and popular in 
experimental economics (Chamberlin, 1948; Frykblom and Shogren, 2000; Smith, 1965). 
It is mainly due to the “ready access to the subject pool, convenience in recruiting on 
university campuses, low opportunity cost of student subjects, relatively steep learning 
curve and some lack of exposure to confounding external information” (Friedman and 
Sunder, 1994, p. 39); thus, their classification as “convenience sample”. The 
appropriateness of the use of such a “convenience sample” in laboratory economics 
experiments is an issue that has received a lot of attention in the literature. While some 
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studies claimed a greater homogeneity among subject samples (Calder et al. 1981) and 
advised caution in the use of students in experimental economics (Peterson 2001), other 
empirical studies found similar behavior between student and non-student subjects in 
contingent valuation and willingness to pay experiments (Dyer et al. 1980; Maguire et al. 
2003; Smith and Mansfield 1998; and Taylor 1998).  
Particularly, Dyer et al. (1980) compared the behavior of business experts and 
„naïve‟ student subjects in a common value offer auction experiment and found that the 
winner‟s curse phenomenon extended to both types of subjects: students and business 
executives; in other words, the experts made the same errors as the „naïve‟ students and 
the results collected were similar across the subjects‟ population. Moreover, in a bilateral 
bargaining experiment, Siegel and Harnett (1964) compared the bargaining behavior of 
students and experienced General Electric salesmen and found them to be similar and to 
conform to the theory. In addition, Harrison and Lesley (1996) replicated a survey 
performed by Carson et al. in 1992 to assess the damages created by the Exxon Valdez
1
 
oil spill using college students in South and North Carolina and found similar results by 
allowing for a re-weighting of the responses from the students‟ population at a fraction of 
the costs ($2,500 in the Harrison and Lesley‟s survey compared to $3,000,000 in the 
Carson et al.‟s survey according to Passell (1993, p.200)). They concluded that the 
responses from convenience samples and from the population are similar, conditional on 
demographic characteristics. Other studies showed that professionals tend to ignore the 
instructions of the experiments and play the game the way they are used to (Anderson 
                                                 
1
 The Exxon Valdez spilled an estimated 10.8 million gallons of oil in Alaska in March 24, 1989 causing 
one of the largest ecological disasters. 
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and Sunder 1995).  In the words of Lusk and Shogren “a theory is a generalization that 
should hold for everyone, including students” (Lusk and Shogren 2007, p.46) 
It would be interesting to replicate our experiments, at a later stage, using 
innovators instead of undergraduate students and compare the results from the two 
groups.  
4.1.2. Recruitment 
Undergraduate students from CASNR, CBA and for the second experiment from all the 
colleges at UNL were recruited via an email announcement sent directly to their email 
accounts. The announcements which are presented in Appendices A1 and B1 for 
experiments one and two, respectively, are based on an announcement example given by 
Davis and Holt (1992). 
4.2.  Session 
Upon arrival, the subjects checked in at the entrance of the lab. Each participant was then 
given an identification number (ID) that he/she would keep for the entire duration of the 
session. The passwords were created with the first two letters referring to the major to be 
able to study the effect of the major on the decisions made, if any. Both experiments were 
computerized. The subjects had online access to the computerized experiments once they 
logged in using their identification number. They were able to make their decision for 
each round with a mouse click. The subjects‟ decisions made during the first experiment 
were kept confidential and unknown to other subjects, while the decisions made during 
the second experiment were known to the player they are matched up against.   
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 Once all participants checked in, the consent form (see Appendices A2 and B2 for 
the first experiment and the second experiment, respectively) was read aloud and the 
participants were asked to sign it and hand it to the assistant. The participants were asked 
to read the instruction sheet which was also read aloud and the participants were allowed 
to ask for any clarification before the session started.  
Both experiments included more than one scenario and a number of rounds within 
each scenario. In order to examine whether the results were influenced by the order in 
which subjects received information, the participants were divided randomly into two 
groups; one where the information in the different scenarios and rounds is presented in 
the sequence shown in Appendices A3 and B3 for experiments one and two, respectively, 
(control group) and one where both the scenarios and the rounds within a scenario are 
randomized. 
4.3.  Post-session: 
4.3.1. Payment: 
When a participant completed the test, he/she came to a private corner in the room where 
the experiment was conducted and returned the assigned password and any documents 
containing instructions (for the second experiment). He/she was then handed the 
participation fee of $15 in cash for the first experiment, and $10 in cash for the second 
experiment plus any additional earnings from playing the game. The participants in the 
second experiment could earn up to an additional $20 depending on the decisions they 
made during the experiment. Each participant was asked to write his/her NU ID, the 
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amount of money he/she earned and his/her signature on the receipt forms for records and 
grant reimbursements.   
4.3.2. Storing the data:  
At the end of a session, the participants‟ lists, assistants‟ names, earnings/participation 
fees, and receipt forms were stored in a folder. Since the experiment was performed in 
several sessions, the observations were pooled. Access to the data was limited to the 
authors of the study.  
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CHAPTER V 
TESTING PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AS A DRIVER BEHIND THE 
INNOVATOR’S PATENT LICENSING DECISION 
5.1.  Introduction 
This first experiment attempts to shed light on the objective behind the patentee‟s 
licensing decision by examining whether, when the decision to license is made, the 
patentee maximizes profits or her strategy is to maintain a dominant market position by 
controlling the largest market share. The existing literature regarding innovation, 
patenting and licensing assumes a profit maximizing innovator. A few studies on patent 
licensing (Gallini 1984, Rockett 1990) suggest that licensing can be used as a tool to 
choose the competition in the market by enabling the patentee to choose the competitors 
that would least threaten her market position and thus, her profits. For instance, Gallini 
(1984) shows how licensing can reduce the incentive of a potential entrant to develop a 
better technology and become a fiercer competitor while Rockett (1990) shows that the 
patentee can crowd the market with weak competitors leaving strong competitors out. 
However, other objectives might drive the innovator‟s licensing decisions such as 
sales/market share maximization. It would be interesting to examine whether, when it 
comes to licensing, a patentee would find it optimal to sacrifice profits to maintain her 
dominant market share position. To answer this question, we develop a choice 
experiment where we consider a market in which an incumbent innovator has already 
developed a new product, patented it and has decided to license it. The innovator could 
license its product to two types of potential competitors: a weak competitor and a strong 
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competitor. For simplicity, the innovator is going to face only two firms, one of each 
type, while the type of a competitor is defined by its cost structure. The strong 
competitor, firm Es, is assumed to have lower production costs than the incumbent 
patentee, I, while the weak competitor, firm Ew, is assumed to have higher production 
costs than both the incumbent firm I and the strong potential competitor, Es. Typically in 
a setting like this, if the innovator was maximizing profits, once the innovation was 
licensed, the innovator and the entrant would be competing in the market producing a 
homogenous product. If the innovator licensed the product before starting production a 
Cournot duopoly game could determine the market price, quantity and the market share 
of each firm while if the innovator licensed the product after she introduced it to the 
market, the market price, quantity and the market share of each firm could be determined 
through a Stackelberg type game.  
In this experiment we assume that when the incumbent licenses to the strong 
competitor she captures a smaller market share than when she licenses to the weak 
competitor but her total profit (including the royalty payments) are greater when she 
licenses to the strong rather than to the weak competitor. This would be consistent with a 
situation where the royalty fee is the same for both potential entrants and it is output 
based (in a Cournot setting the low cost firm will produce a larger quantity and pay a 
larger royalty fee than the high cost firm) and/or when a higher royalty fee is charged to 
the strong competitor who has more to lose by staying out of the market and might thus 
be willing to pay more to enter the market. Therefore, we set up the market so that there 
is a tradeoff between profits and market share when licensing to the weak versus the 
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strong competitor that the patentee should take into account when she makes her 
licensing decision.   
The experiment consists of two scenarios each divided into several rounds. In 
each scenario and round all subjects are considered as innovators and each of them faces 
two virtual types of potential entrants: weak and strong. The choice of virtual competitors 
allows us to focus on examining the behavior of the incumbent rather than both the 
incumbent and the entrant. In a future stage, the interaction between both parties could be 
examined following a different experimental design. The subjects are asked to choose 
between these two firms based on information given to them at the beginning of each 
scenario and round. All subjects in the same round are given the same information and 
payoff matrices. The following assumptions are held constant during the two scenarios 
and different rounds: 
1. All subjects are assumed to have the same product.  
2. The firm chosen by the subject will accept the licensing contract.  
The assumption that the innovator always makes an offer that is profitable to both 
parties is made to keep the analysis simple and the focus on the innovator‟s objective 
function
2
.  
What varies under the two scenarios is the number of firms allowed to enter the 
industry; one firm only or both firms. The two scenarios are described as follows. 
                                                 
2
 If we were to allow the possibility that the proposed licensing contract were rejected, we would have 
several additional ramifications that would be easier to examine in future experiments in which we will 
allow interaction between the innovator and the entrants. Having real subjects as entrants will be then a 
necessary condition and both parties will make decisions subject to their respective objective function. 
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 Scenario 1: the subjects have to make the decision of licensing exclusively to either 
one of these firms knowing that the firm that does not receive a license stays out of 
the market (there is no infringement). 
 Scenario 2: the subjects have to make the decision of licensing exclusively to either 
one of these firms knowing that the firm that does not receive a license might still 
enter the market by developing its own product.   
5.2. Scenario 1 
The assumptions made are the following: (1) Same product for all innovators, (2) the firm 
chosen by the innovator will accept the licensing contract: “take it as is” contract, (3) the 
licensee will enter the market crowding it so that there will be no possibility of entry by 
the firm that does not receive the license after the licensing contract has been signed.  
The notation of the variables of interest is given below. 
- s
I
: Innovator‟s production profits when the strong competitor is in the market 
- w
I
: Innovator‟s production profits when the weak competitor is in the market 
- s
I
: Royalty fee paid by the strong competitor (function of the quantity produced) 
- w
I
: Royalty fee paid by the weak competitor (function of the quantity produced)  
- s
IS : Innovator‟s market share when the strong competitor is in the market 
- w
IS : Innovator‟s market share when the weak competitor is in the market 
In this scenario, the subjects face the problem to whom to license given the 
following information regarding the payoff matrix: 
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- w
I
s
I SS : The innovator‟s market share is higher when she licenses to the weak 
competitor compared to when she licenses to the strong competitor due to her cost 
structure advantage over the weak competitor. 
- w
I
s
I
: When the innovator licenses to the weak competitor she produces more 
and therefore her production profit is higher. 
- w
I
s
I
: The royalty fee is assumed to be a function of the quantity produced. By 
producing more, the strong firm will be paying a higher royalty fee than its weak 
rival. 
Setting up the total profits (i.e., production profits and royalty fee) for the subjects 
from licensing to each type of firm will allow us to capture their decision between a 
strong or a weak competitor, and hence to determine their objective when they make their 
licensing decision. The following cases will be examined.  
Case I. w
I
w
I
s
I
s
I
.  
By setting the total profits from licensing to the strong and the weak competitor equal to 
each other we make licensing to the weak firm more appealing to the innovator since she 
will be getting exactly the same profit as if she had licensed to the strong firm while 
maintaining her dominant market share position. Setting total profits equal to each other 
won‟t allow us to capture the decision of interest but we can test whether the subjects 
understand the task and make the anticipated decision.  
Case II. w
I
w
I
s
I
s
I
.   
Setting the total profits from licensing to the strong firm lower than the total profits from 
licensing to the weak firm won‟t allow us to capture the decision of interest since the 
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innovator will more likely license to the weak firm since she will be getting a higher 
profit in addition to maintaining her leadership position when it comes to market share. 
However, as under the first case, we can test whether the subjects will make the 
anticipated decision.  
Case III. w
I
w
I
s
I
s
I
.  
Setting the total profits from licensing to the strong firm greater than those from licensing 
to the weak firm will allow us to capture the tradeoff between profits and market share. If 
the innovator picks the weak firm to be the licensee despite the fact that she will be 
earning lower profits than if she had licensed to the strong firm then we can infer that the 
innovator places greater importance into having the largest market share. 
5.2.1. Design of scenario 1 
The first scenario includes the three cases described above and has 18 rounds in total. The 
scenario 1 narrative and round information given to the subjects for this experiment is 
presented in Appendix A3. 
The following information should be given to the subjects in order to allow them 
to make the decision between strong versus weak competitor: 
- Total profit from licensing to each type of potential entrant. 
- Market share from licensing to each type of potential entrant. 
Under cases I and II where the total profits from licensing to the weak competitor 
are, respectively, equal to and greater than the total profits from licensing to the strong 
competitor in addition to a general description of the market conditions the subjects are 
given numerical examples that will allow us to examine whether their decisions are 
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affected when actual values are attached to the variables of interest. Specifically, in the 
first round under both cases I and II subjects are given a general description of the market 
conditions while in the second round subjects are given numerical values where the 
innovator‟s market share is given as a percentage of the total market share and her total 
profits in millions of dollars. A third round is included under case II where the 
innovator‟s market share and total profits when she licenses to the weak competitor are 
given as a function of her market share and total profits when she licenses to the strong 
competitor to examine whether absolute market share and profit values have an effect on 
the decision making process.  
In case III where the total profits from licensing to the strong competitor are 
higher than the total profits from licensing to the weak competitor we will be able to 
capture the tradeoff between profits and market share when the subjects make their 
licensing decision. Since this is the case of interest, this case has several rounds where a 
sensitivity analysis is also performed. Specifically, the analysis consists of first giving the 
subjects values for their market share and total profits from licensing to each type of firm 
and then performing a series of changes first in the market share and then in the total 
profits. Changing the values sequentially allows us to test the sensitivity of the subjects‟ 
decision to different proportions of market share and total profits. It also helps us 
determine what drives the change in a decision, if a change occurs.  
5.3. Scenario 2 
In this scenario, the innovator still provides exclusive licensing to one firm but the 
assumption that the firm that does not receive a license stays out of the market is relaxed. 
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Thus, under this scenario the competitor that does not receive the license may be able to 
enter the market, in which case the proportion of the innovator‟s market share and total 
profits will be affected. When making her licensing‟s decision, the innovator will know 
the likelihood of entry by the rival that does not receive a license which she should take 
into consideration when making her licensing decision. The weak rival is assumed to 
enter the market with a close substitute if he is not given the license but is nevertheless 
successful in generating a non-infringing product, while the strong rival is assumed to 
enter the market with a better product if he is not given the license but he has 
nevertheless succeeded in generating a non-infringing product. 
 Market entry by the competitor that does not receive the license might lead to 
different outcomes regarding market shares and total profits. However, in this scenario, 
we are only interested in the cases where an initial outcome presented to the subjects may 
be reversed with a given probability. Specifically, under this scenario, the initial outcome 
will always refer to a market outcome where licensing to the weak rival leads to greater 
market share while licensing to the strong rival leads to great profits for the innovator (as 
under case III in scenario 1). The subjects will need to make their decisions knowing that 
there is likelihood that the outcome of this decision may be reversed. For instance, when 
licensing to the weak competitor there will be a probability that the strong competitor will 
enter the market, in which case the innovator will lose her leadership position and 
similarly when licensing to the strong competitor there will be a probability that the weak 
competitor will enter the market, in which case the innovator will lose her profit 
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advantage. Under this scenario, we want to examine whether the likelihood of this 
reversal in the initial market outcome affects the innovator‟s licensing decision.      
5.3.1. Design of scenario 2 
The second scenario has 11 rounds in total and includes the two cases described above in 
which the subjects face a probability of having the final outcome from scenario 1 
reversed: likelihood of losing the leadership in market share when licensing to the weak 
rival and likelihood of losing the higher profit when licensing to the strong rival. In each 
round, a different probability of entry of the non-licensed rival is assigned. This will 
allow us to test at which probability the subject is more likely to change (if a change 
occurs) his/her decision as to whom he/she is going to license and hence his/her objective 
function.  
 The first four rounds in the second scenario are composed of two parts each. The 
first part introduces the subjects to a round similar to the ones they saw in scenario 1 and 
requires them to make the same type of decision as in the previous scenario: licensing to 
the weak rival or licensing to the strong rival. Depending on the subject‟s choice in this 
part he/she will be directed automatically to the appropriate second part where the 
probability of entry of the second rival without a licensing contract is introduced along 
with the outcomes of the entry: the new market share and actual total profits. The subjects 
will have to decide then whether they want to keep their previous decision and still 
license to the chosen rival in part 1 or change it and license to the second rival. The 
expected total profits are not given to avoid confusion when comparing the new outcome 
with the ones given in the first part of the round. The first part of all four rounds is kept 
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the same. The only difference between these four rounds is the probability of entry 
introduced in the second part. The probability will increase from one round to the next by 
the increment of 20%, going from 20% to 80%. 
The last 7 rounds in scenario 2 are also composed of two parts each. However, in 
these rounds, the subjects are asked to make one single decision versus the two decisions 
they had to make in the first four rounds of scenario 2. The first part of these rounds is the 
same as the first part in the previous rounds. However, now, the subjects have complete 
information of the situation before they make their decision. In other words, they are 
given the probability of entry of both rivals without a license contract along with the 
outcomes of the entry and then they are asked to make their decision to whom they want 
to license. In addition, the last three rounds assume a fixed probability of entry without a 
licensing contract for the weak rival (20%) while the probability of entry without a 
licensing contract for the strong rival is allowed to vary (40%, 60% and 80%) since the 
strong rival has a higher probability of entering the market without a licensing contract 
and without infringing the patent due to its low cost structure (higher R&D). The purpose 
of the last 7 rounds is to examine whether the subjects‟ choice is affected by the way they 
receive information, i.e., information is given sequentially as decisions are made (first 4 
rounds) versus information is given ex ante, before decisions are made (last 7 rounds). 
5.4. Results and discussion 
Sixty undergraduate students participated in the choice experiment. They were recruited 
from the College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources (CASNR) and the 
College of Business Administration at UNL and were paid $15 each in cash for their 
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participation. They were divided into two groups, a control group and a treatment group. 
In the control group, 20 participants took the experiment in the order that the rounds 
appear in Appendix A3; while in the treatment group, 40 participants took a randomized 
version of the experiment where both, the rounds within each scenario and the order of 
scenarios were randomized (some subjects saw the rounds of scenario 1 before the rounds 
of scenario 2 while others saw the inverse). The purpose of the randomization is to 
examine whether the results are influenced by the order in which subjects receive 
information. From the 40 students that took the randomized version of the experiment, 18 
subjects started with scenario 1 and 22 subjects started with scenario 2. The approximate 
average duration of the experiment was 16 minutes for the control version and 15 minutes 
for the randomized version.  
5.4.1. Results and discussion of scenario 1 
5.4.1.1. Data and data edits 
The first scenario has 18 rounds and 180 observations in total. The first 5 rounds 
correspond to cases I and II described previously where the optimal choice would be 
licensing to the weak rival. These 5 rounds won‟t allow us to capture the decision of 
interest but will allow us to test the results obtained from subjects who may make 
“irrational” decisions and examine whether the subjects understand the experiment and 
make the „anticipated‟ decision, i.e., choosing more rather than less, thus, satisfying the 
nonsatiation percept as described by Smith (1982). In other words, these first 5 rounds 
enable us to monitor the subjects and are not included in the analysis. For the sake of 
exposition, the rounds are divided into groups as shown in Table 1 below, for a total of 7 
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groups. The rounds of interest corresponding to case III, rounds 6 to 18, are grouped in 
triplets with the exception of round 6. The reason these rounds are grouped by 3 is that 
the parameters (market share and total profit when licensing to the weak rival and market 
share and total profit when licensing to the strong rival) are kept constant within the 3 
rounds in a group except for one parameter that is allowed to vary in order to examine 
how a decision may change when the market situation changes. Specifically:  
- In rounds 7 to 9 the parameters are expressed in dollar values and the total profit 
when licensing to the strong rival is allowed to vary while everything else is held 
constant.  
- In rounds 10 to 12, the parameters are expressed in dollar values and the market 
share when licensing to the weak rival is allowed to vary while everything else is 
held constant. 
- In rounds 13 to 15, the parameters are expressed in nominal format and the total 
profit when licensing to the strong rival is allowed to vary while everything else is 
held constant (similar to rounds 7 to 9).  
- In rounds 16 to 18, the parameters are expressed in nominal format and the 
market share when licensing to the weak rival is allowed to vary while everything 
else is held constant (similar to rounds 10 to 12). 
Table 1: Division of the 18 rounds 
Case I Group A Rounds 1 & 2 
Case II Group B Rounds 3 to 5 
Case III Group C Round 6 
Group D Rounds 7 to 9 
Group E Rounds 10 to 12 
Group F Rounds 13 to 15 
Group G Rounds 16 to 18 
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The subjects‟ decisions are summarized in contingency tables for the first three 
groups and in tables for the remaining (Tables 2 to 6 in Appendix C). 
The design of the experiment had some subjects taking the questions in sequential 
order (i.e. questions 1 through 18 were asked in order) while other subjects were 
randomly given the questions. Therefore a variable named order was added to the data set 
were “Fixed” meant that the questions were given in a sequential order while “Random” 
meant the questions were given randomly.  
As earlier described, the first scenario consists of a set of questions having either 
a nominal or numerical categorization on which the subject had to base the licensing 
decision. The nominal categorization is the set of questions where the decisions of 
licensing are based on information on market share and profit that are classified as greater 
than, less than or equal to without specification of exact values. The numerical 
categorization is the set of question where exact values for market share (in percentages) 
and profit (in million dollars) are provided to the subjects. Therefore, the data is split into 
two sections to examine the consistency of the licensing decision based on general 
information or exact numerical information. The nominal data was gathered from 
questions 1, 3, 5, 6 and 13 through 18 while the remaining questions are part of the 
numerical data. 
Within the nominal data, four variables names Market Share Weak (MSW), 
Market Share Strong (MSS), Profit Weak (PW) and Profit Strong (PS) are created. 
Market share and profit for each type of competitor is then assigned a value of Greater 
(G), Less (L) or E (equal). For example, question 1 has market share from licensing to the 
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weak competitor greater than the one from licensing to the strong competitor with equal 
amounts of profits. This translates into MSW=G, MSS=L, PW=E and PL=E. The same 
methodology is applied to the remaining questions of the nominal data. Because knowing 
the market share or profit from licensing to one of the competitors automatically gives us 
information about the market share or profit from licensing to the other competitor (i.e. 
MSW=G means MSS=L, PW=E means PS=E, PW=L means PS=G and MSW=L means 
MSS=G), observations having same market share structure with difference in profits are 
grouped into one group while observations having same profit structure but different 
market shares are grouped into another group. The nominal data we are interested in 
analyzing are Groups F and G. For questions in Group F, the variants were in the profits 
from licensing to the strong competitor where the values are defined as a multiple of the 
same unknown value. Therefore the variable PS can have three different values each of 
which is greater than PW. Hence, the three different values are redefined as G1, G2 and 
G3 where G1 meant that PS is 1.25 times greater than PW, G2 is 1.5 times greater than 
PW and G3 is 2 times greater than PW. A similar approach is adopted for market share in 
Group G. 
As for the numerical data we are interested in analyzing (Groups D and E), the 
same four variables described earlier (MSWN, MSSN, PWN and PSN where N stands for 
“numerical values”) are created and the numerical information of each is attributed 
according to the question asked. 
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5.4.1.2.Statistical analysis 
For both nominal and numerical data types, the analysis was performed by group of 
questions. The GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.2 © was used to run a generalized linear 
mixed model with the licensing decision a binary response (0=license to the weak rival, 
1=license to the strong rival). In each group, the variant variable was included as a 
classification variable along with the subject and the order in which the questions were 
presented.  The variant variable and the order were considered as fixed effects and 
interactions between the two factors were investigated. Because the same subject 
answered each set of questions in each group, a correlation between the random errors 
was assumed and First Order Autoregressive (AR1) is considered. The logit link function 
was used along with the binary distribution.  
     (1) 
or  
        (2) 
Where (x) is the probability of observing a value of 1 at a particular value of x.  
All results are reported at the 0.05 rejection level.   
5.4.1.3. Results 
 Groups A and B: 
The data shows that in Group A, 18 subjects out of the 20 subjects in the control group 
made the anticipated decision of licensing to the weak rival while 2 subjects did not 
follow the expected behavior that assumes that individuals usually prefer more to less, in 
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this case, having both a dominant market share and high profits (Table 2a in Appendix 
C). We obtained the same results in the treatment group where 38 out of the 40 subjects 
chose the optimal strategy (licensing to the weak rival) while 2 subjects deviated from the 
expected behavior (Table 2b in Appendix C). However, in Group B, all subjects made the 
anticipated decision and licensed to the weak rival, maximizing both their market share 
and their profits (Table 3 in Appendix C).  
 Group C: 
The data in Group C shows that only 4 subjects in the control group and 17 subjects in 
the treatment group chose to maximize their market share (Table 4 in Appendix C); 
however, when looking at the data in Groups D to G (Table 5 in Appendix C), we notice 
that a larger number chose the market share as incentive for licensing, which indicates 
that the provided values had a significant effect on the decisions. 
 Group D: 
In this group, the total profit when licensing to the strong rival is allowed to vary while 
everything else is held constant. Therefore, only the variables “PSN”, “Order” and the 
interaction “PSN*Order” are used to estimate the model. The results show no significant 
interaction between the “Order” variable and “PSN” (p-value-0.4433). Therefore the 
interaction term is dropped from the model. A second model, estimated using only the 
two variables, shows that the order of information given to the subjects has no significant 
effect on the decision in question (p-value=0.1215).  
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The reduced model including only the variable that was found to be significant is 
used then to provide Least Squares Means estimates of the effects of the variables on the 
licensing decision (Table 7a in Appendix C). The estimated model is the following: 
     (3) 
Where  
The fit of the model was deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 1 which is the recommended value for the generalized 
linear models. 
The analysis shows that as the profits from licensing to the strong rival increases, 
the likelihood of licensing to the strong rival decreases, which contradicts both the 
literature‟s assumptions of profit maximizing innovators and subjects preferring more to 
less. The estimated probabilities of licensing to the weak rival are 18.33%, 41.67% and 
58.33% when the profits from licensing to the strong competitor are $592 million, $750 
million and $928 million respectively (Table 7 in Appendix C). The estimated odds of 
licensing to a weak rival are: 
- 3.18 times greater when the total profit from licensing to the strong rival is $750 
million than when it is $592 million; 
- 6.25 times greater when the total profit from licensing to the strong rival is $928 
million than when it is $592 million; 
- 1.96 times greater when the total profit from licensing to the strong rival is $928 
million than when it is $750 million. 
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When looking at the collected data of rounds 7 to 9 provided in Table 5 in 
Appendix C, we notice that a large proportion of subjects made unexpected switches in 
their decisions in these three rounds (9 out of 20 subjects in the control group and 16 out 
of 40 subjects in the treatment group). These unexpected switches can be attributed to the 
individuals‟ inability to keep track of the values we gave them, even though we would 
expect them to have a better ability to keep track of the values in the fixed version of the 
experiment. This shows that some subjects optimized their objective while others did not 
or were not consistent: 11 subjects in the control group and 24 subjects in the treatment 
group stuck with their choices regardless of the changes in the market share and total 
profits. 
 Group E: 
In this group, the market share when licensing to the weak rival is allowed to vary while 
everything else is held constant. Therefore, only the variables “MSWN”, “Order” and the 
interaction “MSWN*Order” are used to estimate a model. The results show no significant 
interaction between the “Order” variable and “MSWN” (p-value-0.0884) and no 
significant effect of the order of information given (p-value=0.4418). 
The reduced model including only the variable that was found to be significant is 
used then to provide Least Squares Means estimates of the effects of the variables on the 
licensing decision (Table 7 in Appendix C). The estimated model is the following: 
    (4) 
Where  
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The fit of the model was deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 1.02 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
The results show a positive relationship between market share and licensing to the 
weak rival. In other words, as the market share from licensing to the weak rival increases, 
the likelihood of licensing to the weak rival increases. The estimated probabilities of 
licensing to the weak rival are 28.33%, 40% and 53.33% when the market share from 
licensing to the weak rival are 60%, 75% and 90% respectively (the estimates 
corresponding to a market share of 75% and 90% were not statistically significant). The 
estimated odds of licensing to a weak rival are: 
- 1.69 times greater when the market share from licensing to the weak rival is 75% 
than when it is 60%; 
- 2.89 times greater when the market share from licensing to the weak rival is 90% 
than when it is 60%; 
- 1.72 times greater when the market share from licensing to the weak rival is 90% 
than when it is 75%. 
The collected data for this group shows that the subjects were more consistent in 
their choices and few unexpected switches were made (3 in total out of the 60 subjects). 
 Group F: 
In this group, the parameters are expressed in nominal format and the total profit when 
licensing to the strong rival is allowed to vary while everything else is held constant. 
Therefore, only the variables “PS”, “Order” and the interaction “PS*Order” are used to 
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estimate a model. The results show no significant interaction between the “Order” 
variable and “PS” (p-value-0.7547) and no significant effect of the order of information 
given (p-value=0.9511). 
The reduced model including only the variable that was found to be significant is 
used then to provide Least Squares Means estimates of the effects of the variables on the 
licensing decision (Table 7c in Appendix C). The estimated model is the following: 
    (5) 
Where  
The fit of the model was deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 1 which is the recommended value for the generalized 
linear models. 
Despite the fact that this group is similar to Group D, the only difference being 
the values are given in a nominal format, the obtained results are completely the opposite. 
In this group, a positive relationship between the total profits and the decision of 
licensing to the strong rival is estimated: as the total profits from licensing to the strong 
rival increases, the likelihood of licensing to the strong rival increases. The estimated 
probabilities of licensing to the strong rival are 56.67%, 66.67% and 91.67% when the 
total profits from licensing to the strong rival are 1.25, 1.5 and 2 times greater than the 
total profits from licensing to the weak rival, respectively. There is no significant 
difference between the first two levels of profits increase (1.25 and 1.5) on the licensing 
decision while significant differences between the first and third levels (1.25 and 2) and 
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the second and third levels (1.5 and 2) are found. The estimated odds of licensing to a 
strong rival are: 
- 8.4 times greater when the total profits from licensing to the strong rival are twice 
the total profits from licensing to the weak rival than when the total profits from 
licensing to the strong rival are 1.25 times greater than the total profits from 
licensing to the weak rival; 
- 5.49 times greater when the total profits from licensing to the strong rival are 
twice the total profits from licensing to the weak rival than when the total profits 
from licensing to the strong rival are 1.5 times greater than the total profits from 
licensing to the weak rival. 
 Group G: 
In this group, the parameters are expressed in nominal format and the market share when 
licensing to the weak rival is allowed to vary while everything else is held constant. 
Therefore, only the variables “MSW”, “Order” and the interaction “MSW*Order” are 
used to estimate a model. Even though the results show a significant interaction between 
the “Order” variable and “MSW” (p-value-0.0447) the interaction term is dropped 
because when we look at the simple effect, we find that there is no significant difference 
on the licensing decision between the control group and the treatment group, controlling 
for the market share from licensing to the weak rival. Similarly, no significant difference 
on the licensing decision between the three levels of market share is detected, except 
between G2 and G3 (1.75 and 2). When the interaction term is dropped from the model, 
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both variables (MSW and Order) turn out to have a non-significant effect on the licensing 
decision.  
Therefore, despite the fact that this group is similar to Group E, the only 
difference being the values are given in a nominal format, the obtained results are 
different. While in Group E the market share played an important role in the decision of 
licensing, it turn out that it doesn‟t have any effect on the decision in question in this 
group, ascertaining the conclusion that there is a difference between the nominal and 
numerical values.  
5.4.2. Results and discussion of scenario 2 
5.4.2.1. Data and data edits 
The second scenario has 11 rounds and 660 observations in total. As earlier described, 
this scenario is designed in order to examine whether the likelihood of a reversal in the 
initial market outcome generated from the uncertainty about the action of the non-
licensed rival affects the innovator‟s licensing decision. It also investigates whether the 
subjects‟ choice is affected by the way they receive information, i.e., information is given 
sequentially as decisions are made (first 4 rounds) versus information is given ex ante, 
before decisions are made (last 7 rounds). 
In order to perform both analyses (likelihood of switching a decision under 
uncertainty and the effect of the way the information is given), a variable called Info is 
added to the data set where Info can take on two different values: “G” for questions 
where the information is provided gradually in two steps to the subject and “O” for 
questions where the information is presented all at once. Similar to scenario 1, a variable 
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called Order is also added to the data set where Order=”Fixed” meant that the questions 
are presented to the subject in sequential fixed order (i.e. 1 through 11) while 
Order=”Random” meant that the questions are randomly provided.   
The data in which the information is provided in two steps (rounds 1 to 4) is 
extracted from the original data and is used to investigate the effects of additional 
information and to primarily examine (the answer is given in the first step) a switch in the 
licensing decision. Therefore, a variable named Switch is added to the data where 
Switch=0 means that the subject did not change his/her licensing decision after the 
second piece of information is presented while a value of 1 means that the subject 
decided to change their decision. A variable called P describing the probability with 
which the non-licensed competitor enters the market is also added to the data, where P 
can take on four different values (20%, 40%, 60% and 80%). 
For the analysis of the effects of the way the information is provided along with 
the non-licensed competitor‟s probability of entering the market on the licensing 
decision, all answers from rounds 5 to 11 are used as well as answers from the second 
part of rounds 1 to 4. The experiment is designed in such a way that, when the 
information is provided all at once, the only variants between one question and the other 
are the probabilities of a market entry by either type of competitors. The same applies to 
the second part of rounds 1 to 4 when the information is provided gradually. Therefore a 
classification variable describing the probability of entry by the weak competitor versus 
the strong competitor (PENTWS) is added to the data set and consists of two numbers 
separated by a comma. The first number of PENTWS is for the probability of the weak 
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competitor entering the market if the innovator were to license to the strong rival while 
the second number is for the probability of the strong competitor entering the market if 
the innovator were to license to the weak rival. Therefore values of PENTWS of ‟20,20‟, 
‟40,40‟, ‟60,60‟ and ‟80,80‟ mean that the probability of entering the market is the same 
for both type of competitors while values of PENTWS of ‟20,40‟, ‟20,60‟ and ‟20,80‟ 
depict the case where the probability of market entry is greater for the strong competitor 
than for the weak. 
The licensing decision is then transformed into a binary response where 0 means 
that the subject decided to license to the weak competitor while a 1 means that the subject 
decided to license to the strong competitor. 
The collected data from the 60 subjects are summarized in frequency tables 
provided in Appendix C (Tables 8 and 9). Table 8 shows that the number of subjects that 
switched their decision is close to or slightly greater when the information is given all at 
once than when it is given gradually except when the probabilities are 80%-80%, where 
the difference is larger. On the other hand, Table 9 shows that for rounds 1 to 4, 39 
subjects out of 60 did not switch their decisions when the probability of entry of the 
second rival was 20% compared to 36 subjects when the probability of entry of the 
second rival was 40%, 30 subjects when the probability of entry of the second rival was 
60% and finally 29 subjects when the probability of entry of the second rival was 80%. In 
addition, the data shows that, even though the first part of the first four rounds is exactly 
the same among the rounds, there are cases where a subject answered differently. It is 
frequently observed that when a subject decided to switch his/her decision in the second 
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part of a round, he/she repeated the last decision made in the first part of the next round. 
This unexpected behavior can be attributed to the subject‟s being confused by the way the 
information is provided to them (having the same question repeated at the beginning of 
each of these four rounds rather than giving it once and then address sequentially all 
second parts) or the fact that they did not pay attention to the numbers provided which 
questions the ability of individuals to process information and analyze the expected 
probabilities.    
5.4.2.2. Statistical analysis 
For the analysis of the effects of additional information on a switch in the licensing 
decision, a generalized linear mixed model is fit using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 
9.2 ©. Order, probability of entry by the unlicensed competitor and the primary answer 
variable “v” are included as fixed factors in the model. All two way and three way 
interactions between the fixed factors are tested for significance. The logit link function is 
used with the distribution considered as binary (see equations 1 and 2 above). Because all 
questions are asked to all subjects, residual errors are assumed to be correlated. 
A generalized linear mixed model, again using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 
9.2 © with a logit link function and a binary distribution, is also used to examine the 
effects of the way the information is provided and the non-licensed competitor‟s 
probability of entering the market on the licensing decision. The fixed factors included in 
the model are Order, Info and PENTWS. All two and three way interactions between the 
fixed factors are considered. A correlated residual error structure is also assumed and 
investigated in this analysis. 
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All results are reported at 0.05 rejection level. 
5.4.2.3. Results  
i. The decision of switching a licensing decision: 
The fitted model with all possible interactions shows that there is no significant three-
way interaction effect (p-value=0.6875) or two-way interactions. The model is refitted 
without any interaction terms and the variables Order and P are found to have no 
significant effect at all on the decision to switch (p-values=0.8786 and 0.1573 
respectively) while the answers individuals gave in the first part of the question is found 
to have a significant effect (p-value<0.0001). The likelihood of the innovator switching 
his/her decision after all information is given in the second step is higher when the initial 
decision involved licensing to a weak rival than when it involved licensing to the strong 
rival regardless of the increase in the probabilities of entry by the second firm and the 
order of information given. Table 10 in Appendix C provides the Least Squares Means 
Estimates. 
The fit of the model is deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 1.02 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
The estimated probability of switching a decision after the information is 
completed gradually is 61.60% if the innovator decided to license previously to a weak 
rival versus 24.82% if he/she decided to license previously to a strong rival. 
The estimated odds of switching a licensing decision are 4.86 times greater when 
the weak rival is licensed previously than when the strong rival is. 
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The analysis is replicated for each different value of probability separately, and 
the results confirm unanimously the previous conclusion that the order of information 
given doesn‟t have any effect on the licensing decision and that the innovator is more 
likely to switch his/her licensing choice after receiving the complete information if he/she 
decided previously to license to a weak rival (Table 11 in Appendix C). The answer to 
the initial questions is found to have a significant effect for all probabilities except when 
P=20%, for which there is no strong evidence of significance (p-value=0.0517).  
ii. The effect of the way the information is given along with the probabilities of entry 
by the second rival: 
The fitted model with all possible interactions shows that there is no significant three-
way interaction effect (p-value=0.9509) and two-way interactions. The model is refitted 
without any interaction terms and the variables Order is found to have no significant 
effect at all on the decision of licensing (p-value=1078). Because of the absence of an 
interaction term among the significant variables, we look at the main effects of the way 
the information is given and the combinations of the probabilities of entry by either rival 
when he/she is not the licensee. 
The factor that drives the licensing decision depends on the way the information 
is given to the innovator. It turns out that the likelihood of choosing profits over market 
share is higher when the information is given all at once versus gradually (Table 12 in 
Appendix C): 
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- The estimated probability of licensing to the strong competitor is 73.90% when 
the information is given gradually versus 82.68% when the information is given 
all at once. 
- The estimated odds of licensing to the strong competitor are 1.69 times greater 
when the information is given all at once than when it is given gradually. 
The factor that drives the licensing decision depends also on the probability of 
market entry by the rival that does not receive a licensing contract. As the probability of 
entry by the second rival increases, the innovator is more likely to license to the strong 
rival to capture larger returns from the innovation and hence larger profits. We observe 
this behavior when the innovator‟s personal belief about the probabilities of entry by 
either rival are the same (20%,20%; 40%,40%, 60%,60% and 80%,80%), even though 
the likelihood of licensing to the strong rival decreases slightly when the probabilities are 
60%,60%. The same trend is observed when the probability of entry by the weak rival is 
believed to be low and fixed while the probability of entry by the strong rival is believed 
to be higher (20%,20%; 20%,40%; 20%,60% and 20%,80% (the likelihood decreases 
slightly for the latter). The estimated probabilities and odds are reported in Table 12 in 
Appendix C. 
- The estimated probabilities of licensing to the strong rival are 62.60% when the 
beliefs about the probabilities of entry are 20%,20% compared to 77.11% for 
40%,40%, 72.94% for 60%,60%, 80.04% for 80%,80%, 75.73% for 20%,40%, 
89.16% for 20%,60% and finally 85.29% for 20%,80%. 
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- Not all pairwise differences in probabilities of entry were significant. Significant 
differences are detected only between low probabilities or entry by either rivals 
(20%,20%) and low probability of entry by the weak rival but higher probability 
of entry by the strong rival (20%,60% and 20%,80%) as well as between 
20%,20% and 40%,40% and 80%,80%. The likelihood of licensing to the strong 
rival is higher when the expected probabilities of entry by the strong rival are 
high.  
5.5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined an individual experiment that was developed to investigate whether 
profit maximization is the motive behind the patentee‟s licensing decision. The 
experiment was run with 60 undergraduate students attending UNL.  
The results show that the profit maximization assumption does not always hold. 
In fact, we found that the patentee‟s objective function from licensing depends on the 
market structure and on the innovator‟s beliefs regarding rivals. We also found that the 
strategy of crowding the market with weak competitors to leave strong competitors out 
(Rockett 1990) does not always hold true. In fact, as the probability of entry by the 
second rival increases, the innovator is more likely to license to the strong rival to either 
capture larger returns from the innovation or to reduce the incentive of the strong rival to 
develop a better technology and become a fiercer competitor, as Gallini (1984) suggested.   
In addition, the assumption that agents prefer more to less does not hold true in all 
cases. The results show that agents tend often to deviate from the expected behavior. This 
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deviation can be explained by the fact that economic agents find it difficult to analyze 
complex information and calculate expected probabilities.  
We also found that the order of information given to the subjects doesn‟t have any 
significant effect on the licensing decision. However, the motives behind the patent 
licensing decision depend on the way the information is given to the innovator. It turns 
out that the likelihood of choosing profits over market share is higher when the 
information is given ex ante versus gradually as decisions are made. 
Finally, we found that the type of information (nominal values, numerical values 
and general description) did have an effect on the patent licensing decision.  
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EFFECT OF PATENT BREADTH AND THE TYPE OF POTENTIAL 
ENTRANT ON PATENT LICENSING AND PATENT LITIGATION 
6.1.  Introduction 
This second experiment attempts to shed light on the effect of the breadth of patent 
protection and the cost structure of a potential licensee on an innovator‟s decision to 
license her patent and to litigate under infringement. Specifically, the experiment tries to 
answer the following questions.  
 Whether innovators are more likely to license a certain type of patent (broad 
rather than narrow patents) and/or to a certain type of entrant (low versus high 
cost entrant). 
 Whether and how the breadth of the patent affects the probability that the patent 
will be legally challenged (i.e., infringed) by a potential entrant.  
 Whether and how patent breadth affects the innovator‟s decision to invoke a trial 
under infringement.  
 Whether the likelihood that licensing will take place is affected by: (i) whether the 
patentee or the potential entrant initiate the licensing process, (ii) the nature of 
interaction between the patentee and the entrant during the bargaining process 
(one shot versus repeated interaction), and (iii) the nature of information available 
to the patentee and the entrant when they make their respective decisions 
(complete versus incomplete information).  
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As discussed in Chapter III, the patent literature suggests that patent breadth plays 
a crucial role in determining the innovator‟s licensing and litigation behavior. 
Specifically, existing studies show that broad patents can encourage technology licensing 
(Gambardella et al. 2007) and also encourage the licensee not to terminate the licensing 
contract and reduce his incentive to compete aggressively with the innovator (Gallini 
2002). The literature also suggests that the validity of broad patents is more likely to be 
challenged directly or indirectly and that the outcome of a litigation trial will more likely 
not favor the patentee, e.g. the patent can be found to be invalid or its scope narrowed 
(Lentz 1988, Merges and Nelson 1990, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). It would be 
interesting to examine the licensing behavior of a patentee holding a broad patent versus 
a narrow patent and facing different types of rivals. 
To test the predictions of the theoretical studies outlined above and answer the 
questions of interest, we develop an experiment that considers a market where an 
incumbent innovator has already developed a new product, patented it and has to make 
the decision whether to license it taking into consideration the breadth of her patent and 
the type of rival that she faces. The patent‟s breadth can be either broad or narrow while 
the potential entrant can be one of the following three types: a competitor of similar cost 
structure to the patentee, a weak competitor or a strong competitor. Similar to the first 
experiment, the type of the competitor is defined by his cost structure where the weak 
competitor is assumed to have higher production costs, while the strong competitor is 
assumed to have lower production costs. However, unlike the first experiment, the game 
is set up in a way that allows interaction between the innovator and the potential entrant. 
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In this case, the innovator faces a real subject as the potential entrant, who also has to 
make some decisions, e.g., whether to accept or reject the licensing offer, when an offer 
is made, whether to infringe the patent or enter with a non infringing product.  
In order to keep the information provided to the subjects minimal and the game 
simple, the participants will not be told whether they have a narrow or a broad patent and 
whether they face an entrant of a certain type. Instead, they see different payoffs and 
different probabilities depending on the type of patent and entrant that is assigned to them 
under each game. Each game is referred to as a round. Every six rounds fall under a 
scenario and each scenario assumes different market conditions as described in detail in 
the following section.  
6.2.  Market conditions and assumptions 
In this experiment, we assume a profit maximizing firm and that the innovator has to 
make the decision of licensing or not before starting production. In a setting like this, a 
Cournot duopoly game determines the profits for the innovator and the entrant. 
A game tree highlighting the possible decisions for the innovator and the entrant 
and the probabilities and payoffs associated with each decision is provided under each 
round. This tree is available to both, the innovator and the potential entrant. What differ 
from round to round under each scenario are the payoffs and the probabilities associated 
with the different outcomes. 
The main decisions and outcomes at each node are the following: 
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1. The innovator has invented a new product and has protected it with a patent. She 
has to decide whether to license it to a potential entrant. If she decides to license, 
she then has to determine the licensing fee. 
2. The potential entrant has to decide whether to accept or reject the licensing offer, if 
an offer is made. If he accepts the offer, he pays the licensing fee, the current game 
ends and another game starts. The payoffs earned in this case depend on the agreed 
upon licensing fee. If he rejects the offer, or if the innovator decides not to license, 
he has to decide whether to stay out of the market, enter without infringement or 
enter with infringement. If he stays out of the market, he earns $0 profit and the 
innovator maintains his monopoly position. If he decides to enter without infringing 
the patent by investing in R&D and producing a differentiated product, he faces a 
probability  of being successful in developing a non infringing product and a 
probability 1  of failing to develop an alternative product in which case he will 
be staying out of the market. The R&D investment is treated as a sunk cost. Finally, 
if he decides to enter by infringing the patent, he faces the risk that the innovator 
will decide to invoke an infringement trial.  
3. In the case that the entrant infringes the patent, the innovator has to decide whether 
to invoke an infringement trial or not. 
a. If she decides not to go to trial, the current game ends and another game start. The 
payoffs earned in this case are the result of a Cournot duopoly. 
b. If she decides to invoke an infringement trial, she will be facing a probability 
 that the patent will be found valid, hence the entrant has to stop his activity 
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in the market and will be out his trial costs. In case the patent is found invalid or its 
scope has been narrowed, the entrant carries on his activity in the market. Whether 
patent revocation occurs or not, fixed trial costs are incurred by both parties. 
The experiment consists of six different scenarios. What varies between the six 
scenarios is who initiates the licensing process (the innovator or the entrant), the number 
of interactions among the two players (one interaction – take it or leave it offer – or 
multiple interactions) and the completeness and symmetry of the information available to 
the players.  
The six scenarios are described as follows. Scenarios A to D describe the market 
conditions under complete and symmetric information while scenarios E and F describe 
the market conditions under incomplete and asymmetric information. An example of the 
game tree relevant to each scenario can be seen in Appendix B3. 
1. Scenario A: The innovator initiates the licensing process and determines a 
licensing fee. Under this scenario, only one interaction is allowed between the 
players and both players have access to the same game tree, probabilities and 
payoff information. 
2. Scenario B: The entrant decides whether to seek a patent license or not from the 
innovator. Under this scenario, only one interaction is allowed between the 
players, and both players have access to the same game tree, probabilities and 
payoff information. 
3. Scenario C: The innovator decides whether to license or not to the potential 
entrant. However, under this scenario, there may be multiple interactions between 
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the innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee. The number of 
interactions is endogenous to the players. Both players have access to the same 
game tree, probabilities and payoff information. 
4. Scenario D: The entrant decides whether to seek a patent license or not from the 
innovator. However, under this scenario, there may be multiple interactions 
between the innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee. The 
number of interactions is endogenous to the players. Both players have access to 
the same game tree, probabilities and payoff information. 
5. Scenario E: The innovator decides whether to license or not to the potential 
entrant. Under this scenario, there may be multiple interactions between the 
innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee and each player can 
view only their own payoffs. The number of interactions is endogenous to the 
players. 
6. Scenario F: The entrant decides whether to seek a patent license or not from the 
innovator. Under this scenario, there may be multiple interactions between the 
innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee and each player can 
view only their own payoffs. The number of interactions is endogenous to the 
players. 
 Each scenario is divided into several rounds. What varies between these rounds 
are the type of patent breadth and the type of the potential entrant. Since the patent 
breadth can be either broad or narrow and the potential entrant‟s cost structure can be 
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similar to, higher or lower than the innovator‟s, each scenario contains six rounds, equal 
to the number of all possible combinations between the two factors. 
In the various rounds patent breadth is captured by the probability assigned to the 
success of the entrant‟s R&D investment when he decides not to infringe the patent, the 
invalidation of the patent when the potential entrant infringes the patent and both parties 
end up in court and finally by the level of profits associated with each outcome. 
Following the findings of empirical studies, the probabilities under each case are set as 
follows: 
a. Probability of success when investing in R&D  
i. Broad patent: probability of success: 10 – 30%  
ii. Narrow patent: probability of success: 70 – 90% 
b. Probability of patent invalidation during an infringement trial 
i. Broad patent: probability of patent found invalid: 60 – 90%  
ii. Narrow patent: probability of patent found invalid: 10 – 40% 
The type of the potential entrant which is defined by his cost structure is captured 
by the probability of success and failure when investing in R&D and by the level of 
profits associated with each outcome. The literature does not suggest a specific range for 
the probability of success and failure when investing in R&D for each type of rival. 
However, it is assumed that a weak rival has higher production and R&D costs than both 
then innovator and the strong rival, while the strong rival is assumed to have lower 
production and R&D costs than the innovator; the weak rival earns less profit than the 
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strong rival when facing the same patent under the same market conditions. In addition, 
the weak rival has a higher probability of failure when investing in R&D.  
6.3.  Design of the experiment 
Each scenario contains six rounds: three rounds correspond to a broad patent with a 
potential entrant having a similar cost structure (case 1), a higher cost structure (case 2) 
and a lower cost structure (case 3) and three rounds correspond to a narrow patent 
combined with the three cases described above, for a total of 36 rounds. Another set of 36 
rounds containing all previously mentioned combinations is developed where the patent 
breadth is reduced and the players switch roles (i.e., the innovator becomes the entrant 
and the entrant becomes the innovator), for a total of 72 rounds in the second experiment.  
The subjects are paid $10 in cash for their participation in the experiment and are 
given the opportunity to earn up to an additional $20 in cash depending on the decisions 
they make, for a potential total earning of $30. At the beginning of the session, the 
subjects are paired up electronically and randomly through their assigned identification 
numbers with a person that is anonymous to them as they are to that person. One person 
is an innovator who has invented a new product and protected it with a patent and the 
other is a potential entrant who is considering producing and selling that product. Each 
pair of participants is involved in a series of small games (72 rounds). They are not 
informed about the number of games they will be playing to avoid giving them the 
incentive to make risky decisions at the beginning knowing that they have X games left 
to offset any losses. Halfway through the experiment, at round 37, the pair of subjects 
switches roles until the end of the session (the innovator in the first 36 rounds becomes 
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the potential entrant in the last 36 rounds). Switching the roles has been decided for the 
following two reasons: to avoid the bankruptcy problem and to increase the number of 
observations. Under each round, the potential entrant faces a probability of earning 
negative profits depending on his decisions (e.g., R&D costs when the entrant fails to 
generate a non infringing product  and trial cost when the patent is found valid and the 
entrant is not allowed in the market) while the innovator is always guaranteed a positive 
payoff. Switching the roles gives both players the opportunity to make positive profits 
and offset any negative balance. Also, by running an additional 36 rounds with different 
patent breadth values we get 72 rather than 36 observations.   
The subjects are divided into two groups, a control group in which the participants 
see the rounds in the order shown in appendix B3 and a treatment group in which the 
rounds are randomized. The randomization occurs separately within the first 36 rounds 
and then within the last 36 rounds after the role switch has taken place to allow the 
subjects to be both the innovator and the entrant under all the cases and all the scenarios.  
Before the subjects log in to start the computerized experiment, a brief 
demonstration is presented to the participants to introduce them to the 6 different 
scenarios and show them how to play the games. The demo presented and provided to 
them as a document is included in Appendix B3 along with a game tree representing each 
scenario.  
In order to be able to compare the effect of the market conditions on the decisions 
of interest (licensing, challenging and litigation), the levels of profits associated with each 
outcome are rescaled and the probabilities are kept the same. The first 36 rounds 
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represent extreme cases of patent breadth (very broad and very narrow patents) while in 
the last 36 rounds, the degree of breadth is reduced (the patent is less narrow or less 
broad), keeping the same levels of profits associated with each outcome as in the first 36 
rounds to allow for comparison. 
6.4. Data and statistical analysis 
6.4.1. Data description 
The experiment was performed over 9 sessions. A total of 96 undergraduate students 
participated in the experiment, 28 of which were randomly assigned to the control group 
and 68 to the treatment group for a total of 48 teams and 3456 observations. The average 
time of the experiment was 1 hour for the control group versus 1 hour and 8 minutes 
approximately for the treatment group. The average additional payment was $15.31 in the 
control group and $15.37 in the treatment group.  
The data showed blank values for team 184 in two rounds in the last 37 rounds of 
the experiment (rounds 45 and round 54) due to a technical error in the website of the 
experiment. These blanks were treated as missing values in all the analyses that follow, 
resulting in the use of 3454 rather than 3456 observations. The general distribution of the 
data is summarized in a 2-way contingency table where all the values are given in 
percentages (Table 13 in Appendix D). 
The data shows that out of 3454 observations, patent licensing was sought in 
76.95% of all cases and that a licensing agreement occurred in 40.82% of these cases. 
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Figure 1 below gives a visual illustration of the distribution of the data over the seven 
possible outcomes. 
The aggregate findings by scenario are provided in Table 14 in Appendix D. 
Licensing was sought most in scenario E and F under incomplete and asymmetric 
information with multiple interactions between both players (78.47% and 83.33%, 
respectively) compared to 75.87% under scenario A, 77.39% under scenario B, 70.45% 
under scenario C and 76.22% under scenario D. The frequency of reaching a licensing 
agreement was the highest under scenario F (48.26%). The highest frequency of 
challenging a patent occurred under scenario A (40.28%) followed directly by scenario E 
(38.19%) and the highest frequency of invoking a litigation trial occurred under these 
same scenarios.    
Figure 1: Distribution of licensing decision according to the different outcomes 
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6.4.2. Statistical analysis 
The objectives of the experiment is to investigate the effect of patent breadth, the type of 
potential entrant and the market conditions on the licensing, patent challenge and 
litigation decisions. Each decision is analyzed separately and approached differently.  
First we examine the innovator‟s licensing decision using the logistic random 
effects model (refer to equations 1 and 2) due to the binary nature of the response 
variable (license). Only data from scenarios A, C and E are used for this analysis since it 
is only under these scenarios that the innovator initiates licensing.  
The decisions of reaching a licensing agreement and challenging a patent by 
infringement are then examined. The result of each round can yield seven possible 
outcomes (Accept, Stay Out, Succeed, Fail, No trial, Valid and Invalid) that can be 
grouped into four main categories: Accept, Stay out, Invest in R&D and Infringe the 
Patent. Because of the categorical nature of the dependent variables, the best way to 
examine the decisions of accepting a licensing contract and infringing a patent is using a 
specific type of multinomial logit regression model, the baseline-category logit model, 
which estimates the odds of being in one category relative to being in another category 
for all pairs of categories. However, due to the presence of random effects in the model 
(explained in subsection 6.4.3), the model failed to converge and we turned to the second 
best option: transform each category into a binary variable and use the logistic regression 
model with random effects. Because the only way to reach a licensing agreement is for 
the innovator to make the decision to license, if she is the initiator (scenarios A, C and E), 
and for the entrant to make the decision of buying a license, if he is the initiator 
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(scenarios B, D and F), observations that correspond solely to the license column=yes are 
kept in the model. On the other hand, all observations from all scenarios are used in 
examining the decision to challenge the patent via infringement. 
 Finally, the innovator‟s decision to litigate is examined. Similar to the previous 
decision, the logistic regression model with random effect is used due to the binary nature 
of the dependent variable (i.e., invoke a trial or not). Because the only way to invoke a 
litigation trial is for the potential entrant to challenge the patent, observations that 
correspond solely to the results column=”Trial” and “NoTrial” are kept in the model. 
Each decision is examined first separately under each scenario, where only one 
market condition varies, and second aggregately using the combined data from all 
scenarios to allow a better comparison between scenarios.  
The analysis of all previously mentioned models is performed using the 
GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.2 ©. This procedure allows fitting generalized linear 
mixed models and estimates the parameters by applying pseudo-likelihood techniques 
when the models contain random effect. The binary distribution and the logit link options 
in GLIMMIX are used. All results are reported at the 0.05 rejection level. All frequency 
tables are obtained using the FREQ procedure in SAS 9.2 ©. 
6.4.3. Data edits 
In order to examine the decisions mentioned in subsection 6.4.2., the following data 
variables are considered for the statistical analysis of all decisions: 
 Team, representing the 48 different innovator-entrant pairs.  
 Round, representing the round numbers. 
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 License, representing the innovator‟s decision to license (“Yes”) or not to license 
(“No”). 
Because the data collected does not contain explicitly the type of patent breadth or 
the type of the potential entrant, additional variables capturing these differences were 
created for each round. These variables are as follows:  
 A variable named “Breadth” with two levels, broad and narrow 
 A variable named “Type” depicting the three types of potential entrant: same, 
weak and strong. 
 A variable named “Scenario” with three levels reflecting the three scenarios used 
in this analysis: A, C and E. This variable allowed examining the effect of the 
market conditions on the licensing decision. 
 A variable named “Order” with two levels reflecting the order in which the 
information was given to the subjects: control and random.  
 A variable named “Role” with two levels, first and second, to examine the effect 
of the role switch on the results. This variable also allowed specifying the effect 
of the different degree of patent breadth (very broad versus less broad and very 
narrow versus less narrow) on the licensing decision. 
The variables breadth, type, scenario, role and order are treated as fixed effects. Since 
more than one measurement is taken from each team and considering that we sampled a 
subset of the entire population of subjects, the variables team and team*role are treated as 
random effects. All interaction levels of the fixed effects are considered in each model.  
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6.5.   Analysis and results of the patent licensing decision 
6.5.1. Data description  
As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of the experiment is to examine the effect of 
the patent breadth and the type of potential entrant on the licensing behavior of the 
innovator. To examine this objective, only data from scenarios A, C and E are used for 
this analysis since it is only under these scenarios that the innovator initiates licensing.   
The variables used in this analysis are: Team, License (dependent variable), 
Breadth, Type, Scenario (in the aggregate analysis), Order and Role. 
A total of 1728 records were extracted from the experiment 1727of which were 
used in the analysis due to a missing value in round 54. From the 1728 observations, 
1294 corresponded to a “Yes” for the dependent variable “license” and 433 corresponded 
to a “No”.  
Table 15 summarizes the licensing decision in the relevant scenarios (A, C and E) 
according to patent breadth and controlling for the type of potential entrant. Table 15 
shows a very similar occurrence of licensing when the innovator faces a weak and a 
strong rival (76.04% and 76.35%, respectively) and a small decrease in the occurrence of 
licensing when she faces a rival of the same type (72.40%). The occurrence of licensing 
under both a narrow and a broad patent was similar across all entrant types. Figure 2 
illustrates the distribution of licensing by scenario, breadth, type and order controlling for 
the role variable.  
Figure 2a shows a similarity in the frequencies of licensing between scenarios A 
and E compared to a lower frequency for scenario C. Within each scenario, there is a 
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small difference in the frequencies of licensing between the two parts in scenarios A and 
E but no difference in scenario C.   
Figure 2b illustrates the frequency of licensing depending on patent breadth, 
controlling for role and shows that for both types of breadth, the frequencies of licensing 
decreased after the subjects switched role, with the frequency of licensing being greater 
when the innovator held a broad patent versus a narrow patent in both parts. 
Figure 2c illustrates the difference in the frequencies of licensing between the 
three types of potential entrants, controlling for the variable role and shows that the 
occurrence of licensing decreased after the players switched role regardless of the type of 
potential entrant and that the frequencies are similar across all types.    
Figure 2d compares the licensing decision of the subjects in the control group and 
those in the treatment group. Similarly to the three previous figures, it shows a decrease 
in the occurrence of licensing in the last 36 rounds of the experiment. It also shows a 
greater frequency of licensing in the treatment group. This can be attributed to a larger 
sample in the treatment group (68 subjects compared to 28 subjects in the control group).    
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Figure 2: Distribution of licensing by scenario, breadth, type and order controlling 
for role 
  
  
  
Sum of L represents the count of licensing  Sum of N represents the count of no licensing 
Tables 16 and 17 in Appendix D summarize the frequency of licensing by breadth 
and by type, respectively. The data from Table 16 shows that the frequency of making a 
licensing offer is higher when the patent is broad versus narrow under complete and 
symmetric information (scenarios A and C), regardless of the number of interactions 
between both players (one shot game versus multiple interactions) while the frequency is 
lower under incomplete and asymmetric information (scenario E). 
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On the other hand, Table 17 shows that the frequency of making a licensing offer 
is greater when the innovator faces a potential entrant of lower cost structure (strong 
rival) under complete and symmetric information (scenario A and C), while under 
incomplete and asymmetric information (scenario E), the frequency of making a licensing 
offer is greater when the innovator faces a weak rival. It is also observed that the 
frequency of making a licensing offer when the innovator faces a strong competitor is 
very close between all three scenarios (25.69%, 25.39% and 25.17% for scenarios A, C 
and E, respectively). 
6.5.2. Results 
The GLIMMIX procedure was used to model the probabilities of licensing.  
i. Analysis by scenario: 
The decision is first analyzed by scenario and the results are reported in Tables 18 
and 19 in Appendix D. For each scenario, all two-way and three-way interactions are 
included in the model, however none is found significant in all three scenarios.  
The results show that the type of the potential entrant and the order of information 
given do not have any significant effect on the innovator‟s licensing decision. Only the 
variables Role and Breadth are found to have a significant effect on the decision of 
interest in scenario A and no significant effect in scenarios C and E. Table 18 summarizes 
the results of the type III tests of fixed effects for all three scenarios. The least square 
means estimates and differences for the variables Order and Breadth are reported in Table 
19. The results show that the innovator is more likely to license a broad patent versus a 
narrow patent; the estimated probabilities being 83.83% and 74.62%, respectively. The 
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estimated odds of licensing are 1.763 times greater when the patent is broad than when it 
is narrow. In addition, it is found that innovators are more likely to license when they 
haven‟t had any role switch; the estimated probabilities being 83.67% versus 74.84%. 
The estimated odds of licensing are 1.722 times greater before a role switch than after. 
However, this effect cannot be attributed solely to the role switch since patent breadth has 
been reduced in the second part of the experiment. 
ii. Analysis of the aggregate data: 
The decision is examined then using the combined data from all three scenarios (A, C and 
E).  
All different interactions have been considered in the analysis. All three-way 
interactions and above were not significant at the 0.05 rejection level, therefore they were 
removed from the model as the model building process requests. The model was then run 
including all two-way interactions.  
Table 20 summarizes the results of the type III tests of fixed effects and shows 
that only scenario*role and scenario*type interactions are significant (p-values=0.0185 
and 0.0456, respectively) while the breadth and the order are not involved in any 
significant interactions. Looking at the main effects of breadth and order, we notice that 
the order variable is not significant (p-value= 0.6662), indicating that the order of 
information given to the subjects does not have any effect on the licensing decision. On 
the other hand, the breadth variable had a significant effect (p-value=0.0296).  
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The reduced model including only the variables that were found to be significant 
is used then to provide Least Squares Means estimates of the effects of the variables on 
the licensing decision. The estimated model is the following: 
        (7) 
The fit of the model is deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 0.78 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
Because the breadth variable is not involved in any significant interaction, the 
main effect of that variable is examined, averaged over the remaining interactions. From 
the least squares means we notice that an innovator is more likely to license her 
innovation when holding a broad patent than when holding a narrow patent. The 
estimated probabilities of licensing are 83.34% and 78.77% for broad and narrow 
breadth, respectively (Table 21a in Appendix D). The estimated odds of licensing are 
1.349 times greater when the patent is broad than when the patent is narrow (Table 21b in 
Appendix D).   
Because the remaining variables are involved in two-way interactions, we are 
only able to examine the simple effects for these variables averaged over breadth and not 
the main effects. This is performed by looking at the effect of one variable while holding 
the other one fixed. The “slicediff” option in GLIMMIX procedure is used to test one 
factor at each level of the other. Tables 22 and 23 in Appendix D report the slice effects 
comparisons of scenario*role and scenario*type, respectively. These comparisons allow 
detection of significant differences at specific levels of the interactions. Least squares 
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means estimates for each scenario*role and scenario*type interactions are given in Table 
24 in Appendix D where the estimate column is the estimated effect of the interaction 
under the logit scale and the mean column is the estimated probability of licensing under 
a given interaction at the observed scale. 
Table 22a in Appendix D reports the simple effect comparisons of scenario*role 
when controlling for the variable role. The results show a significant difference between 
the effects of scenarios A and C and scenarios C and E on the licensing decision in the 
first part of the experiment with extreme degrees of breadth (p-values<0.05). However, 
no significant difference in the licensing decision was detected between all three 
scenarios after the switch occurs and when the patent breadth has been reduced. This 
absence of difference might be attributed to the learning behavior of the subjects during 
the experiment and the rounds as well as their rival and/or to the change in the degree of 
patent breadth (less broad and less narrow). The estimated odds of licensing are 2.107 
times greater in the first part when there is a take-it or leave it offer than when there are 
multiple interactions among the innovator and the potential entrant under complete and 
symmetric information. Similarly, the estimated odds of licensing when multiple 
interactions are possible are 2.558 times greater in the first part of the experiment under 
incomplete and asymmetric information than under complete and symmetric information. 
Table 22b in Appendix D reports the simple effect comparisons of scenario*role 
when controlling for the variable scenario. The results show that there is no significant 
difference in the effect of licensing between both parts within each scenario. The 
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licensing decision is independent of the degree of patent breadth and the switch of roles 
given a scenario.  
Table 23a in Appendix D reports the simple effect comparisons of scenario*type 
when controlling for the variable type. The results show that when the innovator is facing 
a rival of similar cost structure, there is a significant difference between the effects of 
scenarios A and C and scenarios C and E. The estimated odds of licensing under 
complete and symmetric information are 1.671 times greater when only one offer can be 
made versus the situation where repeated bargaining is possible given that both innovator 
and entrant have the same cost structure. Similarly, the estimated odds of licensing when 
repeated bargaining is possible are 1.859 times greater under incomplete and asymmetric 
information versus complete and symmetric information given that both the innovator 
and the entrant have the same cost structure. The results also show that the effects of the 
market conditions on the licensing decision are not significant when the innovator is 
facing a stronger rival (p-values>0.05). However, the market conditions have a 
significant effect on the licensing decision when the innovator is facing a weak rival. 
Given that the potential entrant has a higher cost structure than the innovator, the 
estimated odds of licensing under complete and symmetric information are 1.696 times 
greater when only one offer can be made versus the situation where repeated bargaining 
is possible; 3.164 times greater under incomplete and asymmetric versus complete and 
symmetric information when repeated bargaining is possible; and 1.866 times greater 
under scenario E than under scenario A. However, in this last case, we cannot be certain 
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whether the possibility of repeated bargaining or the completeness and symmetry of 
information or both generated the difference between scenarios A and E. 
Table 23b in Appendix D reports the simple effect comparisons of scenario*type 
when controlling for the variable scenario. The results show that under complete and 
symmetric information, the type of the potential entrant doesn‟t have a significant effect 
on the licensing decision when only one offer can be made (scenario A) while it does 
when repeated bargaining is possible. The estimated odds of licensing under complete 
and symmetric information and when repeated bargaining is possible are 1.883 times 
greater when the rival is strong than when the rival is of the same cost structure and 1.716 
times greater when the rival is strong than when the rival is weak. Finally, when repeated 
bargaining is possible under incomplete and asymmetric information, the results show a 
significant effect of the type of entrant on the licensing decision: The estimated odds of 
licensing are 1.869 times greater when the innovator faces a weak potential entrant than 
when she faces a potential entrant of the same cost structure and 1.938 times greater 
when she faces a weak versus a strong potential entrant.  
6.6.  Analysis and results of the occurrence of a licensing agreement 
6.6.1. Data description 
The following analysis examines the effects of patent breadth, the potential entrant‟s type 
and the market conditions on the occurrence of a licensing agreement. Unlike the 
previous analysis, data of all scenarios (A, B, C, D, E and F) are used. However, because 
the only way to reach a licensing agreement is for the innovator to make the decision to 
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offer a license if she is the initiator (scenarios A, C and E) and for the entrant to make the 
decision to seek a license if he is the initiator (scenarios B, D and F), observations that 
correspond solely to license=”yes” are kept in the model, reducing therefore the number 
of observation used in the analysis from 3454 to 2658. Out of the 2658 licensing offers, 
1410 offers were accepted (53.05%) and 1248 offers were rejected (46.95%).  
The same variables used in the licensing decision are considered for the statistical 
analysis. In addition, the “Result” column containing the 7 different possible outcomes 
(Accept, Stay out, Succeed, Fail, No trial, Valid and Invalid) is used. Since we are only 
interested in the outcome of accepting the licensing offer at this stage, the multinomial 
variable Result is transformed into a binary variable where the outcome “Accept” is 
considered as 1 and all other outcomes are considered as 0.  
Table 25 in Appendix D shows that the occurrence of licensing is greater when 
the potential entrant is the one initiating the licensing process and multiple interactions 
are possible between both players (scenarios D and F). However, it is slightly higher 
under incomplete and asymmetric information than under complete and symmetric 
information (10.46% and 10.12%, respectively). 
Tables 26 and 27 in Appendix D summarize the decision of accepting a licensing 
offer for each level of patent breadth and each level of the type of the potential entrant 
under different market conditions (scenarios), respectively. The frequency of licensing 
occurrence given a specific patent breadth depends on the market conditions: In scenarios 
A and E the frequency is higher when the patent is narrow while the remaining scenarios 
exhibit the opposite result. The frequency of reaching a licensing agreement is higher 
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when the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process and when she is facing a 
strong rival than when she is facing a weak rival (scenarios A, C and E). The opposite is 
not always true for the remaining scenarios. 
The option “chisq” in the Frequency procedure reports the chi-square test for 
independence for each frequency table. A preliminary look at these chi-squares in Table 
26 in Appendix D show that there is a significant difference between the effects of the 
broad patent and the narrow patent on accepting a licensing offer within scenarios A and 
B only (p-values=0.0015 and 0.0183, respectively). However, because these frequency 
tables do not take into account all the variables in the model, the tests are used only to 
give a description of the data but cannot be relied upon.  
In addition, a preliminary look at the chi-square test for each of the 6 frequency 
tables in Table 27 in Appendix D shows that there is a significant difference between the 
effects of the type of the potential entrant on accepting a licensing offer only under 
scenario E (p-value=0.0233). As mentioned earlier, these tests give us a preliminary view 
of the data but cannot be relied upon due to possible interactions with other variables in 
the model. 
6.6.2. Results 
The GLIMMIX procedure was used to model the probabilities that accept=1. 
i. Analysis of licensing occurrence by scenario: 
The decision is first analyzed by scenario and the results are reported in Appendix D. For 
each scenario, all two-way and three-way interactions are included in the model. 
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The results show that in scenario A, none of the three-way and two-way 
interactions are significant. The occurrence of licensing is significantly affected by the 
patent breadth and the role variable. The innovator and the potential entrant are more 
likely to reach a licensing agreement when the patent is narrow versus broad under 
complete and symmetric information with no multiple interactions regardless of the type 
of the potential entrant and the order of information given. The estimated probabilities of 
reaching a licensing agreement are 35% with a broad patent compared to 52.13% with a 
narrow patent. However, the effect of a narrow patent is not significant on the decision of 
interest (p-value=0.6345). The estimated odds of licensing occurrence are 2.02 times 
greater when the patent is narrow than when it is broad. On the other hand, the likelihood 
of reaching a licensing agreement is higher after the role switch. The estimated 
probabilities are 34.53% and 52.65% before and after the role switch, respectively. The 
estimated odds of licensing occurrence are 2.11 times greater after the role switch than 
before regardless of the type of potential entrant, patent breadth and the order information 
is provided. This can be explained by the learning behavior of the players (Table 28). 
Similar to scenario A, all three-way and two-interactions are not significant in 
scenario B. The variables that significantly affect licensing occurrence are the patent 
breadth and the order of information (p-values= 0.0167 and 0.0346, respectively); the 
potential entrant‟s type and the role are not having any significant effect. Unlike the 
scenario where the innovator initiates the licensing process under complete and 
symmetric information, in this scenario the likelihood of reaching a licensing agreement 
is higher when a patent is broad versus narrow. The estimated probabilities are 56.98% 
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and 45.02% with a broad and narrow patent, respectively. The least squares means 
estimates of each patent breadth do not have a significant effect on the decision of 
interest, however their difference does: The odds of licensing occurrence when the 
entrant is the one initiating the licensing process with no multiple interactions and under 
complete and symmetric information are 1.62 times greater when a patent is broad than 
when it is narrow. The order of information affects significantly the decision of interest 
only when the information is randomized (p-value=0.0293) with an estimated probability 
of 58.45% compared to 43.55% when the order is fixed. The estimated odds of licensing 
occurrence are 1.82 times greater when the information is given randomly versus 
sequentially (Table 29). 
In the analysis of the data of scenario C, two three way interactions are found 
statistically significant: role*breadth*type and order*breadth*type with p-values of 
0.0138 and 0.0449, respectively. However, when we estimate the least square means 
relative to these interactions and investigate the simple effects of each using the 
“slicediff” option in the “lsmeans” statement in SAS 9.2 ©, we find that only one out of 
12 least square means (LSM) estimates and three simple effects out of 25 are significant 
in the first three-way interaction (Table 30). The same is observed in the second three-
way interaction, in which 3 out of 12 LSM estimates and 3 out of 24 simple effects are 
found significant (Table 31). Therefore the three way interaction is dropped from the 
model and a second model is fit with all two-way interactions that are found to be not 
significant. After fitting a third model with no interaction terms, none of the variables are 
found to affect significantly the licensing occurrence (all p-values are greater than the 
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0.05 rejection level). This result is also obtained in scenarios D and F. Table 32 
summarizes the type III tests of fixed effects for these three scenarios. 
In scenario E, when the innovator initiates the licensing process under incomplete 
and asymmetric information with multiple interactions between both parties, 
Order*Breadth and Type are found significant. However, when fitting the model with the 
significant terms, the two-way interaction turned out to be non-significant at the 0.05 
rejection level with a p-value of 0.053. Therefore, the only variable affecting the 
licensing occurrence is the type of potential entrant. Even though the main effect of Type 
is significant (p-value=0.0392), the LSM estimates for each type are not statistically 
different from zero at the 0.05 rejection level (Table 33). In addition, only the difference 
between strong and weak rivals is significant: the odds of licensing occurrence are 1.817 
times greater when the innovator faces a strong rival than when she faces a weak rival 
under incomplete and asymmetric information with multiple interactions and when the 
innovator is the one initiating the licensing process.  
ii. Analysis of the aggregate data: 
 In the aggregate model, up to 4-way interactions are considered in the analysis. All 
three-way interactions and above are not significant at the 0.05 rejection level. Therefore, 
they are removed from the model and the model is run with all two-way interactions.  
Table 34 summarizes the results of the type III tests of fixed effects and shows 
that only Scenario*Role, Scenario*Breadth and Scenario*Type interactions are 
significant (p-values<0.05). The variable Order is not involved in any interaction and its 
main effect is not significant, therefore it is removed from the model. 
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After fitting the significant interactions and relevant terms in the model, 
Scenario*Type turns out to be non-significant at the 0.05 rejection level with a p-value of 
0.0665, hence it is removed from the model. The final fitted model is as follow: 
      (8) 
The fit of the model is deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 0.96 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
Because all the variables in the model are involved in two-way interactions, we 
cannot look at their main effects but their simple effects using the “slicediff” option in the 
“lsmeans” statement in GLIMMIX procedure. Table 35 reports the slice effects 
comparisons of Scenario*Breadth sliced by Scenario and by Breadth while Table 36 
reports the slice effects comparisons of Scenario*Role sliced by Scenario and by Role. 
Least squares means estimates for each Scenario*Role and Scenario*Breadth interactions 
are given in Table 37 where the estimate column is the estimated effect of the interaction 
under the logit scale and the mean column is the estimated probability of accepting a 
licensing offer under a given interaction at the observed scale. 
The results from Table 35a show a significant difference between the effects of 
the two levels of patent breadth on the decision to accept a licensing offer within 
scenarios A and B only, as seen earlier in the data description section. Under complete 
and symmetric information with no repeated bargaining allowed, the estimated odds of 
accepting a licensing offer made by the innovator are 2.037 times greater when the patent 
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in question is narrow rather than broad. On the other hand, under complete and 
symmetric information with no bargaining allowed, the estimated odds of accepting a 
licensing offer made by a potential entrant are 1.689 times greater when the patent is 
broad rather than narrow. This result is conforming to the expectations. When making her 
decision, the innovator knows that if her patent is challenged, she has a higher probability 
of finding her patent invalidated or narrowed.   
The results from Table 35b show that when the patent is narrow, the different 
market conditions do not have a significant effect on the decision to accept a licensing 
offer. However, with a broad patent: 
 The party seeking licensing has a significant effect on the decision to accept a 
licensing offer under complete and symmetric information with no possibility of 
bargaining (scenarios A and B with p-value<0.0001) and under incomplete and 
asymmetric information with the possibility of bargaining (scenarios E and F with 
p-value<0.0001), but no effect under complete and symmetric information with 
bargaining (scenarios C and D).  
o The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer are 2.857 times greater 
when the potential entrant is the one approaching the innovator with a 
licensing offer than when the innovator is initiating, under complete and 
symmetric information and when repeated bargaining is not possible. 
o The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer are 2.222 times greater 
when the potential entrant is the one approaching the innovator with a 
84 
 
 
1
6
4
 
licensing offer than when the innovator is initiating, under incomplete and 
asymmetric information and when repeated bargaining is possible. 
 When there is complete and symmetric information, the possibility of repeated 
bargaining has a significant effect on the decision in question when the innovator 
is the one approaching the potential entrant (scenarios A and C with p-
value<0.0001), but no significant effect when the potential entrant is the one 
approaching the innovator for licensing (scenarios B and D). The estimated odds 
of accepting a licensing offer are 2.352 times greater when bargaining is possible 
than when bargaining is not possible under complete and symmetric information 
given that the innovator is the one approaching the potential entrant. 
 When bargaining is allowed, the completeness and symmetry of information has a 
significant effect on the decision in question when the innovator is the one 
initiating the process with a p-value=0.0023 (scenarios C and E), but no effect 
when the potential entrant is the one approaching the innovator with a licensing 
offer (scenarios D and F). The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer are 
1.880 times greater when there is complete and symmetric information versus 
incomplete and asymmetric information provided the innovator is the initiator. 
 Other significant effects are found in the table (scenarios A and D, scenarios A 
and F, scenarios B and E, scenarios and scenarios D and E). These effects cannot 
be explained by this model because more than one characteristics are different 
among each pair of scenarios. These simple effects are explained by a different 
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model, where the scenario variable will be broken into three different attributes 
(information, bargain and initiate).    
Table 36a shows that the switch of roles halfway through the experiment and the 
decrease in the degree of breadth have a significant different effect on the decision to 
accept a licensing offer within scenario A solely (p-value=0.0037). The estimated odds of 
accepting a licensing offer are 2.227 times greater when the role switch and the degree of 
breadth is reduced than before the switch with extreme degree of patent breadth. This 
effect cannot be explained by this model because there is no way to know what generated 
the difference: a less narrow or less broad patent and/or the learning behavior developed 
by the player regarding the experiment and their partner.  
 Table 36b shows that when the degree of patent breadth is extreme and when 
there was no previous switch of role between the two parties: 
 There is a significant difference between who initiates the licensing process on the 
decision of accepting the licensing offer under complete and symmetric 
information when bargaining is not possible (scenarios A and B with p-
value<0.0001) and when bargaining is possible (scenarios C and D with p-
value=0.0090) and under incomplete and asymmetric information with possible 
bargaining (scenarios E and F with p-value<0.0001). These significant effects 
disappear when the degree of patent breadth is reduced and the players switch 
roles. 
o The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer before the role switch 
are 2.882 times greater when the potential entrant initiates than when the 
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innovator initiates under complete and symmetric information given that 
repeated bargaining is not possible. 
o The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer before the role switch 
are 1.782 times greater when the potential entrant initiates than when the 
innovator initiates under complete and symmetric information given that 
repeated bargaining is possible. 
o The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer before the role switch 
are 2.299 times greater when the potential entrant initiates than when the 
innovator initiates under incomplete and asymmetric information given 
that repeated bargaining is possible. 
 There is a significant difference between repeated bargaining and take it or leave 
it offers solely when the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process under 
complete and symmetric information (scenarios A and C with p-value=0.0010). 
The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer are two times greater when 
repeated bargaining is possible than when it is not possible given that the 
innovator approaches the potential entrant with an offer. No significant effect of 
repeated bargaining is detected when the potential entrant is the one initiating the 
licensing process. This effect also disappears after the role switch. 
 There is no significant difference between the completeness and symmetry of 
information and the incompleteness and asymmetry of information when repeated 
bargaining is possible, but there is between scenarios A and E when repeated 
bargaining is not possible versus possible given that the innovator is the initiators 
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(scenarios A and E with p-value=0.0275). This effect also disappears after the role 
switch. The estimated odds of accepting a licensing offer is 1.56 times greater 
when the information is incomplete and asymmetric and repeated bargaining is 
possible than when the information is complete and symmetric and repeated 
bargaining is not possible, given that the innovator initiates in the first 36 rounds 
of the experiment. It is very clear that this effect can be attributed to either the 
nature of information or the possibility of repeated bargaining or both. The second 
model might be more adequate to explain that effect. 
 All other significant effects cannot be explained by this model since more than 
one characteristic changes between two scenarios. 
When the roles switch and the degree of patent breadth is reduced, bargaining has 
a significant effect on the decision in question under complete and symmetric information 
given that the potential entrant initiates the licensing process (scenarios B and D with p-
value=0.0241). The estimated odds under these conditions are 1.553 times greater when 
repeated bargaining is possible than when it is not. The other significant effect is between 
scenarios D and E (p-value=0.0274) but this effect cannot be explained clearly by this 
model.   
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6.7. Analysis and results of the patent challenging decision 
6.7.1. Data description 
The following analysis examines the effects of licensing, patent breadth, the potential 
entrant‟s type and the market conditions on an entrant‟s decision to challenge a patent via 
infringement. Data of all scenarios (A, B, C, D, E and F) are used.   
The variables considered for the statistical analysis are the following: Team, 
round, license, breadth, type, scenario, order and role, as previously defined. In addition 
to these variables, the “Result” column containing the 7 different possible outcomes is 
used. Since we are only interested in the challenging outcome in this analysis, the 
multinomial variable Result has been first edited as follows: The outcomes corresponding 
to “Fail” and “Succeed” have been labeled “Invest” and the outcomes corresponding to 
“Valid”, “Invalid” and “No Trial” have been labeled “Challenge” while the other 
outcomes “Accept” and “Out” stayed the same. Then, a new binary dependent variable, 
challenge, is created where the outcome “Challenge” is considered as 1 and all other 
outcomes are considered as 0.   
Since challenging a patent can occur whether the decision to license is made or 
not (but obviously when no agreement to license is reached), all 3454 observations were 
used, out of which 1120 patent challenges by infringement were noticed (32.43%). From 
these 1120 patent challenges, 
 61.96% occurred given a licensing offer had been made versus 38.04% when no 
licensing offer had been made (Table 38a); 
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 82.86% occurred when the patent was broad versus 17.14% when the patent was 
narrow (Table 38c); 
 20.71% occurred under scenario A, 16.34% under scenario B, 16.52% under 
scenario C, 13.39% under scenario D, 19.64% under scenario E and 13.69% 
under scenario F (Table 38b); 
 33.48% occurred when the innovator faced a potential entrant of the same cost 
structure versus 29.38% when she faced a strong potential entrant and 37.14% 
when she faced a weak potential entrant (Table 38c). 
A preliminary look at the chi-squares tests of the 4 frequency tables show that 
there is a significant difference between the effects of the levels of licensing, breadth, 
scenario and type on the decision to challenge a patent. However, because these 
frequency tables do not take into account all the variables in the model, the tests are used 
only to provide information about the distribution of the data but cannot be relied upon. 
6.7.2. Results 
The GLIMMIX procedure modeled the probabilities that challenge=1. All results are 
reported at the 0.05 rejection level in Appendix D.  
i. Analysis of patent challenge behavior by scenario 
The decision is first analyzed by scenario. For each scenario, all two-way and three-way 
interactions are included in the model. However, when all three-way interactions are 
included, the model failed to converge in all scenarios except for scenario A, in which 
none turned out to be significant. 
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The analysis of scenario A shows that all two-interactions are not significant and 
that patent challenge is significantly affected by patent breadth, the type of the potential 
entrant and whether a licensing offer has been made or not. LSM estimates and 
differences in these estimates are reported in Table 39. It is found that under complete 
and symmetric information with no multiple interactions between players, the likelihood 
of patent challenge is greater when no licensing offer is made by the innovator. The 
estimated probability of patent challenge is 67.72% when no licensing offer is made 
versus 25.97% when a licensing offer is made and the estimated odds of infringing a 
patent are 5.982 times greater when no licensing offer is made than when an offer is 
made. In addition, the results show that the type of potential entrant affects the challenge 
behavior when the competitor is weak or strong only. A weak rival is more likely to 
challenge a patent than a strong rival given the market conditions; the estimated 
probabilities being 60.48% and 37.62%, respectively. The estimated odds of infringement 
are 2.54 times greater when the innovator faces a weak rival than when she faces a strong 
rival. Finally, a broad patent is associated with a higher likelihood of challenge. The 
estimated probabilities of patent challenge are 78.16% for a broad patent compared to 
17.05% for a narrow patent and the estimated odds of challenging a patent by 
infringement are 17.41 times greater when a patent is broad than when it is narrow. 
The results of the analysis of scenario B show that role*license, breadth*type and 
role*breadth have a significant effect on the decision to challenge a patent under 
complete and symmetric information when the potential entrant is the one initiating the 
licensing process under a one-shot game. Since all the variables are involved in a two-
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way interaction, we can look only at their simple effects (Tables 40 and 41). Similar to 
scenario A, the likelihood of patent challenge is greater when no licensing offer is made 
than when an offer is made regardless of the role switch, however, before the role switch, 
the estimated odds of challenging a patent are 30.97 times greater when no licensing offer 
is made than when an offer is made compared to 4.62 after a switch in the roles. In 
addition, no statistical significant pairwise differences between the three levels of type of 
the potential entrant are detected when the patent is broad. However, there is a significant 
difference between a strong rival and a weak rival and a rival of equal cost structure to 
the innovator and a weak rival when the patent is narrow. The estimated odds of patent 
challenge are 4.41 times greater when the potential entrant is weak than when he is 
strong, and 3.76 times greater when the potential entrant is weak than when he is of the 
same cost structure as the innovator. Regardless of the type of the potential entrant, the 
likelihood of a broad patent being challenged is always greater; however, the estimated 
odds of challenging a patent given a specific type of potential entrant are 21.22, 38.7 and 
6.124 times greater when a patent is broad than when it is narrow given that the potential 
entrant is of equal, lower and higher cost structure than the innovator, respectively. 
Finally, the estimated odds of challenging a patent are 61.5 and 4.77 times greater when 
the patent is broad than when it is narrow before and after a role switch, respectively. 
The results of the analysis for scenario C (Tables 42 and 43) show that Breadth, 
License, Role*Type and Order*Type have a significant effect on the decision of interest. 
However, when fitting the model using the significant terms, the interaction Order*Type 
turns out to be not significant (p-value=0.0518) and is dropped from the model. Similar 
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to previous market conditions, under this scenario, a broad patent is associated with a 
greater likelihood of infringement. The estimated odds of challenging a patent are 30.56 
times greater when a patent is broad than when it is narrow and the estimated 
probabilities of patent challenge are 71.6% and 7.6% for a broad and narrow patent, 
respectively. Similarly, it is found that the likelihood of patent challenge is greater when 
no licensing offer is made than when an offer is made (61.95% and 11.33%, 
respectively). The estimated odds are 12.75 times greater when no licensing offer is made 
than when an offer is made. Finally, the results show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between a strong competitor and a weak competitor and between a 
weak competitor and a competitor of equal cost structure after a role switch occurs. This 
might be attributed to the fact that the patent breadth is reduced. In addition, the 
estimated odds of patent challenge are 3.24 times greater before a role switch (when 
patent breadth is extreme) than after a role switch (when patent breadth is reduced) given 
that the type of the entrant is strong while they are 2.49 times greater after than before a 
role switch given that the type of the entrant is weak. 
The results of the analysis of scenario D show that there are no significant two-
way interactions and that patent breadth, license and role have a significant effect on the 
patent challenge behavior. The results are consistent with previous findings: The 
likelihood of patent challenge is greater with a broad patent and when no licensing offer 
is made; it is however smaller before a role switch occurs. The estimated probabilities are 
54.23% and 9.31% when a licensing offer is made and when it is not, respectively; 
63.59% and 6.51% when a patent is broad and narrow, respectively; and finally 20.60% 
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and 31.93% before and after a switch occurs, respectively. The estimated odds of 
challenging a patent under complete and symmetric information when the entrant is the 
one initiating the licensing process with multiple interactions between both parties are 
11.54 times greater when no licensing offer is made than when an offer is made, 25.07 
times greater when a patent is broad than when it is narrow and finally 1.81 times greater 
after a role switch occurs than before (Table 44). 
In scenario E, license, breadth*type, order*type, role*breadth and order*breadth 
have been found to have a significant effect on the patent challenge behavior. Tables 45 
and 46 report the LSM estimates and the simple effect comparison of the different 
interactions LSM, respectively. The likelihood of patent challenge is greater when no 
licensing offer is made. The estimated odds of challenging a patent are 4.37 times greater 
when the innovator does not make a licensing offer than when she does. Given a narrow 
patent, the estimated odds of patent challenge are 10 times greater when the rival is weak 
than when he is strong, however, when the patent is broad, there is no difference between 
the three types of entrant. The estimated odds of patent challenge are always greater 
when the patent is broad than when it is narrow for all types of entrant, regardless the 
order and the role variables. The estimated odds of patent challenge under scenario E are: 
- 32.83, 54.61 and 9.271 times greater when the patent is broad than when it is 
narrow given that the type of entrant is similar to the innovator, strong and 
weak, respectively; 
-  41.5 and 15.7 times greater when the patent is broad than when it is narrow 
before and after a role switch occurs, respectively; 
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- 48.34 and 13.48 times greater when the patent is broad than when it is narrow 
given that the information is given in a fixed sequence and randomly, 
respectively. 
Finally, the patent challenge behavior under scenario F is affected solely by 
the two-way interaction Breadth*License. The results are reported in Table 47 and show 
that a broad patent is associated with a greater likelihood of being challenged whether a 
licensing offer has been made or not by the potential entrant under the market conditions 
of this scenario. The estimated odds of challenging a patent are 72.24 greater when the 
patent is broad than when it is narrow given that a licensing offer is not made by the 
potential entrant versus and 7.75 times greater when the patent is broad than when it is 
narrow given that a licensing offer is sought by the potential entrant. On the other hand, 
there is a significant difference between the presence and the absence of a licensing offer 
when the patent is broad, but no difference at all with a narrow patent. The estimated 
odds of patent challenge are 11.82 times greater in the absence of a licensing offer than in 
its presence given that the patent is broad. 
ii. Analysis of patent challenge behavior using aggregate data 
Up to 3-way interactions are considered in the analysis (all 4-way interaction and above 
did not converge). The results show a significant 3-way interaction which is kept in the 
model in addition to all the significant 2-way interactions and the following final model is 
fitted:  
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         (9) 
The fit of the model is deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 0.89 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
Because all the variables in the model are involved in two-way and/or three-way 
interactions, we cannot look at their main effects but their simple effects using the 
“slicediff” option in the “lsmeans” statement in GLIMMIX procedure. The results show a 
significant effect of: 
 The patent breadth regardless of the order in which the games are played (control 
vs randomized version). The estimated odds of a potential entrant challenging a 
patent are 39.047 and 23.173 times greater when a patent is broad than when it is 
narrow under the control and the randomized version, respectively; 
 The patent breadth in both parts of the experiment, for all levels of the type of 
entrant and whether a licensing offer has been made or not. In all these cases, the 
likelihood of observing a patent challenge is greater with a broad patent regardless 
of the market conditions. The estimated odds of an entrant challenging a patent 
are 51.193 and 17.675 times greater when the patent is broad than when it is 
narrow in the first and second part of the experiment, respectively. The estimated 
odds in the second part are smaller. This might be due to learning hoe to play the 
game (the potential entrant in the second part was the innovator in the first part) 
and/or to the fact that the degree of patent breadth has been reduced. The 
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estimated odds of patent challenge are 32.011, 50.608 and 16.802 times greater 
when a patent is broad than when it is narrow given that the type of entrant is 
similar to the innovator, strong and weak, respectively. The estimated odds of 
patent challenge are 51.696 and 17.503 times greater when the patent is broad 
than when it is narrow given that a licensing offer has been made or not, 
respectively. 
 The role switch when the patent is narrow. The estimated odds of challenging a 
patent are 2.451 times greater in the second part of the experiment than in the first 
part of the experiment. This effect can be attributed to the switch in role and/or 
the reduction in the degree of patent breadth. 
 The type of the potential entrant in the second part of the experiment only. The 
estimated odds of challenging a patent are 1.685 times greater when the entrant is 
of the equal cost structure to the innovator versus when he is of a lower cost 
structure; 1.508 times greater when the innovator is facing a weak rival versus a 
rival of same cost structure; and finally 2.544 times greater when the innovator is 
facing a weak rival versus a strong rival.  
 The role switch when the rival is of a high cost structure. The estimated odds of 
challenging a patent are 1.934 times greater in the second part of the experiment 
than in the first part. 
 The type of the potential entrant when the patent is narrow. The estimated odds of 
challenging a patent are 3.18 times greater with a weak rival than with a strong 
rival; 1.720 times greater when the entrant has an equal cost structure to the 
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innovator versus a lower cost structure and finally 1.85 times greater when the 
entrant has a higher cost structure versus a similar cost structure. In addition, a 
weak rival is more likely to challenge a patent compared to a strong rival under 
scenarios A, B, C, F in the randomized version and under scenario E in the control 
version.  
 Whether a licensing offer has been made or not. The likelihood of patent 
challenge is greater when no licensing offer is made for both types of patent 
breadth, regardless of the market conditions. However, the likelihood is greater 
when the patent is broad than narrow. The estimated odds are 13.699 and 4.638 
times greater in the absence of a licensing offer than in its presence given that the 
patent is broad and narrow, respectively. 
 The number of interaction (one shot game versus multiple interactions game) in 
both cases: when the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process and 
when the entrant is the one initiating the licensing process.  
o The likelihood of patent challenge is greater in a one shot game for both 
the control and the randomized versions given that the innovator is the one 
initiating the licensing process and the entrant has a high cost structure. It 
is also greater in the control version and when the entrant has a low cost 
structure. The estimated odds of challenging a patent are 3.295 and 2.329 
times greater in a one-shot game than in a game involving multiple 
interactions, given that the innovator is the one initiating the licensing 
process, the entrant has a high cost structure and under the control and the 
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randomized version, respectively, and 2.6 times greater in a one-shot game 
than in a repeated interactions game given that the games are played in a 
random order, the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process and 
the entrant has a low cost structure. 
o The likelihood of patent challenge is greater in a one shot game when the 
entrant has a high and a low cost structure in the control version. 
 The completeness and symmetry of information only when the innovator is the 
one initiating the licensing process. The estimated odds of challenging a patent 
are 4.48 and 3.56 times greater under incomplete and asymmetric information 
than under complete and symmetric information when the entrant is weak in the 
control version and when the entrant is strong in the randomized version, 
respectively. 
 The party that initiates the licensing process in both types of game (one-shot game 
and multiple interactions game) under complete and symmetric information and 
under incomplete and asymmetric information. The likelihood of challenging a 
patent is higher when the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process in a 
one shot game under complete and symmetric information in the randomized 
version and that the type of entrant is same or weak; in a multiple interactions 
game under complete and symmetric information in the randomized version and 
the type of entrant is same; and under incomplete and asymmetric information for 
all types of entrant in the randomized version and for a weak rival in the control 
version.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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6.8.  Analysis and results of the litigation decision 
6.8.1. Data description 
The following analysis examines the effects of licensing, patent breadth, the potential 
entrant‟s type and the market conditions on the innovator‟s decision to invoke an 
infringement trial. Data of all scenarios (A, B, C, D, E and F) are used.   
The variables considered for the statistical analysis are the following: Team, 
round, license, breadth, type, scenario, order and role, as previously defined. In addition 
to these variables, the “Result” column containing the 7 different possible outcomes is 
used. Since we are only interested in the litigation outcome in this analysis, the result 
multinomial variable has been first edited as follows: The outcomes corresponding to 
“Valid” and “Invalid” are labeled “Trial” while the outcome “NoTrial” is kept the same. 
Then, a new binary dependent variable, litigation, is created where the outcome “Trial” is 
considered as 1 and all other outcomes considered as 0.   
Because the only way to invoke a litigation trial is for the potential entrant to 
challenge the patent via infringement, observations that correspond solely to result 
column=”Trial” and “NoTrial” are kept in the model, reducing therefore the number of 
observations used in the analysis from 3454 to 1120 out of which 942 resulted in a 
litigation trial (84.11%).  
From these 942 litigation trials, 
 62.31% occurred given a licensing offer had been made versus 37.69% when no 
licensing offer had been made (Table 48a); 
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 21.13% occurred under scenario A, 15.92% under scenario B, 16.77% under 
scenario C, 13.27% under scenario D, 19.53% under scenario E and 13.38% 
under scenario F (Table 48b); 
 80.68% occurred when the patent was broad versus 19.32% when the patent was 
narrow (Table 48c); 
 32.17% occurred when the innovator faced a potential entrant of the same cost 
structure versus 31.63% when she faced a strong potential entrant and 36.20% 
when she faced a weak potential entrant (Table 48d). 
6.8.2. Results 
The GLIMMIX procedure modeled the probabilities that litigation=1. All results are 
reported at the 0.05 rejection level in Appendix D.  
i. Analysis of patent litigation behavior by scenario: 
The patent litigation behavior analysis resulted in failure of convergence in some 
scenarios, therefore the analysis is performed using the combined data and accounting for 
the effects of the different scenarios. 
ii. Analysis of patent litigation behavior using aggregate data: 
Up to 3-way interactions are considered in the analysis, however, models including all 3-
way and 2-way interactions failed to converge. Therefore, a model with no interactions is 
fitted.  
Type III tests of fixed effects are reported in Table 49. The table shows that the 
variables order, role, breadth and type have a significant effect on the decision to invoke 
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a litigation trial while the different market conditions and the licensing decision have no 
significant effects.  
The model is fit again including only the significant terms which turned out to be 
all significant. The final estimated model is as follow: 
 (10) 
The fit of the model is deemed adequate because of the generalized chi squares 
over the degree of freedom of 0.68 which is close to the recommended value of 1 for the 
generalized linear models. 
Since all the variables in the model are not involved in any interaction, we are 
able to look at their main effect. The results are the following (Tables 50 and 51): 
 The estimated probabilities of invoking a litigation trial are 96.76% in the control 
version versus 92.58% in the randomized version. The estimated odds of invoking 
a litigation trial are 2.393 times greater in the control versus the randomized 
version; 
 The estimated probabilities of invoking a litigation trial are 91.71% before a 
switch in the roles versus 97.11% after the role switch taking into account that the 
degree of breadth has been reduced in the second part of the experiment.  The 
estimated odds of invoking an infringement trial are 3.039 times greater in the 
second part than in the first part of the experiment; 
 The estimated probabilities of invoking a litigation trial are 89.29% when the 
patent is broad versus 97.81% when the patent is narrow. The estimated odds of 
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invoking a litigation trial are 5.347 times greater when the patent is narrow versus 
broad; 
 The estimated probabilities of invoking a litigation trial are 93.37% when the 
innovator faces a rival of similar cost structure, versus 97.47% when the entrant 
has a lower cost structure and 92.98% when the entrant has a higher cost 
structure.  
6.9.  Concluding remarks 
This chapter discussed an economic interactive experiment developed to investigate the 
effect of the breadth of patent protection and the cost structure of a potential licensee on 
an innovator‟s decision to license her patent and to litigate under infringement as well as 
on the likelihood of a patent challenge by infringement. These effects are examined under 
six different market conditions to determine whether these market conditions affect 
behavior. The market conditions of interest are (i) whether the patentee or the potential 
entrant initiate the licensing process, (ii) the nature of interaction between the patentee 
and the entrant during the bargaining process (one shot versus repeated interaction), and 
(iii) the nature of information available to the patentee and the entrant when they make 
their respective decisions (complete versus incomplete information). The experiment was 
run with 96 undergraduate students attending UNL. 
The results show that patent breadth has a significant effect on licensing behavior. 
The findings are consistent with the existing literature in the sense that economic agents 
are more likely to license a broad patent than a narrow patent regardless of the market 
conditions and the type of potential entrant they face. Also, the market conditions are 
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found to have a significant effect on the licensing behavior depending on the type of 
potential entrant the innovator faces. When the innovator faces a strong rival, the 
licensing decision is independent of the market conditions. However, when she faces a 
weak rival or a rival of a similar cost structure, licensing is more likely to be sought in a 
one-shot game than in a repeated interactions game under complete and symmetric 
information, regardless of who initiates the licensing process. In addition, licensing is 
more likely to be sought under incomplete and asymmetric information than under 
complete and symmetric information regardless of who initiates the licensing process. In 
the same manner, the type of the potential entrant affects significantly the licensing 
behavior depending on the market conditions. In a repeated interactions game under 
complete information, the innovator is more likely to license to a strong competitor 
versus a competitor of a similar or higher cost structure, while under incomplete and 
asymmetric information, the innovator is more likely to license to a weak rather than a 
strong competitor. The order the games are played (control versus randomized version) 
doesn‟t have any effect on the licensing decision. 
The results also show that the likelihood of licensing occurrence depends on the 
patent breadth under complete and symmetric information with no repeated interactions. 
The likelihood of reaching a licensing agreement is greater with a narrow patent when the 
innovator is the one initiating the licensing process, while it is found to be greater with a 
broad patent when the entrant is the one initiating the licensing process, regardless of the 
type of the potential entrant. The latter findings where the entrant is the one seeking a 
license conform to expectations as the innovator is more likely to accept a licensing offer 
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when her patent is broad because of the high risk of a patent challenge. However, the 
results are not expected when the innovator is the one seeking a license since with a 
narrow patent, one would expect a strong rival to find it optimal to invest in R&D rather 
than settling to a licensing contract. We also found that the different market conditions 
have a significant effect on the licensing occurrence when the patent is broad and none 
when it is narrow. The nature of the potential entrant is only found to be important under 
incomplete and asymmetric information. Licensing is more likely to occur when the 
innovator faces a strong rival under incomplete and asymmetric information with 
repeated interactions given that the innovator is the one initiating the licensing process. 
The order the games are played does not affect the decision to accept a licensing offer.   
The patent challenge behavior is found to be greatly affected by the patent breadth 
and by whether a licensing offer has been made or not. The results show that a broad 
patent is more likely to be challenged, by infringement in this experiment, by all types of 
potential entrant and under all market conditions, which conforms to the predictions of 
theoretical studies. In addition, the likelihood of patent challenge is greater when no 
licensing offer has been made under all market conditions and for all types of entrant. 
The nature of the entrant is found to have a significant effect on the patent challenge 
behavior: A weak rival is more likely to challenge a patent than a strong rival. The patent 
challenge behavior is affected also by the different market characteristics (who initiate 
the licensing process, the completeness of information and the presence or absence of 
repeated bargaining) depending on the nature of the entrant and the order the games are 
played.   
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Finally, the results show that patent litigation behavior is greatly affected by 
patent breadth, the nature of the entrant, the order the games are played and the role 
switch. The likelihood of an innovator invoking an infringement trial is greater when she 
holds a narrow patent (as suggested in patent litigation literature), when she faces a 
strong rival, under the control version and after a role switch has taken place.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS   
This study investigated the objective of a patentee when deciding to license her 
patent by examining whether, when the decision to license is made, the patentee 
maximizes profits or her strategy is to maintain a dominant market position by 
controlling the largest market share. The study also investigated the likelihood of patent 
licensing, licensing occurrence, patent challenge and patent litigation given patent 
breadth and the type of a potential entrant. Each decision has been examined separately 
under six different market conditions (scenarios) to identify the effects of the party 
initiating the licensing process, the possibility of repeated bargaining and the 
completeness and symmetry of information on the behavior of the economic agents.  
The above questions were examined using economics experiments with 
undergraduate students from UNL as subjects. An individual experiment was developed 
to investigate the objective from licensing, while an interactive experiment was 
developed to examine the patent licensing, patent challenge and patent litigation 
behavior. The findings of these experiments are summarized in sections 5.5 and 6.9 in 
this study. These findings are very helpful in understanding various aspects of the patent 
licensing, patent challenging and patent litigation behavior. 
Both experiments generated rich data. However, only part of this data was used to 
investigate the objectives of this study. The use of the complete data will help investigate 
additional interesting economic questions, such as: 
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- Possible differences in patenting behavior between subjects exposed and trained 
to think like economists (students in Economics, Agricultural Economics, Business or 
any other related major) and subjects without this training; 
- The licensing behavior of the potential entrants (scenarios B, D and E) depending 
on patent breadth and the nature of the potential entrant under the six different market 
conditions; 
- The effect of the agreed upon licensing fee on likelihood of patent challenge and 
patent litigation as well as on the occurrence of licensing depending on the patent 
breadth and the nature of the potential entrant under the six different market 
conditions; 
- The effect of patent breadth and the type of potential entrant on the number of 
offers made in the repeated interactions games. 
These economic questions will be examined using the data generated by the 
second experiment developed in this study. In this experiment, each patent holder was 
allowed to face one potential licensee at a time and the subjects were paired up 
randomly and electronically preserving anonymity among subjects. It would be 
interesting to replicate the current experiment, however, allowing for a direct personal 
interaction between each pair of patent holder and potential entrant.  
Another possible extension of the second experiment would be to allow the 
innovator to face many potential entrants of different types at the same time and test 
the theory developed by Rockett (1990) which suggests that the patentee can crowd 
the market with weak competitors to leave the strong competitors out of the market. 
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Other extensions would be to allow for a potential entrant to face many innovators and 
for many innovators to face many potential entrants. However, these variations require 
a different experimental design than the one developed in this study and will be the 
focus of future research. 
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APPENDIX A1: ANNOUNCEMENT: ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT IN THE DEPT. OF 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
 
You are invited to participate in an economics experiment that will be conducted in the 
next month at the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln. The experiment seeks to examine how individuals make economic decisions 
under different situations and will last up to an hour. Your participation will involve 
making decisions given the information provided to you. Your decisions will be kept 
confidential and all data collected will be presented in aggregate form so it would be 
impossible to identify you and/or link you to any given decision. For your participation 
you will be paid $15 an amount that exceeds the compensation that you would receive for 
working a comparable number of hours. Your participation fee will be paid to you in cash 
immediately after the completion of the experiment.  
If you are interested in participating please send the information requested below 
via email to Dr. Emie Yiannaka at yiannaka2@unl.edu and Ms Rita Abdelnour at 
ritaen@huskers.unl.edu and use “Economics Experiment” as your email‟s subject to 
ensure we receive your response. Once we receive your email, we will contact you with 
more information on the time and place where the experiment will be conducted. Thank 
you. 
 Your name: ……………………………………………….. 
 Your major: ………………………………………………… 
 Phone (day): ………………………………………………... 
  (evening, if different): ……………………………….. 
 Email address: ……………………………………………….. 
Please indicate which time/day is most likely to be convenient for you this semester; feel 
free to indicate more than one time/day 
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Appendix A2: INFORMED CONSENT FORM (will be read to the participants at the 
beginning of the session) 
 
Study Title: Using Economic Experiments to Understand Patenting Behavior: The Patent 
Licensing Decision 
 
You have registered to participate in an economics experiment that seeks to examine how 
individuals make economic decisions under different situations. The information gathered may 
help the authors of the study to better understand the patent licensing decision making process. 
There are no known risks involved in participating in the experiment which will last about an 
hour. You will receive $15 in cash at the end of the session as a compensation for your 
participation. You are free to withdraw at anytime during the session. However, by withdrawing 
you will rescind your right to get paid.  
The information that you provide will be kept confidential and known only to the authors 
of this study. In addition, all data collected will be presented in aggregate form so it will be 
impossible to identify you and/or link you to any given decision. During the experiment you will 
be identified by an identification number assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment.  
You may ask questions concerning this research and have those questions answered 
before agreeing to participate in or during the study. Or you may call the investigators, office 
phone, (402) 472-2047 or (402) 472-7865. Please contact the investigators: 
- if you want to voice concerns or complaints about the research 
- in the event of a research related injury 
Please contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board at (402) 472-6965 
for the following reasons: 
- you wish to talk to someone other than the research staff to obtain answers to questions about 
your rights as a research participant 
- to voice concerns or complaints about the research 
- to provide input concerning the research process 
- in the event the study staff could not be reached 
 Participation in this study is voluntary. You can refuse to participate or withdraw at any 
time without harming your relationship with the researchers or the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, department of Agricultural Economics, or in any other way receive a penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and 
understood the information presented. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
Thank you in advance for your participation in the experiment. 
 
 
Signature of participant: 
 
 
----------------------------------------------                                       ------------------------------    
    Signature of Research Participant                                                            Date 
 
 
Name and phone number of investigators: 
Dr. Amalia (Emie) Yiannaka, PhD, Principal Investigator office: (402) 472-2047 
Ms. Rita Abdelnour, RA, Co-Investigator   office: (402) 472-7865 
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APPENDIX A3: EXPERIMENT 1: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND SURVEY 
General instructions 
Welcome! During the following hour you are going to participate in an economics 
exercise that requires you to make decisions under different situations. Please read every 
situation carefully as while some situations might seem the same they are different. You 
may notice other participants in the room that will be part of the same experiment; 
however, there will be no interaction among you, your decisions will not affect theirs 
(and vice versa) and your decisions will be unknown to them. Do not be concerned if 
others make decisions and finish before you. When you are done making all decisions 
you may leave. Are there any questions?  
Scenario 1:  
Assume that you are an innovator who has developed a new product, you have patented it 
and have made the decision to license it. You can license it to one of the following rival 
firms: a strong competitor or a weak competitor knowing that the firm that does not 
receive a license will stay out of the market.  
The strong competitor has lower costs than you, will produce more output than 
you but will pay you a higher royalty fee than the weak competitor. The weak competitor 
has higher costs than you, will produce less output than you but will pay you a lower 
royalty fee than the strong competitor. Under this case, if you license to the weak 
competitor you maintain your dominant market share position (which means that you will 
be producing more than your rival) and you will be viewed as the leader in this market 
while if you license to the strong competitor you lose your dominant market share 
position (which means that you will be producing less than your rival) and you will no 
longer be viewed as the market leader. Your total profits (which include production 
profits and the royalty fee paid to you by the rival firm) when you license to the strong 
rival may be smaller, greater than or equal to your total profits when you license to the 
weak rival.  
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The following 18 rounds describe different situations regarding your market 
share/leadership position and total profits from licensing to either type of firm. The 
decision you need to make is to whom you will license under each round given the 
information you receive; the weak rival or the strong rival. For each round, click on the 
type of firm you are going to license to and then click the submit button. If you need to 
read this general description before making a decision under any of the following 18 
rounds click on the „Scenario 1: General Description‟ button.  
Are there any questions? 
 
Round 1: 
Your market share from licensing to the strong competitor < your market share from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
And 
Your total profits from licensing to the strong competitor = your total profits from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to  
the strong rival 
Round 2: Your market share 
Your total profit 
85% 
$150 million 
50% 
$150 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
1
6
4
 
Round 3:  
Your market share from licensing to the strong competitor < Your market share from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
And 
Your total profit from licensing to the strong competitor < Your total profit from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the  
strong rival 
Round 4: Your market share 
Your total profit 
60% 
$150 million 
50% 
$110 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the  
strong rival 
Round 5: Your market share 
Your total profit 
1.5 C > 50 % 
$1.25 D 
C<50 % 
$D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and a half times 
greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will control 
more than 50% of the market. In addition, your total profits will be one and a quarter 
times greater when you license to the weak than when you license to the strong rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
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Round 6: 
Your market share from licensing to the strong competitor < Your market share from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
Your total profits from licensing to the strong competitor > Your total profits from 
licensing to the weak competitor 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the  
strong rival 
Round 7: Your market share 
Your total profit 
90% 
$467 million 
40% 
$928 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
  B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 8: Your market share 
Your total profits 
90% 
$467 million 
40% 
$750 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 9: Your market share 
Your total profits 
90% 
$467 million 
40% 
$592 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
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  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 10: Your market share 
Your total profits 
60% 
$400 million 
30% 
$750 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 11: Your market share 
Your total profits 
75% 
$400 million 
30% 
$750 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 12: Your market share 
Your total profits 
90% 
$400 million 
30% 
$750 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 13: Your market share 
Your total profits 
1.25 C > 50 % 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$1.25 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and a quarter 
times greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will 
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control more than 50% of the market. However, your total profits will be one and a 
quarter times greater when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak 
rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 14: Your market share 
Your total profits 
1.25 C > 50 % 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$1.5 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and a quarter 
times greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will 
control more than 50% of the market. However, your total profits will be one and a half 
times greater when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 15: Your market share 
Your total profits 
1.25 C > 50 % 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$2 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and a quarter 
times greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will 
control more than 50% of the market. However, your total profits will be two times 
greater when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak rival.  
 
124 
 
 
1
6
4
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 16: Your market share 
Your total profits 
1.5 C > 50 % 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$1.25 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and a half times 
greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will control 
more than 50% of the market. However, your total profits will be one and a quarter times 
greater when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 17: Your market share 
Your total profits 
1.75 C > 50% 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$1.25 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be one and three quarter 
times greater than your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will 
control more than 50% of the market. However, your total profits will be one and a 
quarter times greater when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak 
rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
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  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 18: Your market share 
Your total profits 
2 C > 50 % 
$D 
C < 50 % 
$1.25 D 
 
The parameter C is a percentage while the parameter D is millions of dollars. Thus, under 
this case if you license to the weak rival your market share will be two times greater than 
your market share when you license to the strong rival and you will control more than 
50% of the market. However, your total profits will be one and a quarter times greater 
when you license to the strong than when you license to the weak rival.  
Your decision: A. License to the weak rival  
B. License to the strong rival 
Scenario 2 
Assume that you are an innovator who has developed a new product, you have patented it 
and have made the decision to license it. You can license it to one of the following rival 
firms: a strong competitor or a weak competitor. However, there is a probability that 
the firm that does not receive a license will enter the market without a licensing 
contract.  
The strong competitor has lower costs than you, will produce more output than 
you but will pay you a higher royalty fee than the weak competitor. The weak competitor 
has higher costs than you, will producer less output than you but will pay you a lower 
royalty fee than the strong competitor. Under this case, if you license to the weak 
competitor you maintain your dominant market share position (which means that you will 
be producing more than your rival) and you will be viewed as the market leader but your 
total profits (which include production profits and the royalty fee paid to you by the rival 
firm) will be lower than if you were to license to the strong competitor. On the other 
hand, if you license to the strong competitor you lose your dominant market share 
position (which means that you will be producing less than your rival) and you will no 
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longer be viewed as the market leader but your total profits are greater than if you were to 
license to the weak competitor. 
In both cases, whether you decide to license to the strong or to the weak 
competitor, there is a probability that the firm that does not receive a license will enter 
the market without a licensing contract in which case your market share and total profits 
will be affected. 
The following 11 rounds describe different situations regarding your market 
share/leadership position and total profits from licensing to either type of firm. The 
decision you need to make is to whom you will license under each round given the 
information you receive; the weak rival or the strong rival. For each round, click on the 
type of firm you are going to license to and then click the submit button. If you need to 
read this general description before making a decision under any of the following 11 
rounds click on the „Scenario 2: General Description button‟.  
Are there any questions? 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 1: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
You have decided to license to the weak competitor. Assume that there is a 20% 
probability that the strong competitor will enter the market without a license in which 
case your new market share and total profits from licensing to the weak competitor would 
be: 
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 When licensing to the weak rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival.  
 
You have decided to license to the strong competitor. Assume there is a 20% probability 
that the weak competitor will enter the market without a license in which case your new 
market share and total profits from licensing to the strong competitor would be: 
 When licensing to the strong rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival. 
 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 2: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
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You have decided to license to the weak competitor. Assume that there is a 40% 
probability that the strong competitor will enter the market without a license in which 
case your new market share and total profits from licensing to the weak competitor would 
be: 
 When licensing to the weak rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival.  
 
You have decided to license to the strong competitor. Assume there is a 40% probability 
that the weak competitor will enter the market without a license in which case your new 
market share and total profits from licensing to the strong competitor would be: 
 When licensing to the strong rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival.  
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  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 3: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
You have decided to license to the weak competitor. Assume that there is a 60% 
probability that the strong competitor will enter the market without a license in which 
case your new market share and total profits from licensing to the weak competitor would 
be: 
 When licensing to the weak rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival.  
 
You have decided to license to the strong competitor. Assume there is a 60% probability 
that the weak competitor will enter the market without a license in which case your new 
market share and total profits from licensing to the strong competitor would be: 
 When licensing to the strong rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
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A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival.  
 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival 
When licensing to the 
strong rival 
Round 4: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
You have decided to license to the weak competitor. Assume that there is a 80% 
probability that the strong competitor will enter the market without a license in which 
case your new market share and total profits from licensing to the weak competitor would 
be: 
 When licensing to the weak rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival.  
 
You have decided to license to the strong competitor. Assume there is a 80% probability 
that the weak competitor will enter the market without a license in which case your new 
market share and total profits from licensing to the strong competitor would be: 
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 When licensing to the strong rival 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Given this new information you may or may not want to change your initial decision. 
Please choose one of the following options.  
A. I do not want to change my initial decision, I will license to the strong rival. 
B. I want to change my initial decision, I will license to the weak rival.  
 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 5: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 20% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 20% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 20% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 20% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor  
  B. License to the strong competitor  
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  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 6: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 40% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 40% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 40% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 40% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 7: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 60% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 60% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
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 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 60% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 60% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 8: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 80% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 80% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 80% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 80% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
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  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 9: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 40% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 20% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 40% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 20% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 10: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 60% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 20% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
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 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 60% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 20% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
  When licensing to the 
weak rival and the strong 
rival does not enter 
When licensing to the 
strong rival and the weak 
rival does not enter 
Round 11: Your market share 
Your total profits 
80% 
$ 500 million 
30% 
$ 650 million 
 
If there is a 80% probability that the strong rival will enter the market when you license 
to the weak rival and a 20% probability that the weak rival will enter the market when 
you license to the strong rival in which case your new market share and total profits will 
be given by  
 When licensing to the weak 
rival and the strong rival 
enters with 80% probability 
When licensing to the strong 
rival and the weak rival 
enters with 20% probability 
Your market share 
Your total profits 
45% 
$ 200 million 
20% 
$ 475 million 
 
Your decision: A. License to the weak competitor 
  B. License to the strong competitor 
 
 
136 
 
 
1
6
4
 
APPENDIX B1: ANNOUNCEMENT: ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT IN THE DEPT. OF 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
You are invited to participate in an economics experiment that will be conducted in May 
2009 at the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
on East Campus. The experiment seeks to examine how individuals make economic 
decisions under different situations and will last up to an hour and a half. Your 
participation will involve making decisions given the information provided to you. 
During the experiment you are going to be paired up electronically against a person that 
will be anonymous to you as you will be to them and your decisions will affect their 
potential earnings and vice versa. Your decisions will be kept confidential and all data 
collected will be presented in aggregate form so it would be impossible to identify you 
and/or link you to any given decision. For your participation you will be paid a minimum 
payment of $10. This amount will be paid to you at the end of the experiment regardless 
of how you play the game. However, depending on how you play the game, you could 
potentially earn up to $20 in addition to your minimum payment, for a total potential 
payment of $30.  You will be paid in cash immediately after the completion of the 
experiment.  
The experiment will start the first week after final exams week and will be 
conducted in the "Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory" (EBEL) on East 
campus, at Filley Hall, room 59, which is located in the basement of Filley Hall. 
If you are interested in participating please register in one of the sessions below 
by replying to our email and mentioning the session that you are registering for. Please 
also indicate whether any of the remaining sessions could also work for you. Send the 
information requested to Dr. Emie Yiannaka at yiannaka2@unl.edu and Ms Rita 
Abdelnour at ritaen@huskers.unl.edu and use “Economics Experiment” as your email‟s 
subject to ensure we receive your response. Thank you. 
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APPENDIX B2: INFORMED CONSENT FORM (will be read to the participants at the 
beginning of the session) 
 
Study Title: Using Economic Experiments to Understand Licensing Behavior: The Patent 
Licensing Decision 
 
You have registered to participate in an economics experiment that seeks to examine how 
individuals make economic decisions under different situations. The information gathered may 
help the authors of the study to better understand the patent licensing decision making process. 
There are no known risks involved in participating in the experiment which will last about an 
hour and a half. For your participation you will be paid a minimum payment of $10. This 
amount will be paid to you at the end of the experiment regardless of how you play the 
game. However, depending on how you play the game, you could potentially earn up to 
$20 in addition to your minimum payment, for a total potential payment of $30. You are 
free to withdraw at anytime during the session. However, by withdrawing you will rescind your 
right to get paid.  
The information that you provide will be kept confidential and known only to the authors 
of this study. In addition, all data collected will be presented in aggregate form so it will be 
impossible to identify you and/or link you to any given decision. During the experiment you will 
be identified by an identification number assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment.  
You may ask questions concerning this research and have those questions answered 
before agreeing to participate in or during the study. Or you may call the investigators, office 
phone, (402) 472-2047 or (402) 472-7865. Please contact the investigators: 
- if you want to voice concerns or complaints about the research 
- in the event of a research related injury 
Please contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board at (402) 472-6965 
for the following reasons: 
- you wish to talk to someone other than the research staff to obtain answers to questions about 
your rights as a research participant 
- to voice concerns or complaints about the research 
- to provide input concerning the research process 
- in the event the study staff could not be reached 
 Participation in this study is voluntary. You can refuse to participate or withdraw at any 
time without harming your relationship with the researchers or the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, department of Agricultural Economics, or in any other way receive a penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and 
understood the information presented. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
Thank you in advance for your participation in the experiment. 
 
Signature of participant: 
 
----------------------------------------------                                       ------------------------------    
    Signature of Research Participant                                                            Date 
 
Name and phone number of investigators: 
Dr. Amalia (Emie) Yiannaka, PhD, Principal Investigator office: (402) 472-2047 
Ms. Rita Abdelnour, RA, Co-Investigator   office: (402) 472-7865 
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APPENDIX B3: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DEMONSTRATION 
General instructions 
Welcome! During the following hour you are going to participate in a series of rounds 
that require you to make decisions under different situations. In each round you are going 
to be paired up electronically against a person that will be anonymous to you as you will 
be to them. You will be making decisions in a market where one of you will be an 
innovator who holds a patent on a new product and the other will be a potential entrant 
(rival) who is considering producing and selling a product in the innovator‟s market. In 
some rounds you might be the innovator, while in others you might be the entrant. The 
decisions you and the person you will be matched up against make affect the payoffs you 
will both earn. Each of you will earn a minimum of $10 dollars for participating in the 
experiment; this amount will be paid to you at the end of the experiment regardless of 
how you play the game. However, depending on how you play the game, you could 
potentially triple your minimum payment and earn up to $20 in addition to your 
minimum payment.  
Note that, in the market where you will be making your decisions, your payoffs will be 
measured in millions of dollars. One million dollars corresponds to $0.02 in real money. 
Your objective is to maximize your earnings in each round. Please note that depending on 
your decisions, you may end up losing money. The total amount you earn or lose is the 
sum of what you earn/lose under each round. If after the completion of all rounds your 
total payoffs are zero or negative, your additional payment will be zero and you will be 
paid your participation fee ($10). If, for instance, your total payoff at the end of all 
rounds is $450 Million you will be paid an additional $9 at the end of the experiment 
while if your total payoff is -$20M your additional payment will be zero.  
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Market conditions 
Scenario A 
The innovator needs to decide whether to sell a patent license to the entrant that will 
allow him/her to enter the innovator‟s market.  
 If the innovator decides to sell a license, she/he needs to determine the licensing 
fee that the entrant must pay. If the entrant accepts the offer to obtain a license 
and pays the licensing fee proposed by the innovator the game ends. The payoffs 
earned in this case depend on the agreed upon licensing fee. 
 If the entrant rejects the licensing offer, or if the innovator decides not to sell a 
patent license, the entrant need to decide (1) whether to stay out of the market, (2) 
enter the market and try to produce a product that does not infringe on the 
innovator‟s patent or (3) enter the market and legally challenge the patent (i.e., 
infringe and/or challenge the validity of the patent). Each of the above three 
decisions results in different payoffs for the innovator and the entrant. In addition, 
decisions (2) and (3) are associated with certain probabilities that the entrant will 
be successful in producing a product that does not infringe the patent (decision 
(2)) and that a patent challenge will result in the patent found invalid in court and 
thus revoked (decision (3)). 
 If the entrant decides to infringe the patent, the innovator needs to further decide 
whether to invoke an infringement trial or not. 
Note that, all these decisions and their associated payoffs need to be considered in order 
to make a decision.  
A game tree that highlights the possible decisions for the innovator and the entrant and 
the probabilities and payoffs associated with each decision under this scenario will be 
provided under each round. What will differ from round to round are the payoffs and the 
probabilities associated with the different outcomes. On the game tree, the innovator‟s 
payoffs appear next to the letter I while the entrant‟s payoffs next to the letter E. your 
own payoffs will appear in bold to distinguish them from your rival‟s payoffs.  
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Under this scenario, both you and the person you are matched up against have access to 
the same game tree, probabilities and payoff information.  
Scenario B 
The market conditions under scenario B are similar to those under scenario A. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is that under scenario B it is the entrant that seeks a 
patent license and makes a licensing offer to the innovator.  
Scenario C 
The market conditions under scenario C are similar to those under scenario A. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is that under scenario C there may be multiple 
interactions between the innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee.  
Scenario D 
The market conditions under scenario D are similar to those under scenario B. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is that under scenario D there may be multiple 
interactions between the innovator and the entrant when determining the licensing fee.  
Scenario E 
The market conditions under scenario E are similar to those under scenario C. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is that under scenario E each player can view only 
their own payoffs.  
Scenario F 
The market conditions under scenario F are similar to those under scenario D. The only 
difference between the two scenarios is that under scenario F each player can view only 
their own payoffs. 
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Scenario A 
 
Profits from this round: Total profits: 
 
INNOVATOR  
License Not license 
Determine Licensing Fee: $X 
ENTRANT 
Accept Reject 
Stay out Enter w/o infringement  Enter with infringement 
Succeed Fail Patent  
Valid 
Patent 
Invalid 
PAYOFFS 
I: $8+X 
E: $7-X 
I: $17 
E: $0 
I: $9 
E: $7 
I: $15 
E: $-4 
I: $6 
E: $5 
I: $13 
E: $-2 
10% 90% 40% 60% 
INNOVATOR 
No trial     Trial  
I: $8 
E: $7 
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Scenario B 
 
ENTRANT  
Buy a license Not buy a license 
Determine Licensing Fee: $X 
INNOVATOR 
Accept Reject 
Stay out Enter w/o infringement  Enter with infringement 
Succeed Fail Patent  
Valid 
Patent 
Invalid 
PAYOFFS 
I: $3+X 
E: $4-X 
I: $8 
E: $0 
I: $3 
E: $2 
I: $6 
E: $-1 
I: $0 
E: $1 
I: $1 
E: $-3 
75% 25% 70% 30% 
INNOVATOR 
No trial  Trial  
I: $3 
E: $4 
ENTRANT  
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Scenario C 
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Scenario D 
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Scenario E 
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Scenario F 
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APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
Table 2: Frequency tables for Group A 
 Round 2 
   Weak Strong Total 
Round 1 Weak 18 0 18 
Strong 1 1 2 
Total 19 1 20 
 
 Round 2 
  Weak Strong Total 
Round 1 Weak 38 1 39 
Strong 1 0 1 
Total 39 1 40 
 
a – Control version b – Randomized version 
 Round 2 
  Weak Strong Total 
Round 1 Weak 17 1 18 
Strong 0 0 0 
Total 17 1 18 
 
 Round 2 
  Weak Strong Total 
Round 1 Weak 21 0 21 
Strong 1 0 1 
Total 22 0 22 
 
c – Randomized version (scenario 1 first)  d – Randomized version (scenario 2 first) 
Table 3: Frequency tables for Group B 
 Round 5 
Round 3: weak Weak Strong Total 
Round 
4 
Weak 20 0 20 
Strong 0 0 0 
Total 20 0 20 
 
 Round 5 
Round 3: weak Weak Strong Total 
Round 
4 
Weak 40 0 40 
Strong 0 0 0 
Total 40 0 40 
 
a – Control version b – Randomized version 
 Round 5 
Round 3: weak Weak Strong Total 
Round 
4 
Weak 18 0 18 
Strong 0 0 0 
Total 18 0 18 
 
 Round 5 
Round 3: weak Weak Strong Total 
Round 
4 
Weak 22 0 22 
Strong 0 0 0 
Total 22 0 22 
 
c – Randomized version (scenario 1 first)  d – Randomized version (scenario 2 first) 
Table 4: Frequency tables for Group C 
 Weak Strong Total 
Round 6 4 16 20 
 
 Weak Strong Total 
Round 6 17 23 40 
 
a – Control version b – Randomized version 
 Weak Strong Total 
Round 6 7 11 18 
 
 Weak Strong Total 
Round 6 10 12 22 
 
c – Randomized version (scenario 1 first)  d – Randomized version (scenario 2 first) 
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Table 5: Results summary for Groups D to G 
 AAA AAB ABB ABA BBB BBA BAA BAB 
Rounds 7 to 9 1 5 4 0 10 0 0 0 
Rounds 10 to 12 8 0 0 1 10 0 1 0 
Rounds 13 to 15 2 5 1 0 12 0 0 0 
Rounds 16 to 18 10 1 0 0 8 0 1 0 
a- Control version 
 AAA AAB ABB ABA BBB BBA BAA BAB 
Rounds 7 to 9 9 10 5 1 15 0 0 0 
Rounds 10 to 12 6 0 1 1 17 6 9 0 
Rounds 13 to 15 2 8 7 1 19 0 0 3 
Rounds 16 to 18 18 1 1 3 11 5 1 0 
b- Randomized version 
 AAA AAB ABB ABA BBB BBA BAA BAB 
Rounds 7 to 9 5 5 3 0 5 0 0 0 
Rounds 10 to 12 2 0 1 0 7 4 4 0 
Rounds 13 to 15 1 4 4 0 7 0 0 2 
Rounds 16 to 18 8 1 1 2 4 1 1 0 
c- Randomized version (scenario 1 first) 
 AAA AAB ABB ABA BBB BBA BAA BAB 
Rounds 7 to 9 4 5 2 1 10 0 0 0 
Rounds 10 to 12 4 0 0 1 10 2 5 0 
Rounds 13 to 15 1 4 3 1 12 0 0 1 
Rounds 16 to 18 10 0 0 1 7 4 0 0 
d- Randomized version (scenario 2 first) 
* A: licensing to the weak rival and B: licensing to the strong rival 
 
149 
 
 
1
6
4
 
Table 6: Frequency tables for Groups D to G (aggregated data) 
Group D 
license PSN 
Total 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 592 750 928 
A* 11 
6.11 
15.49 
18.33 
25 
13.89 
35.21 
41.67 
35 
19.44 
49.30 
58.33 
71 
39.44 
 
 
B** 49 
27.22 
44.95 
81.67 
35 
19.44 
32.11 
58.33 
25 
13.89 
22.94 
41.67 
109 
60.56 
 
 
Total 60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
180 
100.00 
 
Group E 
license MSWN 
Total 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 60 75 90 
A* 17 
9.44 
23.29 
28.33 
24 
13.33 
32.88 
40.00 
32 
17.78 
43.84 
53.33 
73 
40.56 
 
 
B** 43 
23.89 
40.19 
71.67 
36 
20.00 
33.64 
60.00 
28 
15.56 
26.17 
46.67 
107 
59.44 
 
 
Total 60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
180 
100.00 
 
  
Group F 
license PS 
Total 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % G1 G2 G3 
A* 26 
14.44 
50.98 
43.33 
20 
11.11 
39.22 
33.33 
5 
2.78 
9.80 
8.33 
51 
28.33 
 
 
B** 34 
18.89 
26.36 
56.67 
40 
22.22 
31.01 
66.67 
55 
30.56 
42.64 
91.67 
129 
71.67 
 
 
Total 60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
180 
100.00 
 
Group G 
license MSW 
Total 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % G1 G2 G3 
A* 34 
18.89 
32.69 
56.67 
32 
17.78 
30.77 
53.33 
38 
21.11 
36.54 
63.33 
104 
57.78 
 
 
B** 26 
14.44 
34.21 
43.33 
28 
15.56 
36.84 
46.67 
22 
12.22 
28.95 
36.67 
76 
42.22 
 
 
Total 60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
60 
33.33 
180 
100.00 
 
* A represents the decision of licensing to the weak 
rival 
** B represents the decision of licensing to the 
strong rival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 7: Results of Groups D to G 
Group D Group E 
PSN Least Squares Means 
PSN Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
592 -1.4939 0.3365 59 -4.44 <.0001 0.1833 0.05038 
750 -0.3365 0.2641 59 -1.27 0.2076 0.4167 0.06418 
928 0.3365 0.2641 59 1.27 0.2076 0.5833 0.06418 
 
MSWN Least Squares Means 
MSWN Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
60 -0.9280 0.2889 118 -3.21 0.0017 0.2833 0.05867 
75 -0.4055 0.2657 118 -1.53 0.1297 0.4000 0.06378 
90 0.1335 0.2610 118 0.51 0.6098 0.5333 0.06495 
 
  
Differences of PSN Least Squares Means 
PSN _PSN Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
592 750 -1.1575 0.3144 59 -3.68 0.0005 0.314 
592 928 -1.8304 0.3343 59 -5.47 <.0001 0.160 
750 928 -0.6729 0.1996 59 -3.37 0.0013 0.510 
 
Differences of MSWN Least Squares Means 
MSWN _MSWN Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
60 75 -0.5225 0.2318 118 -2.25 0.0260 0.593 
60 90 -1.0615 0.2952 118 -3.60 0.0005 0.346 
75 90 -0.5390 0.2192 118 -2.46 0.0154 0.583 
 
  
Group F Group G 
PS Least Squares Means 
PS Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
G1* 0.2683 0.2627 59 1.02 0.3114 0.5667 0.06451 
G2* 0.6931 0.2762 59 2.51 0.0148 0.6667 0.06137 
G3* 2.3979 0.4710 59 5.09 <.0001 0.9167 0.03598 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of order*MSW LS Means By MSW 
Simple 
Effect 
Level order _order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value 
Pr > 
|t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
 G1 F R -0.1016 0.5611 116 -0.18 0.8566 0.903 
G2 F R 0.4055 0.5648 116 0.72 0.4742 1.500 
G3 F R -0.5302 0.5717 116 -0.93 0.3557 0.588 
 
  
Differences of PS Least Squares Means 
PS _PS Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
G1 G2 -0.4249 0.2429 59 -1.75 0.0855 0.654 
G1 G3 -2.1296 0.4534 59 -4.70 <.0001 0.119 
G2 G3 -1.7047 0.4696 59 -3.63 0.0006 0.182 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of order*MSW LS Means By order 
Simple 
Effect 
Level MSW _MSW Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value 
Pr > 
|t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
F G1 G2 -0.2048 0.3262 116 -0.63 0.5313 0.815 
F G1 G3 1.55E-15 0.4280 116 0.00 1.0000 1.000 
F G2 G3 0.2048 0.3262 116 0.63 0.5313 1.227 
R G1 G2 0.3023 0.2290 116 1.32 0.1894 1.353 
R G1 G3 -0.4286 0.3134 116 -1.37 0.1741 0.651 
R G2 G3 -0.7309 0.2362 116 -3.09 0.0025 0.481 
 
* G1= 1.25D, G2=1.5D and G3=2D * G1= 1.5C, G2=1.75C and G3= 2C 
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Table 8: Frequency tables for Scenario 2  Table 9: Frequency tables for rounds 1 to 4 
Info = G 
Switch PENTWS 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 20,20 40,40 60,60 80,80 Total 
0 23 
9.58 
29.49 
38.33 
16 
6.67 
20.51 
26.67 
20 
8.33 
25.64 
33.33 
19 
7.92 
24.36 
31.67 
78 
32.50 
 
 
1 37 
15.42 
22.84 
61.67 
44 
18.33 
27.16 
73.33 
40 
16.67 
24.69 
66.67 
41 
17.08 
25.31 
68.33 
162 
67.50 
 
 
Total 60 
25.00 
60 
25.00 
60 
25.00 
60 
25.00 
240 
100.00 
 
 Table of Q11 by Q12 
Q11 Q12 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 0 1 Total 
0 17 
28.33 
53.13 
73.91 
15 
25.00 
46.88 
40.54 
32 
53.33 
 
 
1 6 
10.00 
21.43 
26.09 
22 
36.67 
78.57 
59.46 
28 
46.67 
 
 
Total 23 
38.33 
37 
61.67 
60 
100.00 
 
Table of Q21 by Q22 
Q21 Q22 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 0 1 Total 
0 12 
20.00 
37.50 
75.00 
20 
33.33 
62.50 
45.45 
32 
53.33 
 
 
1 4 
6.67 
14.29 
25.00 
24 
40.00 
85.71 
54.55 
28 
46.67 
 
 
Total 16 
26.67 
44 
73.33 
60 
100.00 
 
    
Info = O 
Switch PENTWS 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 20,20 20,40 20,60 20,80 40,40 60,60 80,80 Total 
0 23 
5.48 
29.87 
38.33 
11 
2.62 
14.29 
18.33 
5 
1.19 
6.49 
8.33 
7 
1.67 
9.09 
11.67 
12 
2.86 
15.58 
20.00 
13 
3.10 
16.88 
21.67 
6 
1.43 
7.79 
10.00 
77 
18.33 
 
 
1 37 
8.81 
10.79 
61.67 
49 
11.67 
14.29 
81.67 
55 
13.10 
16.03 
91.67 
53 
12.62 
15.45 
88.33 
48 
11.43 
13.99 
80.00 
47 
11.19 
13.70 
78.33 
54 
12.86 
15.74 
90.00 
343 
81.67 
 
 
Total 60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
60 
14.29 
420 
100.00 
 
 Table of Q31 by Q32 
Q31 Q32 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 0 1 Total 
0 11 
18.33 
34.38 
55.00 
21 
35.00 
65.63 
52.50 
32 
53.33 
 
 
1 9 
15.00 
32.14 
45.00 
19 
31.67 
67.86 
47.50 
28 
46.67 
 
 
Total 20 
33.33 
40 
66.67 
60 
100.00 
 
Table of Q41 by Q42 
Q41 Q42 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.Row % 
4.Col % 0 1 Total 
0 9 
15.00 
30.00 
47.37 
21 
35.00 
70.00 
51.22 
30 
50.00 
 
 
1 10 
16.67 
33.33 
52.63 
20 
33.33 
66.67 
48.78 
30 
50.00 
 
 
Total 19 
31.67 
41 
68.33 
60 
100.00 
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Table 10: Results of switching decision  Table 11: Results of switching decision by probability 
 
v Least Squares Means 
v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
0 0.4725 0.2154 25 2.19 0.0377 0.6160 0.05095 
1 -1.1083 0.2520 25 -4.40 0.0002 0.2482 0.04703 
 
  
v Least Squares Means when P=20 
v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
0 -0.1252 0.3603 58 -0.35 0.7296 0.4688 0.08972 
1 -1.2993 0.4684 58 -2.77 0.0074 0.2143 0.07887 
 
   
Differences of v Least Squares Means 
v _v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
0 1 1.5808 0.3012 25 5.25 <.0001 4.859 
 
 v Least Squares Means when P=40% 
v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
0 0.5108 0.3714 58 1.38 0.1743 0.6250 0.08704 
1 -1.7918 0.5493 58 -3.26 0.0019 0.1429 0.06726 
 
   
  v Least Squares Means when P=60% 
v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
0 0.6466 0.3786 58 1.71 0.0930 0.6563 0.08540 
1 -0.7472 0.4116 58 -1.82 0.0746 0.3214 0.08977 
 
   
  v Least Squares Means when P=80% 
v Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
0 0.8473 0.4052 58 2.09 0.0409 0.7000 0.08510 
1 -0.6931 0.3939 58 -1.76 0.0837 0.3333 0.08754 
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Table 12: Results of scenario 2 
a. Info Least Squares Means 
Info Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
G 1.0406 0.2069 59 5.03 <.0001 0.7390 0.03991 
O 1.5631 0.1616 59 9.67 <.0001 0.8268 0.02314 
 
 
b. Differences of Info Least Squares Means 
Info _Info Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
G O -0.5226 0.2371 59 -2.20 0.0314 0.593 
 
 
c. PENTWS Least Squares Means 
PENTWS Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
20,20 0.5151 0.1898 354 2.71 0.0070 0.6260 0.04444 
20,40 1.1381 0.3319 354 3.43 0.0007 0.7573 0.06100 
20,60 2.1074 0.4751 354 4.44 <.0001 0.8916 0.04591 
20,80 1.7576 0.4190 354 4.19 <.0001 0.8529 0.05257 
40,40 1.2146 0.2188 354 5.55 <.0001 0.7711 0.03861 
60,60 0.9914 0.2076 354 4.77 <.0001 0.7294 0.04099 
80,80 1.3889 0.2304 354 6.03 <.0001 0.8004 0.03681 
 
 
d. Differences of PENTWS Least Squares Means 
PENTWS _PENTWS Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
20,20 20,40 -0.6230 0.3789 354 -1.64 0.1010 0.536 
20,20 20,60 -1.5923 0.5104 354 -3.12 0.0020 0.203 
20,20 20,80 -1.2424 0.4592 354 -2.71 0.0072 0.289 
20,20 40,40 -0.6994 0.2557 354 -2.74 0.0065 0.497 
20,20 60,60 -0.4762 0.2710 354 -1.76 0.0797 0.621 
20,20 80,80 -0.8738 0.2798 354 -3.12 0.0019 0.417 
20,40 20,60 -0.9694 0.5026 354 -1.93 0.0546 0.379 
20,40 20,80 -0.6195 0.5031 354 -1.23 0.2190 0.538 
20,40 40,40 -0.07649 0.3986 354 -0.19 0.8479 0.926 
20,40 60,60 0.1467 0.3900 354 0.38 0.7069 1.158 
20,40 80,80 -0.2508 0.3856 354 -0.65 0.5158 0.778 
20,60 20,80 0.3499 0.5422 354 0.65 0.5192 1.419 
20,60 40,40 0.8929 0.5254 354 1.70 0.0901 2.442 
20,60 60,60 1.1161 0.5209 354 2.14 0.0328 3.053 
20,60 80,80 0.7186 0.5294 354 1.36 0.1755 2.051 
20,80 40,40 0.5430 0.4759 354 1.14 0.2547 1.721 
20,80 60,60 0.7662 0.4717 354 1.62 0.1052 2.152 
20,80 80,80 0.3687 0.4858 354 0.76 0.4484 1.446 
40,40 60,60 0.2232 0.2648 354 0.84 0.3998 1.250 
40,40 80,80 -0.1743 0.3044 354 -0.57 0.5672 0.840 
60,60 80,80 -0.3975 0.2717 354 -1.46 0.1443 0.672 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
Table 13: Frequency table of License by Result using aggregate data 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Fail Invalid NoTrial Out Succeed Valid Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
104 
3.01 
13.07 
37.41 
209 
6.05 
26.26 
35.19 
71 
2.06 
8.92 
39.89 
19 
0.55 
2.39 
79.17 
247 
7.15 
31.03 
39.71 
146 
4.23 
18.34 
41.95 
796 
23.05 
 
 
Yes 1410 
40.82 
53.05 
100.00 
174 
5.04 
6.55 
62.59 
385 
11.15 
14.48 
64.81 
107 
3.10 
4.03 
60.11 
5 
0.14 
0.19 
20.83 
375 
10.86 
14.11 
60.29 
202 
5.85 
7.60 
58.05 
2658 
76.95 
 
 
Total 1410 
40.82 
278 
8.05 
594 
17.20 
178 
5.15 
24 
0.69 
622 
18.01 
348 
10.08 
3454 
100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 14: Frequency table of License by Result by scenario 
Table of License by Result – Scenario A 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Out invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3 
0.52 
2.16 
60.00 
57 
9.90 
41.01 
38.26 
7 
1.22 
5.04 
21.21 
72 
12.50 
51.80 
36.18 
139 
24.13 
 
 
Yes 190 
32.99 
43.48 
100.00 
2 
0.35 
0.46 
40.00 
92 
15.97 
21.05 
61.74 
26 
4.51 
5.95 
78.79 
127 
22.05 
29.06 
63.82 
437 
75.87 
 
 
Total 190 
32.99 
5 
0.87 
149 
25.87 
33 
5.73 
199 
34.55 
576 
100.00 
 
Table of License by Result – Scenario B 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
52 
9.04 
40.00 
33.77 
19 
3.30 
14.62 
57.58 
59 
10.26 
45.38 
39.33 
130 
22.61 
 
 
Yes 238 
41.39 
53.48 
100.00 
102 
17.74 
22.92 
66.23 
14 
2.43 
3.15 
42.42 
91 
15.83 
20.45 
60.67 
445 
77.39 
 
 
Total 238 
41.39 
154 
26.78 
33 
5.74 
150 
26.09 
575 
100.00 
 
  
Table of License by Result – Scenario C 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Out invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3 
0.52 
1.76 
75.00 
75 
13.04 
44.12 
45.45 
11 
1.91 
6.47 
40.74 
81 
14.09 
47.65 
51.27 
170 
29.57 
 
 
Yes 221 
38.43 
54.57 
100.00 
1 
0.17 
0.25 
25.00 
90 
15.65 
22.22 
54.55 
16 
2.78 
3.95 
59.26 
77 
13.39 
19.01 
48.73 
405 
70.43 
 
 
Total 221 
38.43 
4 
0.70 
165 
28.70 
27 
4.70 
158 
27.48 
575 
100.00 
 
Table of License by Result – Scenario D 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Out invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5 
0.87 
3.65 
100.00 
66 
11.46 
48.18 
43.42 
17 
2.95 
12.41 
68.00 
49 
8.51 
35.77 
39.20 
137 
23.78 
 
 
Yes 269 
46.70 
61.28 
100.00 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
86 
14.93 
19.59 
56.58 
8 
1.39 
1.82 
32.00 
76 
13.19 
17.31 
60.80 
439 
76.22 
 
 
Total 269 
46.70 
5 
0.87 
152 
26.39 
25 
4.34 
125 
21.70 
576 
100.00 
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Table 14: Frequency table of License by Result by scenario (contd.) 
Table of License by Result -  Scenario E 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Out invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5 
0.87 
4.03 
83.33 
48 
8.33 
38.71 
35.29 
9 
1.56 
7.26 
25.00 
62 
10.76 
50.00 
33.70 
124 
21.53 
 
 
Yes 214 
37.15 
47.35 
100.00 
1 
0.17 
0.22 
16.67 
88 
15.28 
19.47 
64.71 
27 
4.69 
5.97 
75.00 
122 
21.18 
26.99 
66.30 
452 
78.47 
 
 
Total 214 
37.15 
6 
1.04 
136 
23.61 
36 
6.25 
184 
31.94 
576 
100.00 
 
Table of License by Result – Scenario F 
License Result 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.% Row 
4.% Col Accept Out invest notrial trial Total 
No 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3 
0.52 
3.13 
75.00 
53 
9.20 
55.21 
36.81 
8 
1.39 
8.33 
33.33 
32 
5.56 
33.33 
25.40 
96 
16.67 
 
 
Yes 278 
48.26 
57.92 
100.00 
1 
0.17 
0.21 
25.00 
91 
15.80 
18.96 
63.19 
16 
2.78 
3.33 
66.67 
94 
16.32 
19.58 
74.60 
480 
83.33 
 
 
Total 278 
48.26 
4 
0.69 
144 
25.00 
24 
4.17 
126 
21.88 
576 
100.00 
 
 
Table 15: Frequency table Breadth by License controlling for the type of the potential entrant 
Controlling for type = same  Controlling for type = strong  Controlling for type = weak 
Breadth License  Breadth License  Breadth License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.% Row  
4.% Col  No Yes Total 
 1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.% Col No Yes Total 
 1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.% Col No Yes Total 
broad 74 
12.85 
25.69 
46.54 
214 
37.15 
74.31 
51.32 
288 
50.00 
 
 
 broad 63 
10.96 
21.88 
46.32 
225 
39.13 
78.13 
51.25 
288 
50.09 
 
 
 broad 61 
10.59 
21.18 
44.20 
227 
39.41 
78.82 
51.83 
288 
50.00 
 
 
narrow 85 
14.76 
29.51 
53.46 
203 
35.24 
70.49 
48.68 
288 
50.00 
 
 
 narrow 73 
12.70 
25.44 
53.68 
214 
37.22 
74.56 
48.75 
287 
49.91 
 
 
 narrow 77 
13.37 
26.74 
55.80 
211 
36.63 
73.26 
48.17 
288 
50.00 
 
 
Total 159 
27.60 
417 
72.40 
576 
100 
 Total 136 
23.65 
439 
76.35 
575 
100 
 Total 138 
23.96 
438 
76.04 
576 
100 1
5
6
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Table 16: Frequency table Breadth by License 
Scenario A 
Breadth License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
broad 57 
9.90 
19.79 
41.01 
231 
40.10 
80.21 
52.86 
288 
50.00 
 
 
narrow 82 
14.24 
28.47 
58.99 
206 
35.76 
71.53 
47.14 
288 
50.00 
 
 
Total 139 
24.13 
437 
75.87 
576 
100.00 
 
Scenario C 
Breadth License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
broad 77 
13.39 
26.74 
45.29 
211 
36.70 
73.26 
52.10 
288 
50.09 
 
 
narrow 93 
16.17 
32.40 
54.71 
194 
33.74 
67.60 
47.90 
287 
49.91 
 
 
Total 170 
29.57 
405 
70.43 
575 
100.00 
 
Scenario E 
Breadth License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
broad 64 
11.11 
22.22 
51.61 
224 
38.89 
77.78 
49.56 
288 
50.00 
 
 
narrow 60 
10.42 
20.83 
48.39 
228 
39.58 
79.17 
50.44 
288 
50.00 
 
 
Total 124 
21.53 
452 
78.47 
576 
100.00 
 
 
Table 17: Frequency table Type by License 
Scenario A 
Type License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
same 49 
8.51 
25.52 
35.25 
143 
24.83 
74.48 
32.72 
192 
33.33 
 
 
strong 44 
7.64 
22.92 
31.65 
148 
25.69 
77.08 
33.87 
192 
33.33 
 
 
weak 46 
7.99 
23.96 
33.09 
146 
25.35 
76.04 
33.41 
192 
33.33 
 
 
Total 139 
24.13 
437 
75.87 
576 
100.00 
 
Scenario C 
Type License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
same 64 
11.13 
33.33 
37.65 
128 
22.26 
66.67 
31.60 
192 
33.39 
 
 
strong 45 
7.83 
23.56 
26.47 
146 
25.39 
76.44 
36.05 
191 
33.22 
 
 
weak 61 
10.61 
31.77 
35.88 
131 
22.78 
68.23 
32.35 
192 
33.39 
 
 
Total 170 
29.57 
405 
70.43 
575 
100.00 
 
Scenario E 
Type License 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col No Yes Total 
same 46 
7.99 
23.96 
37.10 
146 
25.35 
76.04 
32.30 
192 
33.33 
 
 
strong 47 
8.16 
24.48 
37.90 
145 
25.17 
75.52 
32.08 
192 
33.33 
 
 
weak 31 
5.38 
16.15 
25.00 
161 
27.95 
83.85 
35.62 
192 
33.33 
 
 
Total 124 
21.53 
452 
78.47 
576 
100.00 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 18: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects 
Scenario A 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Role 1 47 4.30 0.0435 
Order 1 477 0.02 0.8783 
Breadth 1 477 6.97 0.0086 
Type 2 477 0.22 0.8053 
 
Scenario C 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Role 1 47 0.10 0.7556 
Order 1 476 0.22 0.6424 
Breadth 1 476 2.57 0.1094 
Type 2 476 2.95 0.0532 
 
Scenario E 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Role 1 47 2.77 0.1027 
Order 1 477 0.65 0.4197 
Breadth 1 477 0.21 0.6507 
Type 2 477 3.01 0.0501 
 
 
Table 19: Results of licensing decision for Scenario A 
Role Least Squares Means 
Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first 1.6341 0.2411 47 6.78 <.0001 0.8367 0.03294 
second 1.0903 0.2273 47 4.80 <.0001 0.7484 0.04280 
 
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 1.6458 0.2290 479 7.19 <.0001 0.8383 0.03104 
narrow 1.0786 0.2150 479 5.02 <.0001 0.7462 0.04071 
 
  
Differences of Role Least Squares Means 
Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
first second 0.5438 0.2620 47 2.08 0.0435 1.722 
 
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow 0.5671 0.2153 479 2.63 0.0087 1.763 
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Table 20: Type III Tests of Fixed effects for licensing decision using aggregate data 
Effect Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Scenario 2 1608 5.84 0.0030 
Order 1 1608 0.19 0.6662 
Scenario*Order 2 1608 0.61 0.5450 
Role 1 46 1.29 0.2615 
Scenario*Role 2 1608 4.00 0.0185 
Order*Role 1 1608 0.04 0.8457 
Breadth 1 1608 4.74 0.0296 
Scenario*Breadth 2 1608 2.52 0.0807 
Order*Breadth 1 1608 0.04 0.8408 
Role*Breadth 1 1608 0.12 0.7282 
Type 2 1608 2.64 0.0714 
Scenario*Type 4 1608 2.43 0.0456 
Order*Type 2 1608 1.78 0.1689 
Role*Type 2 1608 0.21 0.8116 
Breadth*Type 2 1608 0.09 0.9100 
 
Table 21: Main effect of Breadth 
a. Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard  
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Broad 1.6100 0.2027 1620 7.94 <.0001 0.8334 0.02815 
Narrow 1.3109 0.1999 1620 6.56 <.0001 0.7877 0.03344 
 
b. Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Broad Narrow 0.2991 0.1274 1620 2.35 0.0190 1.349 
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Table 22: Simple effect comparisons of Scenario*Role Least Squares Means 
a.  Controlling for Role 
Simple Effect 
Level Scenario Scenario Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first A C 0.7453 0.2248 1620 3.32 0.0009 2.107 
Role first A E -0.1941 0.2424 1620 -0.80 0.4234 0.824 
Role first C E -0.9395 0.2314 1620 -4.06 <.0001 0.391 
Role second A C -0.00833 0.2098 1620 -0.04 0.9683 0.992 
Role second A E -0.2178 0.2134 1620 -1.02 0.3077 0.804 
Role second C E -0.2095 0.2142 1620 -0.98 0.3282 0.811 
 
b.  Controlling for Scenario 
Simple 
Effect Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Scenario A first second 0.6300 0.3292 1620 1.91 0.0558 1.878 
Scenario C first second -0.1236 0.3175 1620 -0.39 0.6971 0.884 
Scenario E first second 0.6064 0.3362 1620 1.80 0.0714 1.834 
 
 
Table 23: Simple effect comparisons of Scenario*type Least Squares Means 
a. Controlling for Type 
Simple Effect 
Level Scenario Scenario Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Type same A C 0.5135 0.2586 1620 1.99 0.0473 1.671 
Type same A E -0.1073 0.2699 1620 -0.40 0.6911 0.898 
Type same C E -0.6207 0.2613 1620 -2.38 0.0176 0.538 
Type strong A C 0.06358 0.2746 1620 0.23 0.8169 1.066 
Type strong A E 0.1129 0.2734 1620 0.41 0.6796 1.120 
Type strong C E 0.04935 0.2718 1620 0.18 0.8560 1.051 
Type weak A C 0.5285 0.2625 1620 2.01 0.0442 1.696 
Type weak A E -0.6235 0.2927 1620 -2.13 0.0333 0.536 
Type weak C E -1.1520 0.2838 1620 -4.06 <.0001 0.316 
 
b. Controlling for Scenario 
Simple 
Effect Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Scenario A same strong -0.1835 0.2712 1620 -0.68 0.4986 0.832 
Scenario A same weak -0.1087 0.2693 1620 -0.40 0.6865 0.897 
Scenario A strong weak 0.07482 0.2736 1620 0.27 0.7845 1.078 
Scenario C same strong -0.6334 0.2614 1620 -2.42 0.0155 0.531 
Scenario C same weak -0.09371 0.2500 1620 -0.37 0.7078 0.911 
Scenario C strong weak 0.5397 0.2626 1620 2.06 0.0400 1.716 
Scenario E same strong 0.03666 0.2708 1620 0.14 0.8923 1.037 
Scenario E same weak -0.6250 0.2918 1620 -2.14 0.0323 0.535 
Scenario E strong weak -0.6616 0.2910 1620 -2.27 0.0231 0.516 
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Table 24: Least Squares Means of Scenario*Role and Scenario*Type 
a. Scenario*Role Least Squares Means 
Scenario Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
A first 1.8297 0.2757 1620 6.64 <.0001 0.8617 0.03285 
A second 1.1996 0.2609 1620 4.60 <.0001 0.7685 0.04642 
C first 1.0843 0.2613 1620 4.15 <.0001 0.7473 0.04934 
C second 1.2080 0.2614 1620 4.62 <.0001 0.7699 0.04630 
E first 2.0238 0.2812 1620 7.20 <.0001 0.8833 0.02899 
E second 1.4174 0.2649 1620 5.35 <.0001 0.8049 0.04159 
 
b. Scenario*Type Least Squares Means 
Scenario Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
A same 1.4172 0.2610 1620 5.43 <.0001 0.8049 0.04099 
A strong 1.6008 0.2659 1620 6.02 <.0001 0.8321 0.03714 
A weak 1.5260 0.2638 1620 5.78 <.0001 0.8214 0.03870 
C same 0.9038 0.2504 1620 3.61 0.0003 0.7117 0.05138 
C strong 1.5372 0.2640 1620 5.82 <.0001 0.8231 0.03844 
C weak 0.9975 0.2519 1620 3.96 <.0001 0.7306 0.04959 
E same 1.5245 0.2638 1620 5.78 <.0001 0.8212 0.03873 
E strong 1.4879 0.2628 1620 5.66 <.0001 0.8158 0.03950 
E weak 2.1495 0.2855 1620 7.53 <.0001 0.8956 0.02669 
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Table 25: Frequency table of Accept by Scenario 
accept Scenario 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col A B C D E F Total 
0 247 
9.29 
19.79 
56.52 
207 
7.79 
16.59 
46.52 
184 
6.92 
14.74 
45.43 
170 
6.40 
13.62 
38.72 
238 
8.95 
19.07 
52.65 
202 
7.60 
16.19 
42.08 
1248 
46.95 
 
 
1 190 
7.15 
13.48 
43.48 
238 
8.95 
16.88 
53.48 
221 
8.31 
15.67 
54.57 
269 
10.12 
19.08 
61.28 
214 
8.05 
15.18 
47.35 
278 
10.46 
19.72 
57.92 
1410 
53.05 
 
 
Total 437 
16.44 
445 
16.74 
405 
15.24 
439 
16.52 
452 
17.01 
480 
18.06 
2658 
100.00 
Frequency Missing = 2 
Table 26: Frequency table Breadth*Accept under different market conditions 
Controlling for scenario=A 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 147 
33.64 
63.64 
59.51 
84 
19.22 
36.36 
44.21 
231 
52.86 
 
 
narrow 100 
22.88 
48.54 
40.49 
106 
24.26 
51.46 
55.79 
206 
47.14 
 
 
Total 247 
56.52 
190 
43.48 
437 
100.00 
 
 Controlling for scenario=B 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 89 
20.00 
40.83 
43.00 
129 
28.99 
59.17 
54.20 
218 
48.99 
 
 
narrow 118 
26.52 
51.98 
57.00 
109 
24.49 
48.02 
45.80 
227 
51.01 
 
 
Total 207 
46.52 
238 
53.48 
445 
100.00 
 
 Controlling for scenario=C 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 92 
22.72 
43.60 
50.00 
119 
29.38 
56.40 
53.85 
211 
52.10 
 
 
narrow 92 
22.72 
47.42 
50.00 
102 
25.19 
52.58 
46.15 
194 
47.90 
 
 
Total 184 
45.43 
221 
54.57 
405 
100.00 
 
 
Controlling for scenario=D 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 79 
18.00 
34.96 
46.47 
147 
33.49 
65.04 
54.65 
226 
51.48 
 
 
narrow 91 
20.73 
42.72 
53.53 
122 
27.79 
57.28 
45.35 
213 
48.52 
 
 
Total 170 
38.72 
269 
61.28 
439 
100.00 
 
  
Controlling for scenario=E 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 126 
27.88 
56.25 
52.94 
98 
21.68 
43.75 
45.79 
224 
49.56 
 
 
narrow 112 
24.78 
49.12 
47.06 
116 
25.66 
50.88 
54.21 
228 
50.44 
 
 
Total 238 
52.65 
214 
47.35 
452 
100.00 
 
  
Controlling for scenario=F 
Breadth accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
broad 99 
20.63 
40.08 
49.01 
148 
30.83 
59.92 
53.24 
247 
51.46 
 
 
narrow 103 
21.46 
44.21 
50.99 
130 
27.08 
55.79 
46.76 
233 
48.54 
 
 
Total 202 
42.08 
278 
57.92 
480 
100.00 
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Table 27: Frequency table Type*Accept under different market conditions 
Controlling for scenario=A 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 74 
16.93 
51.75 
29.96 
69 
15.79 
48.25 
36.32 
143 
32.72 
 
 
strong 84 
19.22 
56.76 
34.01 
64 
14.65 
43.24 
33.68 
148 
33.87 
 
 
weak 89 
20.37 
60.96 
36.03 
57 
13.04 
39.04 
30.00 
146 
33.41 
 
 
Total 247 
56.52 
190 
43.48 
437 
100.00 
 
Controlling for scenario=D 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 62 
14.12 
41.89 
36.47 
86 
19.59 
58.11 
31.97 
148 
33.71 
 
 
Strong 53 
12.07 
36.55 
31.18 
92 
20.96 
63.45 
34.20 
145 
33.03 
 
 
Weak 55 
12.53 
37.67 
32.35 
91 
20.73 
62.33 
33.83 
146 
33.26 
 
 
Total 170 
38.72 
269 
61.28 
439 
100.00 
 
 Controlling for scenario=B 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 66 
14.83 
44.30 
31.88 
83 
18.65 
55.70 
34.87 
149 
33.48 
 
 
strong 77 
17.30 
52.74 
37.20 
69 
15.51 
47.26 
28.99 
146 
32.81 
 
 
weak 64 
14.38 
42.67 
30.92 
86 
19.33 
57.33 
36.13 
150 
33.71 
 
 
Total 207 
46.52 
238 
53.48 
445 
100.00 
 
Controlling for scenario=E 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 81 
17.92 
55.48 
34.03 
65 
14.38 
44.52 
30.37 
146 
32.30 
 
 
strong 63 
13.94 
43.45 
26.47 
82 
18.14 
56.55 
38.32 
145 
32.08 
 
 
weak 94 
20.80 
58.39 
39.50 
67 
14.82 
41.61 
31.31 
161 
35.62 
 
 
Total 238 
52.65 
214 
47.35 
452 
100.00 
 
 Controlling for scenario=C 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 66 
16.30 
51.56 
35.87 
62 
15.31 
48.44 
28.05 
128 
31.60 
 
 
strong 61 
15.06 
41.78 
33.15 
85 
20.99 
58.22 
38.46 
146 
36.05 
 
 
weak 57 
14.07 
43.51 
30.98 
74 
18.27 
56.49 
33.48 
131 
32.35 
 
 
Total 184 
45.43 
221 
54.57 
405 
100.00 
 
Controlling for scenario=F 
Type accept 
Total 
1.Freq 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 
same 65 
13.54 
41.40 
32.18 
92 
19.17 
58.60 
33.09 
157 
32.71 
 
 
strong 68 
14.17 
42.50 
33.66 
92 
19.17 
57.50 
33.09 
160 
33.33 
 
 
weak 69 
14.38 
42.33 
34.16 
94 
19.58 
57.67 
33.81 
163 
33.96 
 
 
Total 202 
42.08 
278 
57.92 
480 
100.00 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 28: Results of licensing occurrence in scenario A Table 29: Results of licensing occurrence in scenario B 
Role Least Squares Means 
Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first -0.6397 0.1968 45 -3.25 0.0022 0.3453 0.04449 
second 0.1061 0.1999 45 0.53 0.5982 0.5265 0.04984 
 
Order Least Squares Means 
Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
f -0.2594 0.2362 350 -1.10 0.2729 0.4355 0.05807 
r 0.3406 0.1556 350 2.19 0.0293 0.5843 0.03779 
 
  
Differences of Role Least Squares Means 
Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
first second -0.7458 0.2740 45 -2.72 0.0092 0.474 
 
Differences of Order Least Squares Means 
Order Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
f r -0.6000 0.2828 350 -2.12 0.0346 0.549 
 
  
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad -0.6189 0.1761 342 -3.51 0.0005 0.3500 0.04007 
narrow 0.08525 0.1792 342 0.48 0.6345 0.5213 0.04472 
 
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 0.2810 0.1750 350 1.61 0.1091 0.5698 0.04289 
narrow -0.1999 0.1714 350 -1.17 0.2445 0.4502 0.04243 
 
  
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow -0.7041 0.2097 342 -3.36 0.0009 0.495 
 
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow 0.4809 0.2000 350 2.40 0.0167 1.618 
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Table 30: LSM estimates and Simple effects of Role*Breadth*Type in Scenario C 
Role*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means 
Role Breadth Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first broad same -0.5906 0.4394 296 -1.34 0.1800 0.3565 0.1008 
first broad strong -0.00941 0.3929 296 -0.02 0.9809 0.4976 0.09822 
first broad weak 0.5273 0.4219 296 1.25 0.2123 0.6289 0.09846 
first narrow same 0.3878 0.4391 296 0.88 0.3778 0.5958 0.1058 
first narrow strong -0.1215 0.4002 296 -0.30 0.7617 0.4697 0.09969 
first narrow weak -0.2127 0.4467 296 -0.48 0.6343 0.4470 0.1104 
second broad same 0.4339 0.4225 296 1.03 0.3052 0.6068 0.1008 
second broad strong 1.2559 0.4517 296 2.78 0.0058 0.7783 0.07794 
second broad weak 0.08589 0.4143 296 0.21 0.8359 0.5215 0.1034 
second narrow same -0.4809 0.4473 296 -1.08 0.2832 0.3820 0.1056 
second narrow strong -0.1947 0.4068 296 -0.48 0.6325 0.4515 0.1007 
second narrow weak 0.4834 0.4451 296 1.09 0.2784 0.6185 0.1050 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Role*Breadth 
Simple Effect Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role*Breadth first broad same strong -0.5812 0.5462 296 -1.06 0.2882 0.559 
Role*Breadth first broad same weak -1.1179 0.5689 296 -1.97 0.0503 0.327 
Role*Breadth first broad strong weak -0.5367 0.5340 296 -1.01 0.3157 0.585 
Role*Breadth first narrow same strong 0.5093 0.5528 296 0.92 0.3576 1.664 
Role*Breadth first narrow same weak 0.6005 0.5825 296 1.03 0.3034 1.823 
Role*Breadth first narrow strong weak 0.09120 0.5549 296 0.16 0.8696 1.095 
Role*Breadth second broad same strong -0.8220 0.5785 296 -1.42 0.1564 0.440 
Role*Breadth second broad same weak 0.3480 0.5492 296 0.63 0.5267 1.416 
Role*Breadth second broad strong weak 1.1701 0.5733 296 2.04 0.0421 3.222 
Role*Breadth second narrow same strong -0.2862 0.5649 296 -0.51 0.6127 0.751 
Role*Breadth second narrow same weak -0.9643 0.5868 296 -1.64 0.1014 0.381 
Role*Breadth second narrow strong weak -0.6781 0.5627 296 -1.20 0.2292 0.508 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Role*Type 
Simple Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role*Type first same broad narrow -0.9784 0.5769 296 -1.70 0.0909 0.376 
Role*Type first strong broad narrow 0.1121 0.5153 296 0.22 0.8280 1.119 
Role*Type first weak broad narrow 0.7400 0.5768 296 1.28 0.2005 2.096 
Role*Type second same broad narrow 0.9149 0.5721 296 1.60 0.1109 2.496 
Role*Type sec strong broad narrow 1.4507 0.5676 296 2.56 0.0111 4.266 
Role*Type second weak broad narrow -0.3975 0.5674 296 -0.70 0.4842 0.672 
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Table 30: LSM estimates and Simple effects of Role*Breadth*Type in Scenario C 
(contd) 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Breadth*Type 
Simple Effect Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth*Type broad same first second -1.0245 0.5700 296 -1.80 0.0733 0.359 
Breadth*Type broad strong first second -1.2654 0.5751 296 -2.20 0.0286 0.282 
Breadth*Type broad weak first second 0.4414 0.5426 296 0.81 0.4165 1.555 
Breadth*Type narrow same first second 0.8688 0.5781 296 1.50 0.1339 2.384 
Breadth*Type narrow strong first second 0.07321 0.5355 296 0.14 0.8913 1.076 
Breadth*Type narrow weak first second -0.6961 0.6020 296 -1.16 0.2485 0.499 
 
 
Table 31: LSM estimates and simple effects of Order*Breadth*Type in Scenario C 
Order*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means 
Order Breadth Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
f broad same 0.1766 0.5374 296 0.33 0.7427 0.5440 0.1333 
f broad strong 0.1624 0.4912 296 0.33 0.7412 0.5405 0.1220 
f broad weak 0.6565 0.5399 296 1.22 0.2250 0.6585 0.1214 
f narrow same -0.1684 0.5707 296 -0.30 0.7681 0.4580 0.1417 
f narrow strong -0.1646 0.4986 296 -0.33 0.7415 0.4589 0.1238 
f narrow weak -0.4758 0.5305 296 -0.90 0.3705 0.3832 0.1254 
r broad same -0.3332 0.3595 296 -0.93 0.3547 0.4175 0.08742 
r broad strong 1.0841 0.3776 296 2.87 0.0044 0.7473 0.07131 
r broad weak -0.04329 0.3369 296 -0.13 0.8978 0.4892 0.08419 
r narrow same 0.07532 0.3562 296 0.21 0.8327 0.5188 0.08891 
r narrow strong -0.1516 0.3424 296 -0.44 0.6583 0.4622 0.08511 
r narrow weak 0.7465 0.3897 296 1.92 0.0564 0.6784 0.08501 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Order*Breadth 
Simple Effect Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Order*Breadth f broad same strong 0.01416 0.6571 296 0.02 0.9828 1.014 
Order*Breadth f broad same weak -0.4799 0.6944 296 -0.69 0.4900 0.619 
Order*Breadth f broad strong weak -0.4941 0.6585 296 -0.75 0.4537 0.610 
Order*Breadth f narrow same strong -0.00380 0.6914 296 -0.01 0.9956 0.996 
Order*Breadth f narrow same weak 0.3074 0.7054 296 0.44 0.6633 1.360 
Order*Breadth f narrow strong weak 0.3112 0.6579 296 0.47 0.6365 1.365 
Order*Breadth r broad same strong -1.4174 0.4789 296 -2.96 0.0033 0.242 
Order*Breadth r broad same weak -0.2899 0.4485 296 -0.65 0.5185 0.748 
Order*Breadth r broad strong weak 1.1274 0.4653 296 2.42 0.0160 3.088 
Order*Breadth r narrow same strong 0.2269 0.4507 296 0.50 0.6150 1.255 
Order*Breadth r narrow same weak -0.6712 0.4851 296 -1.38 0.1675 0.511 
Order*Breadth r narrow strong weak -0.8981 0.4751 296 -1.89 0.0597 0.407 
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Table 31: LSM estimates and simple effects of Order*Breadth*Type in Scenario C 
(contd.) 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Order*Type 
Simple Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Order*Type f same broad narrow 0.3450 0.7126 296 0.48 0.6287 1.412 
Order*Type f strong broad narrow 0.3270 0.6255 296 0.52 0.6015 1.387 
Order*Type f weak broad narrow 1.1323 0.6894 296 1.64 0.1016 3.103 
Order*Type r same broad narrow -0.4086 0.4612 296 -0.89 0.3764 0.665 
Order*Type r strong broad narrow 1.2357 0.4675 296 2.64 0.0087 3.441 
Order*Type r weak broad narrow -0.7898 0.4742 296 -1.67 0.0969 0.454 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Breadth*Type 
Simple Effect Level Order Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth*Type broad same f r 0.5098 0.6464 296 0.79 0.4309 1.665 
Breadth*Type broad strong f r -0.9217 0.6177 296 -1.49 0.1367 0.398 
Breadth*Type broad weak f r 0.6998 0.6366 296 1.10 0.2726 2.013 
Breadth*Type narrow same f r -0.2437 0.6734 296 -0.36 0.7177 0.784 
Breadth*Type narrow 
strong 
f r -0.01301 0.6058 296 -0.02 0.9829 0.987 
Breadth*Type narrow weak f r -1.2223 0.6585 296 -1.86 0.0644 0.295 
 
Table 32: Type III tests of fixed effects for Scenarios C, D and F 
Scenario C 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF 
F 
Value Pr > F 
Order 1 308 0.29 0.5912 
Role 1 45 1.01 0.3207 
Breadth 1 308 0.77 0.3797 
Type 2 308 1.16 0.3157 
 
Scenario D 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF 
F 
Value Pr > F 
Order 1 343 0.97 0.3246 
Role 1 44 0.72 0.4017 
Breadth 1 343 2.82 0.0943 
Type 2 343 0.40 0.6715 
 
  
Scenario F 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Order 1 382 0.17 0.6797 
Role 1 46 3.72 0.0600 
Breadth 1 382 0.92 0.3381 
Type 2 382 0.06 0.9458 
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Table 33: Results of licensing occurrence in Scenario E 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Type 2 357 3.27 0.0392 
 
 
Type Least Squares Means 
Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
same -0.2162 0.1976 357 -1.09 0.2745 0.4462 0.04882 
strong 0.2443 0.1984 357 1.23 0.2189 0.5608 0.04886 
weak -0.3528 0.1902 357 -1.85 0.0645 0.4127 0.04610 
 
 
Differences of Type Least Squares Means 
Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
same strong -0.4605 0.2478 357 -1.86 0.0639 0.631 
same weak 0.1365 0.2423 357 0.56 0.5734 1.146 
strong weak 0.5971 0.2427 357 2.46 0.0144 1.817 
 
Table 34: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects of licensing occurrence (aggregate data) 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Scenario 5 2521 5.95 <.0001 
Order 1 2521 0.80 0.3698 
Scenario*Order 5 2521 1.28 0.2704 
Role 1 46 0.06 0.8027 
Scenario*Role 5 2521 5.61 <.0001 
Order*Role 1 2521 0.70 0.4044 
Breadth 1 2521 0.07 0.7851 
Scenario*Breadth 5 2521 5.22 <.0001 
Order*Breadth 1 2521 0.62 0.4293 
Role*Breadth 1 2521 1.13 0.2882 
Type 2 2521 0.04 0.9603 
Scenario*Type 10 2521 1.75 0.0650 
Order*Type 2 2521 0.84 0.4329 
Role*Type 2 2521 1.61 0.1992 
Breadth*Type 2 2521 0.31 0.7347 
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Table 35: Simple Effect Comparisons of Scenario*Breadth LSM for licensing 
occurrence (aggregate data) 
a. By Scenario 
Simple 
Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Scenario A Broad narrow -0.7122 0.2115 2546 -3.37 0.0008 0.491 
Scenario B Broad narrow 0.5240 0.2052 2546 2.55 0.0107 1.689 
Scenario C Broad narrow 0.2576 0.2134 2546 1.21 0.2275 1.294 
Scenario D Broad narrow 0.3894 0.2095 2546 1.86 0.0633 1.476 
Scenario E Broad narrow -0.3594 0.2016 2546 -1.78 0.0746 0.698 
Scenario F Broad narrow 0.2003 0.1981 2546 1.01 0.3121 1.222 
 
 
b. By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Scenario Scenario Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad A B -1.0504 0.2101 2546 -5.00 <.0001 0.350 
Breadth broad A C -0.9295 0.2093 2546 -4.44 <.0001 0.395 
Breadth broad A D -1.3103 0.2107 2546 -6.22 <.0001 0.270 
Breadth broad A E -0.2985 0.2063 2546 -1.45 0.1482 0.742 
Breadth broad A F -1.0960 0.2036 2546 -5.38 <.0001 0.334 
Breadth broad B C 0.1209 0.2101 2546 0.58 0.5649 1.129 
Breadth broad B D -0.2598 0.2099 2546 -1.24 0.2159 0.771 
Breadth broad B E 0.7520 0.2075 2546 3.62 0.0003 2.121 
Breadth broad B F -0.04555 0.2029 2546 -0.22 0.8224 0.955 
Breadth broad C D -0.3808 0.2103 2546 -1.81 0.0703 0.683 
Breadth broad C E 0.6310 0.2068 2546 3.05 0.0023 1.880 
Breadth broad C F -0.1665 0.2034 2546 -0.82 0.4132 0.847 
Breadth broad D E 1.0118 0.2082 2546 4.86 <.0001 2.751 
Breadth broad D F 0.2143 0.2035 2546 1.05 0.2925 1.239 
Breadth broad E F -0.7975 0.2009 2546 -3.97 <.0001 0.450 
Breadth narrow A B 0.1857 0.2082 2546 0.89 0.3725 1.204 
Breadth narrow A C 0.04030 0.2155 2546 0.19 0.8517 1.041 
Breadth narrow A D -0.2088 0.2127 2546 -0.98 0.3264 0.812 
Breadth narrow A E 0.05425 0.2066 2546 0.26 0.7928 1.056 
Breadth narrow A F -0.1835 0.2079 2546 -0.88 0.3776 0.832 
Breadth narrow B C -0.1454 0.2106 2546 -0.69 0.4900 0.865 
Breadth narrow B D -0.3945 0.2066 2546 -1.91 0.0564 0.674 
Breadth narrow B E -0.1314 0.2013 2546 -0.65 0.5138 0.877 
Breadth narrow B F -0.3692 0.2016 2546 -1.83 0.0672 0.691 
Breadth narrow C D -0.2491 0.2147 2546 -1.16 0.2461 0.780 
Breadth narrow C E 0.01395 0.2085 2546 0.07 0.9466 1.014 
Breadth narrow C F -0.2238 0.2103 2546 -1.06 0.2873 0.799 
Breadth narrow D E 0.2630 0.2058 2546 1.28 0.2013 1.301 
Breadth narrow D F 0.02529 0.2062 2546 0.12 0.9024 1.026 
Breadth narrow E F -0.2377 0.2010 2546 -1.18 0.2369 0.788 
 
 
 
 
  
170 
Table 36: Simple Effect Comparisons of Scenario*Role LSM for licensing 
occurrence (aggregate data) 
a. By Scenario 
Simple 
Effect Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Scenario A first second -0.8011 0.2755 2546 -2.91 0.0037 0.449 
Scenario B first second 0.4486 0.2715 2546 1.65 0.0986 1.566 
Scenario C first second -0.3029 0.2770 2546 -1.09 0.2742 0.739 
Scenario D first second 0.2240 0.2760 2546 0.81 0.4171 1.251 
Scenario E first second -0.1557 0.2683 2546 -0.58 0.5617 0.856 
Scenario F first second 0.4729 0.2663 2546 1.78 0.0760 1.605 
 
 
b. By Role 
Simple 
Effect Level Scenario Scenario Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first A B -1.0572 0.2147 2546 -4.92 <.0001 0.347 
Role first A C -0.6937 0.2101 2546 -3.30 0.0010 0.500 
Role first A D -1.2721 0.2191 2546 -5.81 <.0001 0.280 
Role first A E -0.4448 0.2017 2546 -2.20 0.0275 0.641 
Role first A F -1.2767 0.2106 2546 -6.06 <.0001 0.279 
Role first B C 0.3635 0.2174 2546 1.67 0.0946 1.438 
Role first B D -0.2149 0.2230 2546 -0.96 0.3354 0.807 
Role first B E 0.6124 0.2091 2546 2.93 0.0034 1.845 
Role first B F -0.2195 0.2146 2546 -1.02 0.3065 0.803 
Role first C D -0.5784 0.2214 2546 -2.61 0.0090 0.561 
Role first C E 0.2489 0.2041 2546 1.22 0.2228 1.283 
Role first C F -0.5830 0.2131 2546 -2.74 0.0063 0.558 
Role first D E 0.8273 0.2136 2546 3.87 0.0001 2.287 
Role first D F -0.00463 0.2190 2546 -0.02 0.9831 0.995 
Role first E F -0.8319 0.2049 2546 -4.06 <.0001 0.435 
Role second A B 0.1925 0.2050 2546 0.94 0.3478 1.212 
Role second A C -0.1955 0.2147 2546 -0.91 0.3626 0.822 
Role second A D -0.2470 0.2062 2546 -1.20 0.2310 0.781 
Role second A E 0.2006 0.2112 2546 0.95 0.3424 1.222 
Role second A F -0.00277 0.2025 2546 -0.01 0.9891 0.997 
Role second B C -0.3880 0.2049 2546 -1.89 0.0585 0.678 
Role second B D -0.4394 0.1947 2546 -2.26 0.0241 0.644 
Role second B E 0.008107 0.2013 2546 0.04 0.9679 1.008 
Role second B F -0.1952 0.1906 2546 -1.02 0.3057 0.823 
Role second C D -0.05147 0.2058 2546 -0.25 0.8025 0.950 
Role second C E 0.3961 0.2112 2546 1.88 0.0608 1.486 
Role second C F 0.1927 0.2024 2546 0.95 0.3411 1.213 
Role second D E 0.4476 0.2028 2546 2.21 0.0274 1.564 
Role second D F 0.2442 0.1918 2546 1.27 0.2030 1.277 
Role second E F -0.2033 0.1990 2546 -1.02 0.3069 0.816 
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Table 37: LSM estimates of Scenario*Breadth and Scenario*Role in licensing 
occurrence (aggregate data) 
a. Scenario*Breadth Least Squares Means 
Scenario Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
A broad -0.6384 0.1730 2546 -3.69 0.0002 0.3456 0.03913 
A narrow 0.07377 0.1755 2546 0.42 0.6743 0.5184 0.04382 
B broad 0.4120 0.1730 2546 2.38 0.0173 0.6016 0.04147 
B narrow -0.1119 0.1688 2546 -0.66 0.5074 0.4720 0.04207 
C broad 0.2911 0.1731 2546 1.68 0.0927 0.5723 0.04236 
C narrow 0.03347 0.1781 2546 0.19 0.8510 0.5084 0.04451 
D broad 0.6719 0.1740 2546 3.86 0.0001 0.6619 0.03893 
D narrow 0.2825 0.1740 2546 1.62 0.1046 0.5702 0.04264 
E broad -0.3399 0.1698 2546 -2.00 0.0455 0.4158 0.04126 
E narrow 0.01951 0.1672 2546 0.12 0.9071 0.5049 0.04180 
F broad 0.4576 0.1652 2546 2.77 0.0056 0.6124 0.03921 
F narrow 0.2572 0.1683 2546 1.53 0.1265 0.5640 0.04139 
 
b. Scenario*Role Least Squares Means 
Scenario Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
A first -0.6829 0.1935 2546 -3.53 0.0004 0.3356 0.04315 
A second 0.1182 0.1972 2546 0.60 0.5489 0.5295 0.04913 
B first 0.3744 0.1998 2546 1.87 0.0611 0.5925 0.04823 
B second -0.07424 0.1853 2546 -0.40 0.6887 0.4814 0.04626 
C first 0.01083 0.1964 2546 0.06 0.9560 0.5027 0.04911 
C second 0.3137 0.1966 2546 1.60 0.1107 0.5778 0.04797 
D first 0.5892 0.2049 2546 2.88 0.0041 0.6432 0.04701 
D second 0.3652 0.1863 2546 1.96 0.0501 0.5903 0.04506 
E first -0.2381 0.1873 2546 -1.27 0.2037 0.4408 0.04616 
E second -0.08235 0.1934 2546 -0.43 0.6703 0.4794 0.04828 
F first 0.5938 0.1955 2546 3.04 0.0024 0.6442 0.04481 
F second 0.1210 0.1823 2546 0.66 0.5069 0.5302 0.04540 
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Table 38: Frequency table of patent challenge decision 
a. Table of License by challenge 
License challenge 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 Total 
No 370 
10.71 
46.48 
15.85 
426 
12.33 
53.52 
38.04 
796 
23.05 
 
 
Yes 1964 
56.86 
73.89 
84.15 
694 
20.09 
26.11 
61.96 
2658 
76.95 
 
 
Total 2334 
67.57 
1120 
32.43 
3454 
100.00 
 
b. Table of Scenario by challenge 
Scenario challenge 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 Total 
A 344 
9.96 
59.72 
14.74 
232 
6.72 
40.28 
20.71 
576 
16.68 
 
 
B 392 
11.35 
68.17 
16.80 
183 
5.30 
31.83 
16.34 
575 
16.65 
 
 
C 390 
11.29 
67.83 
16.71 
185 
5.36 
32.17 
16.52 
575 
16.65 
 
 
D 426 
12.33 
73.96 
18.25 
150 
4.34 
26.04 
13.39 
576 
16.68 
 
 
E 356 
10.31 
61.81 
15.25 
220 
6.37 
38.19 
19.64 
576 
16.68 
 
 
F 426 
12.33 
73.96 
18.25 
150 
4.34 
26.04 
13.39 
576 
16.68 
 
 
Total 2334 
67.57 
1120 
32.43 
3454 
100.00 
 
c. Table of Breadth by challenge 
Breadth challenge 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 Total 
broad 799 
23.13 
46.27 
34.23 
928 
26.87 
53.73 
82.86 
1727 
50.00 
 
 
narrow 1535 
44.44 
88.88 
65.77 
192 
5.56 
11.12 
17.14 
1727 
50.00 
 
 
Total 2334 
67.57 
1120 
32.43 
3454 
100.00 
 
d. Table of Type by challenge 
Type challenge 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col 0 1 Total 
same 777 
22.50 
67.45 
33.29 
375 
10.86 
32.55 
33.48 
1152 
33.35 
 
 
strong 821 
23.77 
71.39 
35.18 
329 
9.53 
28.61 
29.38 
1150 
33.29 
 
 
weak 736 
21.31 
63.89 
31.53 
416 
12.04 
36.11 
37.14 
1152 
33.35 
 
 
Total 2334 
67.57 
1120 
32.43 
3454 
100.00 
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Table 39: LSM estimates and differences of estimates for patent challenge behavior 
in Scenario A 
License Least Squares Means 
License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
No 0.7410 0.2369 476 3.13 0.0019 0.6772 0.05179 
Yes -1.0477 0.1542 476 -6.80 <.0001 0.2597 0.02964 
 
 
Differences of License Least Squares Means 
License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
No Yes 1.7887 0.2886 476 6.20 <.0001 5.982 
 
 
Type Least Squares Means 
Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
same -0.3797 0.2010 476 -1.89 0.0595 0.4062 0.04848 
strong -0.5059 0.2054 476 -2.46 0.0141 0.3762 0.04819 
weak 0.4256 0.2046 476 2.08 0.0380 0.6048 0.04889 
 
 
Differences of Type Least Squares Means 
Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
same strong 0.1262 0.2570 476 0.49 0.6236 1.135 
same weak -0.8052 0.2585 476 -3.12 0.0019 0.447 
strong weak -0.9314 0.2612 476 -3.57 0.0004 0.394 
 
 
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 1.2752 0.1873 476 6.81 <.0001 0.7816 0.03196 
narrow -1.5819 0.1877 476 -8.43 <.0001 0.1705 0.02654 
 
 
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow 2.8571 0.2531 476 11.29 <.0001 17.410 
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Table 40: LSM estimates for patent challenge in Scenario B 
Role*License Least Squares Means 
Role License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first No 0.8797 0.3714 471 2.37 0.0183 0.7068 0.07697 
first Yes -2.5533 0.3425 471 -7.45 <.0001 0.07221 0.02295 
second No 0.3297 0.3961 471 0.83 0.4056 0.5817 0.09638 
second Yes -1.2001 0.1861 471 -6.45 <.0001 0.2315 0.03310 
 
 
Breadth*Type Least Squares Means 
Breadth Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad same 0.6097 0.2750 471 2.22 0.0271 0.6479 0.06274 
broad strong 1.0524 0.2766 471 3.81 0.0002 0.7412 0.05305 
broad weak 0.6914 0.2758 471 2.51 0.0125 0.6663 0.06132 
narrow same -2.4454 0.4138 471 -5.91 <.0001 0.07977 0.03038 
narrow strong -2.6034 0.4121 471 -6.32 <.0001 0.06892 0.02644 
narrow weak -1.1207 0.3236 471 -3.46 0.0006 0.2459 0.06000 
 
 
Role*Breadth Least Squares Means 
Role Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first broad 1.2227 0.3097 471 3.95 <.0001 0.7725 0.05442 
first narrow -2.8963 0.4095 471 -7.07 <.0001 0.05234 0.02031 
second broad 0.3463 0.2556 471 1.35 0.1761 0.5857 0.06203 
second narrow -1.2167 0.2874 471 -4.23 <.0001 0.2285 0.05067 
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Table 41: Simple effect comparisons of LSM for patent challenge in Scenario B 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*License Least Squares Means By Role 
Simple 
Effect Level License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first No Yes 3.4330 0.5600 471 6.13 <.0001 30.968 
Role second No Yes 1.5298 0.4255 471 3.60 0.0004 4.617 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*License Least Squares Means By License 
Simple 
Effect Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
License No first second 0.5500 0.5429 471 1.01 0.3115 1.733 
License Yes first second -1.3532 0.3856 471 -3.51 0.0005 0.258 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad same strong -0.4427 0.3242 471 -1.37 0.1727 0.642 
Breadth broad same weak -0.08174 0.3304 471 -0.25 0.8047 0.922 
Breadth broad strong weak 0.3610 0.3261 471 1.11 0.2688 1.435 
Breadth narrow same strong 0.1579 0.5461 471 0.29 0.7726 1.171 
Breadth narrow same weak -1.3247 0.4787 471 -2.77 0.0059 0.266 
Breadth narrow strong weak -1.4826 0.4834 471 -3.07 0.0023 0.227 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Type 
Simple Effect 
Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Type same broad narrow 3.0552 0.5009 471 6.10 <.0001 21.224 
Type strong broad narrow 3.6558 0.5107 471 7.16 <.0001 38.699 
Type weak broad narrow 1.8122 0.4189 471 4.33 <.0001 6.124 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth Least Squares Means By Role 
Simple 
Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first broad narrow 4.1190 0.5747 471 7.17 <.0001 61.499 
Role second broad narrow 1.5631 0.3064 471 5.10 <.0001 4.773 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad first second 0.8764 0.4008 471 2.19 0.0293 2.402 
Breadth narrow first second -1.6796 0.4944 471 -3.40 0.0007 0.186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
176 
Table 42: LSM estimates for patent challenge in Scenario C 
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 0.9247 0.1846 473 5.01 <.0001 0.7160 0.03754 
narrow -2.4951 0.2426 473 -10.28 <.0001 0.07620 0.01708 
 
 
License Least Squares Means 
License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
No 0.4875 0.2229 473 2.19 0.0292 0.6195 0.05254 
Yes -2.0579 0.2011 473 -10.23 <.0001 0.1133 0.02020 
 
 
Role*Type Least Squares Means 
Role Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first same -0.4512 0.2827 473 -1.60 0.1112 0.3891 0.06720 
first strong -0.7345 0.2907 473 -2.53 0.0118 0.3242 0.06369 
first weak -0.9440 0.2878 473 -3.28 0.0011 0.2801 0.05803 
second same -0.6382 0.2844 473 -2.24 0.0253 0.3457 0.06433 
second strong -1.9102 0.3527 473 -5.42 <.0001 0.1290 0.03962 
second weak -0.03326 0.2751 473 -0.12 0.9038 0.4917 0.06875 
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Table 43: Difference of LSM and Simple effect comparisons for patent challenge in 
Scenario C 
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow 3.4198 0.3344 473 10.23 <.0001 30.562 
 
 
Differences of License Least Squares Means 
License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
No Yes 2.5454 0.3259 473 7.81 <.0001 12.749 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Type Least Squares Means By Role 
Simple 
Effect Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first same strong 0.2834 0.3903 473 0.73 0.4682 1.328 
Role first same weak 0.4928 0.3902 473 1.26 0.2072 1.637 
Role first strong weak 0.2095 0.3916 473 0.53 0.5930 1.233 
Role second same strong 1.2721 0.4366 473 2.91 0.0037 3.568 
Role second same weak -0.6049 0.3825 473 -1.58 0.1144 0.546 
Role second strong weak -1.8770 0.4356 473 -4.31 <.0001 0.153 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Type Least Squares Means By Type 
Simple Effect 
Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Type same first second 0.1870 0.3944 473 0.47 0.6356 1.206 
Type strong first second 1.1757 0.4439 473 2.65 0.0084 3.240 
Type weak first second -0.9107 0.3922 473 -2.32 0.0207 0.402 
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Table 44: LSM estimates and differences of LSM for patent challenge in Scenario D 
License Least Squares Means 
License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
No 0.1697 0.2610 478 0.65 0.5160 0.5423 0.06479 
Yes -2.2760 0.2184 478 -10.42 <.0001 0.09313 0.01845 
 
 
Differences of License Least Squares Means 
License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
No Yes 2.4456 0.3405 478 7.18 <.0001 11.538 
 
 
Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 0.5578 0.1966 478 2.84 0.0048 0.6359 0.04553 
narrow -2.6640 0.2757 478 -9.66 <.0001 0.06513 0.01678 
 
 
Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow 3.2218 0.3371 478 9.56 <.0001 25.073 
 
 
Role Least Squares Means 
Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first -1.3493 0.2148 47 -6.28 <.0001 0.2060 0.03512 
second -0.7570 0.2206 47 -3.43 0.0013 0.3193 0.04796 
 
 
Differences of Role Least Squares Means 
Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
first second -0.5923 0.2719 47 -2.18 0.0344 0.553 
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Table 45: LSM estimates for patent challenge under Scenario E 
License Least Squares Means 
License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
No 0.2427 0.2949 470 0.82 0.4110 0.5604 0.07266 
Yes -1.2317 0.2000 470 -6.16 <.0001 0.2259 0.03498 
 
 
Breadth*Type Least Squares Means 
Breadth Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad same 1.3445 0.3026 470 4.44 <.0001 0.7932 0.04962 
broad strong 0.7511 0.2859 470 2.63 0.0089 0.6794 0.06228 
broad weak 1.2801 0.3075 470 4.16 <.0001 0.7825 0.05235 
narrow same -2.1469 0.4061 470 -5.29 <.0001 0.1046 0.03804 
narrow strong -3.2491 0.5419 470 -6.00 <.0001 0.03736 0.01949 
narrow weak -0.9469 0.3220 470 -2.94 0.0034 0.2795 0.06485 
 
 
Order*Type Least Squares Means 
Order Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
f same -0.4025 0.4594 470 -0.88 0.3814 0.4007 0.1103 
f strong -1.8991 0.5504 470 -3.45 0.0006 0.1302 0.06234 
f weak 0.4153 0.4040 470 1.03 0.3045 0.6024 0.09676 
r same -0.3999 0.2677 470 -1.49 0.1360 0.4013 0.06433 
r strong -0.5989 0.2844 470 -2.11 0.0358 0.3546 0.06509 
r weak -0.08210 0.2506 470 -0.33 0.7434 0.4795 0.06255 
 
 
Role*Breadth Least Squares Means 
Role Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first broad 1.2410 0.2760 470 4.50 <.0001 0.7757 0.04801 
first narrow -2.4847 0.3940 470 -6.31 <.0001 0.07694 0.02798 
second broad 1.0095 0.2646 470 3.82 0.0002 0.7329 0.05179 
second narrow -1.7439 0.3335 470 -5.23 <.0001 0.1488 0.04224 
 
 
Order*Breadth Least Squares Means 
Order Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
f broad 1.3103 0.3355 470 3.91 0.0001 0.7876 0.05613 
f narrow -2.5679 0.5063 470 -5.07 <.0001 0.07123 0.03349 
r broad 0.9401 0.2187 470 4.30 <.0001 0.7191 0.04417 
r narrow -1.6607 0.2554 470 -6.50 <.0001 0.1597 0.03426 
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Table 46: Difference of LSM and simple effect comparisons of LSM for patent 
challenge under Scenario E 
Differences of License Least Squares Means 
License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
No Yes 1.4744 0.3070 470 4.80 <.0001 4.369 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad same strong 0.5934 0.3592 470 1.65 0.0992 1.810 
Breadth broad same weak 0.06444 0.3612 470 0.18 0.8585 1.067 
Breadth broad strong weak -0.5289 0.3577 470 -1.48 0.1399 0.589 
Breadth narrow same strong 1.1022 0.6056 470 1.82 0.0694 3.011 
Breadth narrow same weak -1.2000 0.4655 470 -2.58 0.0102 0.301 
Breadth narrow strong weak -2.3022 0.5742 470 -4.01 <.0001 0.100 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*Type Least Squares Means By Type 
Simple Effect 
Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Type same broad narrow 3.4914 0.4591 470 7.60 <.0001 32.832 
Type strong broad narrow 4.0002 0.5642 470 7.09 <.0001 54.610 
Type weak broad narrow 2.2269 0.3840 470 5.80 <.0001 9.271 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Type Least Squares Means By Order 
Simple 
Effect 
Level Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Order f same strong 1.4966 0.6260 470 2.39 0.0172 4.466 
Order f same weak -0.8178 0.5394 470 -1.52 0.1301 0.441 
Order f strong weak -2.3144 0.6172 470 -3.75 0.0002 0.099 
Order r same strong 0.1990 0.3442 470 0.58 0.5634 1.220 
Order r same weak -0.3178 0.3078 470 -1.03 0.3024 0.728 
Order r strong weak -0.5168 0.3268 470 -1.58 0.1145 0.596 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Type Least Squares Means By Type 
Simple Effect 
Level Order Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Type same f r -0.00265 0.5132 470 -0.01 0.9959 0.997 
Type strong f r -1.3002 0.5790 470 -2.25 0.0252 0.272 
Type weak f r 0.4974 0.4504 470 1.10 0.2700 1.644 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth Least Squares Means By Role 
Simple 
Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Role first broad narrow 3.7257 0.4307 470 8.65 <.0001 41.499 
Role second broad narrow 2.7534 0.3703 470 7.44 <.0001 15.696 
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Table 46: Difference of LSM and simple effect comparisons of LSM for patent 
challenge under Scenario E (contd.) 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Role*Breadth Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad first second 0.2314 0.3277 470 0.71 0.4803 1.260 
Breadth narrow first second -0.7408 0.4348 470 -1.70 0.0891 0.477 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Breadth Least Squares Means By Order 
Simple 
Effect 
Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Order f broad narrow 3.8782 0.5545 470 6.99 <.0001 48.338 
Order r broad narrow 2.6008 0.2848 470 9.13 <.0001 13.475 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Order*Breadth Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level Order Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad f r 0.3702 0.3684 470 1.00 0.3155 1.448 
Breadth narrow f r -0.9072 0.5470 470 -1.66 0.0979 0.404 
 
 
Table 47: LSM estimates and simple effect comparison of LSM for patent challenge 
under Scenario F 
Breadth*License Least Squares Means 
Breadth License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad No 1.9048 0.4758 477 4.00 <.0001 0.8704 0.05366 
broad Yes -0.5647 0.1687 477 -3.35 0.0009 0.3625 0.03898 
narrow No -2.3752 0.4988 477 -4.76 <.0001 0.08509 0.03883 
narrow Yes -2.6124 0.2706 477 -9.65 <.0001 0.06835 0.01723 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*License Least Squares Means By Breadth 
Simple Effect 
Level License License Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
Breadth broad No Yes 2.4695 0.4910 477 5.03 <.0001 11.816 
Breadth narrow No Yes 0.2372 0.5546 477 0.43 0.6691 1.268 
 
 
Simple Effect Comparisons of Breadth*License Least Squares Means By License 
Simple 
Effect Level Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
License No broad narrow 4.2799 0.6636 477 6.45 <.0001 72.235 
License Yes broad narrow 2.0477 0.2856 477 7.17 <.0001 7.750 
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Table 48: Frequency table of litigation decision 
a. Table of License by litigation 
License litigation 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col  0 1 Total 
No 71 
6.34 
16.67 
39.89 
355 
31.70 
83.33 
37.69 
426 
38.04 
 
 
Yes 107 
9.55 
15.42 
60.11 
587 
52.41 
84.58 
62.31 
694 
61.96 
 
 
Total 178 
15.89 
942 
84.11 
1120 
100.00 
 
b. Table of Scenario by litigation 
Scenario litigation 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col  0 1 Total 
A 33 
2.95 
14.22 
18.54 
199 
17.77 
85.78 
21.13 
232 
20.71 
 
 
B 33 
2.95 
18.03 
18.54 
150 
13.39 
81.97 
15.92 
183 
16.34 
 
 
C 27 
2.41 
14.59 
15.17 
158 
14.11 
85.41 
16.77 
185 
16.52 
 
 
D 25 
2.23 
16.67 
14.04 
125 
11.16 
83.33 
13.27 
150 
13.39 
 
 
E 36 
3.21 
16.36 
20.22 
184 
16.43 
83.64 
19.53 
220 
19.64 
 
 
F 24 
2.14 
16.00 
13.48 
126 
11.25 
84.00 
13.38 
150 
13.39 
 
 
Total 178 
15.89 
942 
84.11 
1120 
100.00 
 
c. Table of Breadth by litigation 
Breadth litigation 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col  0 1 Total 
broad 168 
15.00 
18.10 
94.38 
760 
67.86 
81.90 
80.68 
928 
82.86 
 
 
narrow 10 
0.89 
5.21 
5.62 
182 
16.25 
94.79 
19.32 
192 
17.14 
 
 
Total 178 
15.89 
942 
84.11 
1120 
100.00 
 
d. Table of Type by litigation 
Type litigation 
1.Frequency 
2.% 
3.%Row 
4.%Col  0 1 Total 
same 72 
6.43 
19.20 
40.45 
303 
27.05 
80.80 
32.17 
375 
33.48 
 
 
strong 31 
2.77 
9.42 
17.42 
298 
26.61 
90.58 
31.63 
329 
29.38 
 
 
weak 75 
6.70 
18.03 
42.13 
341 
30.45 
81.97 
36.20 
416 
37.14 
 
 
Total 178 
15.89 
942 
84.11 
1120 
100.00 
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Table 49: Type III tests of Fixed Effects for patent litigation 
Effect 
Num 
DF 
Den 
DF F Value Pr > F 
Scenario 5 1015 1.61 0.1539 
Order 1 1015 5.29 0.0216 
Role 1 47 10.30 0.0024 
Breadth 1 1015 18.21 <.0001 
Type 2 1015 10.54 <.0001 
License 1 1015 0.01 0.9261 
 
Table 50: Differences of significant terms Order Least Squares Means 
a. Differences of Order Least Squares Means 
Order Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
f r 0.8727 0.3814 1021 2.29 0.0223 2.393 
 
b. Differences of Role Least Squares Means 
Role Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
first second -1.1129 0.3379 47 -3.29 0.0019 0.329 
 
c. Differences of Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
broad narrow -1.6789 0.3973 1021 -4.23 <.0001 0.187 
 
d. Differences of Type Least Squares Means 
Type Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
same strong -1.0058 0.2572 1021 -3.91 <.0001 0.366 
same weak 0.06207 0.2110 1021 0.29 0.7687 1.064 
strong weak 1.0678 0.2564 1021 4.17 <.0001 2.909 
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Table 51: LSM for patent litigation 
a. Order Least Squares Means 
Order Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
f 3.3963 0.3816 1021 8.90 <.0001 0.9676 0.01197 
r 2.5236 0.2602 1021 9.70 <.0001 0.9258 0.01788 
 
b. Role Least Squares Means 
Role Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
first 2.4035 0.2999 47 8.01 <.0001 0.9171 0.02281 
second 3.5164 0.3282 47 10.71 <.0001 0.9711 0.009196 
 
c. Breadth Least Squares Means 
Breadth Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
broad 2.1205 0.1974 1021 10.74 <.0001 0.8929 0.01888 
narrow 3.7994 0.4249 1021 8.94 <.0001 0.9781 0.009099 
 
d. Type Least Squares Means 
Type Estimate 
Standard 
Error DF t Value Pr > |t| Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
same 2.6454 0.2855 1021 9.27 <.0001 0.9337 0.01767 
strong 3.6511 0.3306 1021 11.05 <.0001 0.9747 0.008153 
weak 2.5833 0.2809 1021 9.20 <.0001 0.9298 0.01834 
 
 
